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STRENTHENING OF ANTI CORRUPTION COMMISSION AND LAWS IN 
NIGERIA 
 
Fatima Waziri, S.J.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
 
 
 
This S.J.D. dissertation explores the role of law in challenging and curbing public 
corruption in Nigeria through the use of anti corruption agencies and laws. A comparative 
approach is used that draws upon development from other jurisdictions to illuminate issues in 
the Nigerian context. More broadly, this S.J.D. dissertation examined and analyzed the major 
anti corruption agencies and laws in Nigeria (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, Code of Conduct 
Bureau) and their approach towards corruption and democratic process. I also examined the 
role Freedom of Information Law plays in curbing corruption and promoting transparency, 
twelve years after the Freedom of Information Bill was first presented to the Nigerian 
National Assembly, it was finally passed into law May, 2011. 
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The main text of this dissertation is comprised of an introductory chapter that defines 
corruption and related concepts. The next chapter sets the tone of Nigeria as a nation leading 
into the Nigerian legal system and their jurisdiction in hearing corruption cases. Chapter five 
introduces the anti corruption agencies in Nigeria, past and present. Chapter six deals with 
United States of America’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), its effects on Nigeria and 
the controversy caused by the exception of FCPA Act called facilitation payment. The last 
chapter analyzes the present anticorruption agencies and their laws, proffering 
recommendations and also the Freedom of Information law in Nigeria while drawing 
developments from India’s Right to Information Act and South Africa’s Promotion of Access 
to Information Act. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY  
 
“The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is a 
failure of governance at the local, state, and federal level,  and some of that is due, as you know 
so well, to corruption, others of it to a lack of capacity or mismanagement.”“We think its good 
business to eliminate corrupt practices. It is better for competition, it’s better for the trade and 
investment environment, it’s better for Nigeria’s reputation as a place to do business without 
heavy transaction costs that corruption call on a company to make. So we will do what we can to 
prosecute those who cross the line who have any American connection, and we want to see 
reinstatement of a vigorous corruption commission”.1 
 
 
Some years ago in Nigeria, I was watching the local news on television and there was the 
President of Nigeria at that time in the midst of elementary school children celebrating children’s 
day which is celebrated on May 27th of every year. The President asked a few of the elementary 
school children what they wanted their career paths to be when they grow up and to my chagrin, 
one child said “I want to be the President of Nigeria” another child said “I want to be appointed a 
minister of government” another said “I want to be a politician so I can make plenty and plenty 
of money”. I sat there asking myself what has happened to occupations like being a doctor, 
lawyer, teacher, nurse, engineer e.t.c.  Even the young already have this mindset that one has to 
be a public office holder to be successful or to be rich 
                                                          
1 See Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Address on her visit to Nigeria (August 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/08/127830.htm. 
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Corruption is so widespread that each country has developed its own terminology to 
describe these practices; egunje in Nigeria, mordida in Mexico2, arreglo in Philippines3, 
baksheesh in Egypt4, dash in Kenya5, pot-de-vin in France6 steekpenning in The Netherlands7, 
tangente in Italy8. All these phrases or slangs as it were, are used to refer to bribe such as money 
or a favor, offered or given to a person in a position of trust to influence that person's views or 
conduct. Corruption is not a novel concern in the world today. Volumes of literature have 
already been written about this intriguing topic globally and tons of conferences have been and 
are still been organized to address this menace. It is an everyday occurrence in countries 
throughout the world, whether developed or under developed.  
Corruption has become a global phenomenon and no country is completely corrupt free.  
However, corruption is apparent in some countries than others because those countries with less 
corruption have learnt to manage corruption than others by putting the necessary checks and 
balances in place and curbing the opportunities of corruption while others have either not figured 
corruption out or lack the political will to do same. The use of public power and resources in a 
manner that advances individual, factional, ethnic, religious or other limited interests at the 
expense of more broad based social, national or global needs is corruption because power and 
public resources are appropriated towards private purposes and gains. Theft, bribery, extortion, 
patronage, nepotism, and other practices grouped together as corruption.  
 
                                                          
2 http://www.mexicomatters.net/retirementmexico/04_bribeslamordidainmexico.php. 
3 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, U.C. Press 19 (1988). 
4 http://www.publicradio.org/columns/marketplace/middleeast/2008/03/baksheeshor_bribery.html. 
5 http://www.aidworkers.net/?q=node/238. 
6 http://www.allwords.com/word-bribe.html. 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
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In Nigeria, corruption has become a part and parcel of the society, which (corruption) 
appears to be out of control.9 The present chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission, Mrs. Farida Waziri, recently voiced out her concerns at the level of corruption in 
Nigeria  by stating that the “endemic corruption cases in the country has overwhelmed the 
commission‘s workforce”. She said with a population of one hundred and forty million, the 
commission‘s one thousand five hundred operatives finds the task of prosecuting corruption 
cases daunting.10 From my experience, research and interviews, I can attest to the fact that 
corruption in Nigeria is indeed out of control and one of the greatest challenges of our 
generation, which will not be very easy to tackle.11  
Public corruption has long been a fact of life in Nigeria as shall be discussed in later 
chapters, elections are often fraught with fraud, intimidation, and violence, politicians embezzle 
money from infrastructural services and programmes. Corruption can be found in almost every 
facet of the society but it is most imbedded in the public sector of the country which will be my 
area of focus. Throughout the existence of Nigeria as a sovereign nation, it has experienced 
corruption which has been traced to traditional and colonial power structures. The military 
overthrew the government of the first republic in 1965 claiming that it wanted to rid the country 
of corruption but the military regimes also proved to be corrupt. The story still remains the same 
today; endemic, entrenched, systemic corruption is the order of the day in the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. In depth discussion is contained in chapter one of this dissertation.  
                                                          
9 Nuhu Ribadu is a visiting Fellow at St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, visiting Fellow at the Center for 
Global Development and former Executive Chairman, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of 
Nigeria. Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee: Capital Loss and Corruption: The Example of 
Nigeria (May 19, 2009). 
10 The Punch Newspaper, We are overwhelmed by Corruption Cases (May 22, 2010). 
11 See Appendix 2 for list of pending corruption cases in Court. 
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 Countries suffering from corruption cannot make the best use of their human and natural 
resources and are likely to remain vulnerable to and dependent upon outside interests and 
markets.12 Evidently, corruption is a cost to Nigeria in many ways like the subversion of 
development plans, the diversion of human and natural resources that may have been invested in 
a productive way, as well as upsetting the normal operation of markets. Nigeria has an 
impressive array of structures, institutions and laws aimed at combating corruption, The Code of 
Conduct Bureau (CCB), Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) are anti 
corruption commissions in Nigeria. However, these institutions fall short of the standards and 
requirements of an effective anti-corruption regime as demanded by the anti-corruption 
conventions,13 such as the lack of independence and non partisanship of the officers, lack of 
access to information, enforcement capabilities, funding and a proactive community. These 
lapses I shall discuss further in later chapters of my research.  
My dissertation focuses on the public and government sphere, my focus on public sector 
corruption is justified by the statistical evidence which demonstrates a correlation between the 
extent of the government involvement in the economy and corruption. Having said that, it is 
important to note that public authority is not the only reason for corruption in Nigeria. I shall be 
examining the anti corruption commissions and relevant anticorruption laws we have in Nigeria.  
                                                          
12 Johnston M, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America, Monterey, CA: Brooks- Cole (1982). 
13 See the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences & the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.  The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(AU Convention) was adopted in Maputo on 11 July 2003. It represents regional consensus on what African states 
should do in the areas of prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset recovery. The United 
Nations Convention against Corruption was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 31 October2003 
(Resolution 58/4).To combat corruption it includes measures on prevention, criminalization, international 
cooperation and  asset recovery. The treaty entered into force on 14 December 2005, following the 30th ratification 
by Ecuador. Nigeria is a signatory to this Convention. 
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I shall also examine other aspects of the society that contribute to widespread corruption. My 
dissertation will be a combination of detailed explication and analysis of jurisdictions such as 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Africa India and the United States.  
The number of indices focused on corruption measurement has grown over the years of 
which Nigeria constantly ranges amongst the most corrupt countries in the world. They range 
from some of the most established and widely used indicators like Transparency International’s 
(TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)14 and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)15, to a newer generation of measurement and assessment tools like the Mo 
Ibrahim’s Index of African Governance16 and the Global Integrity Report.17 An immediate 
problem for any comparative empirical work is that governance quality and particularly 
corruption cannot be directly measured and so alternative indicators have to be constructed using 
subjective judgments. These indicators have been accused of been biased and subjective as 
pointed out by individuals I have spoken to. However, just as it is difficult to define corruption 
across different cultures and political environments, it is also not easy to measure its extent. 
                                                          
14 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 
15 The WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries 
since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators are based on several 
hundred variables obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey 
respondents, nongovernmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector 
organizations worldwide. in percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries 
worldwide, Nigeria’s aggregate governance indicators  from 2000 – 2009 are 7,(there was no indicator for 
2001),2,5,7,9,11,15,21 and 15 respectively. Index is available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
16 Under this index, 2010, Nigeria’s total score was 43 in a scale of 0 - 100. Fundamentally, the Min–Max method 
involves re-scaling the raw data values to a scale of 0–100, for every indicator, for every country, and for every year. 
Index available at  http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index 
17 In 2008, Nigeria’s overall rating was 64 of 100 which was regarded as weak. Each country assessment contained 
in the Global Integrity Report comprises two core elements: a qualitative Reporter's Notebook and a quantitative 
Integrity Indicators scorecard, the data from which is aggregated and used to generate the cross-country Global 
Integrity Index. An Integrity Indicators scorecard assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key 
governance and anti-corruption mechanisms through more than 300 actionable indicators. It examines issues such as 
transparency of the public procurement process, media freedom, asset disclosure requirements, and conflicts of 
interest regulations. Scorecards take into account both existing legal measures on the books and de facto realities of 
practical implementation in each country. They are scored by a lead in-country researcher and blindly reviewed by a 
panel of peer reviewers, a mix of other in-country experts as well as outside experts. Index available at  
http://report.globalintegrity.org/Nigeria/2008 
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Instead, the most common measures work indirectly, based not on registering specific corrupt 
acts but people’s perceptions of the extent of corruption.  
As already stated, one of the most widely cited examples is the ‘Corruption Perception 
Index’ (CPI) produced by Transparency International (TI)  an international organization and 
Nigeria has consistently ranked low in the Corruption Perceptions Index ranking. The annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) first released in 1995, is the best known of Transparency 
International’s tools for measuring the level of corruption in countries. It ranks one hundred and 
eighty countries by their perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert assessments and 
opinion surveys.18 TI gathers data from sources that span the last two years and the CPI is 
calculated using data from thirteen sources originated from eleven independent institutions. All 
sources measure the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public 
and political sectors and all sources provide a ranking of countries which include an assessment 
of multiple countries.19 
Evaluation of the extent of corruption in countries is done by country experts, nonresident 
and residents consisting of the following sources; Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment, Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Global Insight and Merchant 
International Group. Additional sources are resident business leaders evaluating their own 
country consisting of the following sources.20 Institute for Management Development (IMD), 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and The World Economic Forum. 
To determine the mean value for a country, standardization is carried out via a matching 
percentiles technique and this uses the ranks of countries reported by each individual source. 
                                                          
18 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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This method is useful for combining sources that have a different distribution. While there is 
some information loss in this technique, it allows all reported scores to remain within the bounds 
of the CPI, that is to say, to remain between zero and ten. A beta-transformation is then 
performed on scores. This increases the standard deviation among all countries included in the 
CPI and avoids the process by which the matching percentiles technique results in a smaller 
standard deviation from year to year. All of the standardized values for a country are then 
averaged, to determine a country's score. The CPI score and rank are accompanied by the 
number of sources, high-low range, standard deviation and confidence range for each country.21  
For the purpose of my dissertation, I shall be using the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The mainstream of this line of thought is due to the fact that this 
metric of measuring corruption is a perception based indicator, they rely on the subjective 
opinions as well as perceptions of levels of corruption in a given country among experts and 
citizens.  The use of this indicator has been largely embraced by Nigerians in watching the 
corruption scale in Nigeria.  In addition, based on my first hand experience of systematic 
corruption in Nigeria, it is my believe that the ranking of Nigeria by Transparency International 
and other corruption indexes is  not far from what is actually obtainable in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Id.  
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effectively. It helps combat corruption in procurement, promote civil society participation and 
oversight to strengthen accountability at country and project levels, address governance issues 
coupled with corruption risks in sectors such as infrastructure, health, education, and natural 
resources.22  
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 
 
 
 It is trite that corruption is a global phenomenon. However, I believe that combating 
corruption entails changing the opportunities and/or incentives that foster it plus tightening loose 
ends of anti corruption laws already in place and enforcing thus. Coercive measures that seek to 
raise the cost of corrupt behavior by increasing the certainty as well as severity of punishment 
need to be taken, legal sanctions and decrees predominate among the coercive measures. My 
work is unique because in Nigeria there is hardly any scholarship that seeks to strengthen the anti 
corruption commissions and laws, moreover history has shown that there have been various anti 
corruption regimes that have recorded little or no success in the past. 
 It is worthy to note that with prevailing conditions such as  ethnic and religious conflict, 
conflict over natural resources and bad governance in Nigeria, corruption will be difficult to 
                                                          
22http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=368929&pagePK=141143&piPK=141103&theSitePK=
368896. 
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evade, let alone control. The shortages of consumer goods, lack of access to good education and 
employment opportunities mean that playing by the rules is to invite failure and disappointments. 
Where instability exists, corruption prevails. Take for instance in Nigeria, the members of the 
police force, staff of some government institution, teachers at the elementary and secondary 
schools,  university professors  are poorly paid, which means that these groups of persons will be  
susceptible to corruption in order to meet their daily economic needs. 
Corruption is responsible for the perpetual collapse of infrastructure and institutions, it is 
behind the underdevelopment and cyclical failure of democracy in Nigeria.23 Corruption stands 
in the way of people having access to goods and services that they need to maintain a decent 
standard of living. In Nigeria today, some political factions (a comprehensive list of all the 
political parties in Nigeria can be found at the Independent National Commission website),24 
have been involved in capturing the apparatus of government so as to employ the latter to 
generate benefits for themselves.25  
As argued by former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary 
Robinson, she posited that “analyzing corruption in the light of its impact on human rights could 
well strengthen public understanding of the evils of corruption and lead to a stronger sense of 
public rejection”.26  I believe that an analysis of corruption that borders on human rights will 
emphasize its harm to individuals by putting a human face to the ills of corruption thereby 
strengthening public support for anticorruption. When people become more aware of the damage 
corruption does to public and individual interests plus the harm that even minor corruption can 
cause, they are more likely to support campaigns and programmes to prevent it.  
                                                          
23 In the history of Nigeria, there has been various collapses of institutions due to corruption. I shall expatiate in later 
chapters. 
24 See http://www.inecnigeria.org/political/index.html. 
25 The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is known to be the most influential and corrupt party in Nigeria. There have 
been cases of PDP hijacking states during election time. 
26 Transparency International (TI), Global Corruption Report, Berlin (2004). 
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Corruption makes it possible for human rights violators to go unpunished by enjoying 
impunity, people do not have access to justice, are not secure and cannot protect their 
livelihoods. Court officials and the police pay more heed to bribes than to law. Hospitals do not 
attend to the sick because the medical staff pays more attention to patients who grease their 
palms.  Public clinics lack supplies due to corrupt public contracting procedures. Schools cannot 
offer their students a sound education because the education budget has been mismanaged, as a 
result teachers cannot be paid and books cannot be purchased. In numerous ways like this, 
corruption deprives vulnerable people of income, and prevents people from fulfilling their 
political, civil, social, cultural and economic rights.27 It is high time we refocus and give the 
issue of corruption the attention it rightly deserves, making corruption history is the surest way 
of solving most of the problems of Nigeria history.  
Against this backdrop, my dissertation draws best practices from different jurisdictions to 
come up with a Nigerian specific model. My research will be a great contribution to 
jurisprudence because it combines legal, historical, social and political perspectives in its final 
analysis. I looked at legal frame works, the past, the future looking for that missing link that is 
constantly preventing anti corruption framework in Nigeria from succeeding. This kind of 
interdisciplinary inquiry is very important in discerning the underlying limitations and restraint 
in the fight against corruption that has eaten so deep into the Nigeria society.  
Promoting accountability, transparency, human rights and rule of law in Nigeria, one of 
Africa’s most powerful and populous nations, would prompt positive development throughout 
the continent because Nigeria has contributed and is still contributing to the growth of Africa 
through its aid and assistance to other African countries in need by providing financial and 
                                                          
27 Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force on 23 March, 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
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military assistance as needed. The comparative aspects of my dissertation would foster 
international cooperation and knowledge sharing. 
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2.0 CORRUPTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
“The deterioration of every government begins with the decay of the principles on which it was 
founded”28 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Corruption has attracted a great deal of attention all over the world. In developed and 
developing countries, large or small, market-oriented or other- wise, governments have fallen 
because of accusations of corruption and gladly the amount of attention now paid to corruption is 
enormous. Corruption around the world is believed to be endemic, pervasive and a significant 
contributor to slow economic growth, it stifles investment and inhibits the provision of public 
services. It has increased inequality to such an extent that international organizations like the 
                                                          
28C.L. de Montesquieu, available at http://www.davar.net/QUOTES/GOVERN.HTM. 
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World Bank have identified corruption as ‘the single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development’.29 
In Nigeria, the level of corruption is incomprehensible and it exists in almost all spheres of 
government.  During the military era, corruption was a topic that was not discussed in the open 
even though most people knew it existed. However, after the democratic transition, people and 
organizations felt more comfortable and started to challenge the state of corruption in the 
country, because of the increase in recent years in the number of countries with democratic 
governments, free and active media has created an environment in which discussion of 
corruption is no longer forbidden. 
 
 
2.2 DEFINING CORRUPTION 
 
 
 There is no universally accepted definition of corruption. Hence, what amounts to 
corruption varies from one country to another, one legal system to another, communities and 
individuals. The term corruption has an assortment of meanings but for the purpose of my 
research, my focus shall be on public corruption which in broad terms is referred to as the abuse 
of public office for individual gain. Dictionary definitions of corruption vary; the Webster’s 
dictionary defines corruption as “inducement (as of a political official) by means of improper 
considerations (as bribery) to commit a violation of duty”.30 The Oxford dictionary definitions 
are broadly similar, but with stronger echoes of other meanings, in the Oxford version, corrupt 
                                                          
29 http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.ctm. 
30 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
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means “to destroy or pervert the integrity or fidelity of (a person) in his discharge of duty, to 
induce to act dishonestly or unfaithfully, to make venal, to bribe.31 Both definitions explicitly 
include bribery and encompass both the giving and receiving of bribes.  
At the home front, the 1999 Constitution establishes a Code of Conduct for public 
officers32 and made it a political objective33 for the state to abolish all corrupt practices and abuse 
of power. My main contention however with this constitutional definition is that it does not 
define or explain what can be termed as corrupt practices and this is a lacuna that should be 
addressed because like I have already pointed out corrupt practices defer amongst  individuals 
and having the constitution spell it out will erase any misconception.  
I believe that corruption should be described rather than defined, by putting a human face 
to corruption and personalizing issues drives home the ills and evil corruption causes.  In 
essence, I shall attempt to describe corruption. Imagine where government official loot 
government accounts for their own benefit and leave ordinary people to suffer the brunt of lack 
of necessary infrastructures like access to good education, health care, good roads, electricity and 
water. Imagine where a person cannot get the services they are entitled to unless they give bribes. 
Imagine not able to get a good job after graduation from college because you do not know a 
highly placed person. Imagine being scared of the police who are supposed to be the guardian of 
the society because of well too known police corruption. Imagine having bridges to nowhere 
because the government contractor designated to carry out the project squandered the funds 
allocated for the project. Imagine the many deaths that occur every day because the hospital are 
                                                          
31 The Oxford English Dictionary 
32 Constitution, Art. 66, 107, 172, 173, 209, 292 & 318 (1999 ) (Nigeria) & Fifth Schedule Part I of the Constitution. 
(1999 ) (Nigeria). 
33Constitution, Art. 15(5) & 60(a) (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
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under equipped, underfunded with striking doctors who have not been paid their salary in 
months; indeed these are everyday scenarios in Nigeria due to corruption. 
According to Nye,34 corruption is defined as “behavior which deviates from the formal 
duties of public role. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of 
ascriptive relationship rather than merit), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public 
resources for private- regarding uses)”.35  I particularly like Nye’s definition of corruption 
because it includes acts like nepotism which is often overlooked and in some cases not referred 
to as corruption as it is excusable in some cultures.   
In Nigeria, Nepotism is very common, it is not unusual to show favoritism in hiring 
practices by choosing a relative or friend over other more qualified candidates. However, some 
can argue that political patronage does not have to be based on personal relationships but on 
political contributions, either in the past or future to the person making the appointment, or, 
granting the benefits. 
 Another author Alam in his book called “Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the 
Political Economy of Underdevelopment”36 sees corruption as a deviation from the norms or 
practices of modern bureaucracy. I can relate to this definition because based on my personal 
experiences and the experiences of almost everyone I interviewed in Nigeria during the course of 
my research asserted that some government agencies they had dealt with in the past do not 
follow formal protocol or due process. Bureaucracy is essential and necessary for the operation 
of large organizations but it has been used to encourage inefficiency and rigidity in the Nigerian 
                                                          
34 Nye is a university distinguished service professor, the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations and 
the former Dean of the Kennedy School, Harvard University. 
35See  J.S Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost- Benefit Analysis, The American Political Science 
Review, 61, 2.at 419 (1967). 
36See the American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48, 4 at 441 -456 (1989). 
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public service. Because the Nigerian society has been excessively corrupt, the bureaucrats too 
have grown corruptible and corrupt. Thus in Nigeria, corruption is a permanent integral feature 
of bureaucracy and therefore not unusual to find the bureaucrats bending rules and jumping 
official procedures and protocols in order to achieve selfish ends.37 
 
2.3 PROGRESSION OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
  
 
No nation can make progress when its leaders are corrupt and unwilling to accept their 
mistakes like past Nigerian leaders. The former Executive Chairman of Nigeria’s anti corruption 
Commission the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Mr. Nuhu Ribadu estimated that 
Nigeria lost about  three hundred and eighty billion dollars to corruption and waste by those in 
government between 1960 and 1999,38  a figure he came up with by looking through records kept 
by the Nigerian central bank and the ministry of finance,39 he stated that Nigeria has nothing to 
show for the missing money and that probably half of it went into stealing.40  
Credible, popular, and accountable leadership is the fundamental prerequisite for unity, 
stability, and progress. When leaders manipulate information and statistics, wage a war against 
popular groups, their organization and condone corruption, waste, and inefficiency, the nation is 
bound to experience socioeconomic and political deterioration.41 If corruption is to be controlled, 
corrupt officials have to be exposed and punished frequently and severely then the expected costs 
                                                          
37 M. A. O. Aluko and A.A. Adesopo, An Appraisal of the Two Faces of Bureaucracy in Relation to the Nigerian 
Society, J. Soc. Sci., 8(1): 13-21 (2004). 
38Nigerian leaders stole $380 billion; BBC News online (London), Oct 20, 2006 available at 
http://news.bbc.uk/2/hi/Africa/6069230.stm 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 See Julius Ihonvbere, Nigeria: The politics of Adjustment and Democracy at 111(1994). 
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of corruption will decrease, there should be no opportunities for corruption and a very high risk 
of detection. The enticements for a bureaucrat to accept a bribe depends on economy-wide 
outcomes which, in turn, depend on the number of other bureaucrats accept bribes. 
 
Where an officeholder realizes that they will be exposed, disgraced out of office and 
severely punished, that officeholder may rethink before they commit any acts of corruption. In 
Nigeria today, officeholders do not perceive such threat, they go about their corrupt ways 
undetected and if or when they get caught, most of them basically receive a slap on the wrist.42 
Brazil passed a groundbreaking anti corruption law on June 2010 referred to as Ficha Limpa 
which means clean slate, this law would bar anybody who has any corruption charges (or even 
allegations) pending against them from running for any political office (in municipal, state or 
federal elections) for eight years, the law further bars candidates who have been expelled from 
any professional organizations.43 This law is worth emulating by Nigeria. 
 The Nigerian experience since receiving political independence has been one of 
animosity and mutual suspicion between its leadership and its citizens. Politicians, aided by 
sections of the intellectual class have generally treated the masses as illiterate, ignorant, as 
objects of manipulation and exploitation in the political process. Elections in Nigeria have been 
fraught with widespread rigging and violence by political fractions through the masses.44 
Corruption in Nigeria undermines democratic institutions, retards economic development and 
contributes to government instability. 
Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral 
                                                          
42 See case study 1, 2, 3 in appendix 3. 
43See Brazilian Complementary Law n. 135 of June 4th, 2010. 
44 The Carter Center and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Final Report, Observing the 1998-
1999 Nigeria Elections at 12 (Nov. 1999) available at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1152.pdf . 
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processes, perverting the rule of law, creates bureaucratic bottlenecks whose only reason for 
existence is the soliciting of bribes.45  Here the argument is that corruption has impeded the 
ability of the government to deal effectively and efficiently with poverty, it has also helped to 
further concentrate income and wealth in the hands of a selected few which exacerbated the 
conflict between the rich and the impoverished.  
 
 
2.4 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
 
 
When democracy is lost, freedom level declines. Most of the failed and deeply troubled 
democracies in the world fall into the bottom half of states in controlling corruption. They are in 
the top ten percent of most corrupt and in addition, their states are simply not very effective. 
They are politically unstable with significant levels of politically motivated violence or a recent 
history of such that has not been put to rest, or a more general diffuse sense that the government 
is fragile and could be overthrown. Executive power is seriously abused, several of these 
countries have Presidents with grandiose political projects that they believe require them to 
concentrate and aggrandize power.46  
Corruption causes are numerous and complex, the absence of an efficient, professional 
and committed civil service has been cited as an important contributor to corruption in Nigeria 
including a rise in the opportunities of corruption. Badly governed democracy, abuse of power, 
                                                          
45 Statement by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Action against Corruption and Economic Crime. 
Available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html. 
46 Larry Diamond, Democratic Governance and Performance of Democracy, speech at the conference on 
Democracy that delivers; improving the quality of democratic governance and economic growth, Center for 
international private enterprise, Washington D.C (Oct. 27, 2009). 
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lack of tough anti corruption bodies and lack of political will, are all missing links needed for a 
democracy to thrive and to combat corruption. By rise in the opportunities of corruption I mean 
for instance registration of a company in Nigeria involves so many steps, many involving 
contacts with officials with discretionary powers. By badly governed democracy I mean the 
extreme lawlessness and unaccountability experienced regularly in Nigeria. By abuse of power I 
mean disregard for the law and manipulation of the justice system. 
 Critics argue that civil servants in African countries see public service as an opportunity 
to generate wealth for themselves, their families and their friends, this is very well the story in 
Nigeria. Obsession with materialism, compulsion for a shortcut to affluence, glorification and 
approbation of ill-gotten wealth by the general public, are among the reasons for the persistence 
of corruption in Nigeria.47 In Nigeria one is respected by the amount of money they have so 
people thrive to become rich by all means. The inability or failure of Nigeria to secure efficient, 
professional, honest and honorable civil servants has been advanced as an explanation for the 
pervasiveness of corruption this is because of the role nepotism and connections play.  
The lack of ethical standards throughout the agencies of government and business 
organizations in Nigeria is a serious drawback.  According to Bowman, ethics is action, the way 
we practice our values is a guidance system to be used in making decisions. The issue of ethics 
in public sector encompasses a broad range, including a stress on obedience to authority, on the 
necessity of logic in moral reasoning, and on the necessity of putting moral judgment into 
practice.48 The issue of ethics in public sector is not emphasized enough; ethics is the standards 
of behavior that tells us what we ought to do in our personal and professional lives which apply 
                                                          
47 Ndiulor, Tony Price Nigeria is paying for Corruption, The Guardian Online(Nigeria) March 17, 1999 
48 Bowman, James S Introduction: Ethical Theory and practice in Public Management, in Ethical Frontier in Public 
Management: Seeking New Strategies for Resolving Ethical Dilemmas; James S. Bowman, editor, San Francisco: 
Jossey Base (1991)  
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to all individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. It is imperative to uphold ethics in the 
public sector as a guide to what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior.  
High ethical standards are important in the public sector because they are important to 
credibility and lead to increase support for government agencies and political leaders. 
Unfortunately, many officeholders in Nigeria whether appointed or elected do not have a clear 
conception of the ethical demands of their position even though these standards have been 
clearly quoted in the Nigerian constitution and by the Code of Conduct bureau.49 A viable, 
efficiently performing state is critical to wealth creation, economic growth and to achieve these 
objectives recruitment into the public sector must be based on merit and not on political or rent 
seeking considerations.50 To build upon the thoughts of Mr. Collier, when the government 
appoints more competent individuals to oversee different sectors, it is going to bring about 
economic growth because such individual would have the necessary know how that is essential 
for wealth creation and productivity.  
In Nigeria, a significant number of people in top civil service positions are either political 
appointees or individuals with strong connections. There is a popular saying in Nigeria that as 
long as one keeps ones “god fathers happy, they will remain in position”.51 In essence, most 
public offices have been hijacked by these self proclaimed god fathers52 and Nigerians have 
witnessed in bewilderment how some self proclaimed god fathers hijacked their states. My 
                                                          
49 Constitution, Art. 172, Third Schedule, Part I, Federal Executive Bodies (Established by Section 153)(1999) 
(Nigeria). 
50 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion;Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about it Oxford 
University Press at 3- 4 (2007). 
51 Jibrin Ibrahim, The Rise of Nigeria’s Political Godfathers, BBC Focus on Africa Magazine(London), November 
10, 2003 available at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3156540.stm. 
52 Godfathers are generally defined as men who have the power personally to determine both who gets nominated to 
contest elections and who wins in a state. Many regard them as a huge challenge to democracy in the country - 
although the godfathers themselves are staunchly supportive of the practice. Godfatherism is both a symptom and a 
cause of the violence and corruption that together permeate the political process in Nigeria. Public officials who owe 
their position to the efforts of a political godfather incur a debt that they are expected to repay without end 
throughout their tenure in office; Human Rights Watch, Criminal Politices; Violence, Godfather and Corruption in 
Nigeria 19, 16(A) (Oct. 2007). 
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interest in this dissertation concerns political godfathers53 which consist of rich men whose 
contributions to campaign funds of some candidates have helped the latter to win elections. 
Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu, who had a running battle with his godfather, Senator 
Jim Nwobo, for over two years, defined godfather from his own personal experience as follows: 
 
“…an impervious guardian figure who provided the lifeline and direction to the 
godson, perceived to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the 
oracular personality located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and 
decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless... strictly speaking, a godfather is simply a self-
seeking individual out there to use the government for his own purposes”54 
 
Political godfathers in Nigeria are political gatekeepers and they dictate who participates 
in politics and under what conditions, the role of such people is harmful to the advancement of 
popular and participatory democracy in Nigeria which promotes corruption. Trouble start to 
brew when what a godfather makes from his instrumental relationship with his clients falls below 
expectation and the godson becomes defiant to the wishes of his godfather, the godfather too 
becomes anxious when he realizes that the godson does not want him to have all he wanted from 
the government, such as jobs and contracts. To emphasize my line of argument, see appendix 3 
for some case studies of godfather and son relationship gone bad. 
 
                                                          
53 The word godfather depicts different meanings to different people. In parts of Europe and America, godfather is 
associated with a mentor or a young person trying to become baptized in the Catholic Church is that will fit in as a 
mentor to that young person.  In France, the term godfather of industry is used to depict corporate titans, that is, 
businessmen with the most clout, and an intriguing class of people who keeps the economy running. The French 
godfathers can be broken down into two types: the first are those who manipulate the economy for their own benefit, 
and the second those that can be referred to as crisis fixers, social reformers, and populist advocates of the poor.53 
54 The Source, Chimaroke Nnamani, The godfather phenomenon in democratic Nigeria: Silicon or real? pg. 30-31 
(June 2, 2003). 
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The lack of fear of detection and weakened scrutiny is another factor fostering corruption 
in Nigeria, there is good international evidence that civil liberties and a strong civil society such 
as a free press reduces corruption. This reduction in overall scrutiny of the political process 
enabled powerful politicians and officials to dismantle the more specific procedures for scrutiny 
which had been built into the system. The drafters of the Nigerian anti corruption instruments 
focused excessively on the role of law enforcement agencies, quasi – judicial bodies, prosecutors 
and judges in the fight against corruption, to the neglect of civil society organizations (non state 
actors).55  
As Transparency International has noted, “any attempt to develop an anti – corruption 
strategy that fails to involve civil society neglects one of the most potentially useful and 
powerful tools available”.56 This statement is true because Involving civil society builds trust 
between society and anti corruption institutions, it will enable civil society to acts as watch dogs 
for these institutions by reporting cases of corruption. Civil society can keep track on politicians 
and pressure them to comply with their commitments in terms of fighting corruption and the 
media will expose cases of corruption, they will also put pressure for investigations and 
sanctions.  
In the United States, there are various Nongovernmental organizations whose focus is to 
promote transparency and integrity within the government. Such organizations like Transparency 
                                                          
55 See Anti – Corruption Act Art. 6(e) & (f) “It is the duty of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission)… (e) to educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; and (f) to 
enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.” Art. 5(1)(n) of the EFCC Act also provides: “The 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission shall be responsible for carrying out and sustaining rigorous public and 
enlightenment campaign against economic and financial crimes within and outside Nigeria.”  
56 TI Source Book, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System (2000) available at 
www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook. 
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International –USA,57 Revenue Watch Institute,58 Publish What You Pay,59 Freedom House, 
60Trace International,61 InterAction,62 Democracy 21,63 Global Witness,64 Global Integrity,65 
Government Accountability Project66 and Project on Government Oversite.67  These 
organizations have made combating corruption within the government and system their main 
focus.    Civil society plays a pivotal role in fighting corruption and as such, should be included 
in the process because they can pressurize and draw attention to any state actor whom for 
whatever reason is unwilling to implement anti – corruption laws.  
Without active support from the general public, particularly in a system like Nigeria 
where there is a general distrust of government, any initiative to tackle pervasive corruption is 
likely to struggle for legitimacy. The absence of comprehensive national strategies to combat 
corrupt, exclusion of civil society, as well as a lack of real political will to implement reform is 
the foremost predicament in Nigeria. Civil society plays the role of a critic that advocates for 
those underrepresented interests of the people. It can mobilize the people and can reach the 
minds of ordinary citizens who may find it hard to believe that their governments are making a 
genuine effort to tackle corruption. Above all it is essential to raise public awareness, to awaken 
society to the disastrous effects of corruption and to get across the message that combating it is 
possible.  
                                                          
57 http://www.transparency-usa.org/ 
58 http://www.revenuewatch.org/ 
59 http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ 
60 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
61 https://secure.traceinternational.org/Default.asp? 
62 http://www.interaction.org/ 
63 http://www.democracy21.org/ 
64 http://www.globalwitness.org/ 
65 http://www.globalintegrity.org/ 
66 http://www.whistleblower.org/ 
67 http://www.pogo.org/ 
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Civil society is a guarantor that the interests of those people governments claim to 
represent are not being neglected. It is the manifold groups making up civil society which can 
remind governments and ensure that corruption has to be fought in the interest of those that can 
least afford to defend themselves against its brutal attacks like the poor, uneducated, and the 
weak. Finally, civil society is the watchdog, the whistleblower and the vanguard to warrant that 
the government and – to a lesser extent – the private sector respect their borders. To take you one 
step further along my line of argument, allow me to finally mention a few cases where civil 
society has succeeded in facilitating a process in which it joined forces with governments, what 
these examples show is that civil society can have an impact in the area of raising public 
awareness as well as in lobbying for concrete change or in helping to initiate and carry out a 
process of reforming national integrity systems. 
A vibrant civil society put up a stiff resistance against military rule in Nigeria, 
notwithstanding the harassment and intimidation of the leaders of the pro-democracy movement, 
Nigerians were mobilized to fight for the termination of military dictatorship. The battle was 
eventually won on May 29, 1999, when democratic rule was restored.  Due to the sustained 
campaign for freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal declared sedition illegal and 
unconstitutional in the case of Arthur Nwankwo v. The State.68 In this case, the appellant, a 
governorship candidate had accused the Jim Nwobodo regime in Anambra State of massive 
corruption, was convicted and sentenced to one year imprisonment. In setting aside the 
conviction the Court of Appeal (Per Olatawura JCA) held that:  
 
“It is my view that the law of sedition which has derogated from the freedom of 
speech guaranteed under this Constitution is inconsistent with the 1979 Constitution 
                                                          
68 5 NCCR 228 (1985) (Nigeria). 
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more so when this cannot lead to a public disorder as envisaged under Section 41(1) (a) 
of the 1979 Constitution.69 We are no longer the illiterates or the mob society our 
colonial masters had in mind when the law was promulgated. The whole of CAP XXXIII 
which deals with Defamation is sufficient guarantee against defamatory libel. The 
safeguard provided under Section 50(2) is inadequate more so where the truth of what is 
published is no defense. To retain Section 51 of the Criminal Code, in its present form, 
that is even if not inconsistent with the freedom of expression guaranteed by our 
Constitution will be a deadly weapon and to be used at will by a corrupt government or a 
tyrant.” 
 
On the 3rd of March 1998, in the heat of a brutal draconian leadership a group of civil 
right activist under the leadership of a vibrant fearless lawyer Olisa Agbakoba decided to 
organize a five million man march to oppose a staged Government rally calling on General 
Abacha who at that time was the Nigerian military ruler to continue in office. The government 
unleashed untold brutality on the marchers and their leader was beaten and detained. Two 
months later this same group under the umbrella of United Action for Democracy (UAD) and 
under the leadership of the same fearless lawyer led a twenty city strike against the continued 
military rule in Nigeria. 70 As he was returning from a West African Human Rights meeting in 
1998, Olisa Agbakoba was arrested, imprisoned and was only released after the death of 
Abacha.71 Olisa Agbakoba drew the attention of other civil society groups and the international 
community to the plight of Nigerians. This goes to show that where governments fail to act or 
                                                          
69 Nothing in section 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society - in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or public health. 
70 Personal interview with Olisa Agbakoba at the office of Olisa Agbakoba and Associates, Lagos, Nigeria (May 
2009). 
71 Id.  
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are reluctant to take on new challenges, civil society stands ready to act. Hence, the role of civil 
society is priceless in curbing public corruption. 
 
 
2.5 THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION 
 
 
The negative consequences of corruption, especially in developing countries can 
generally be categorized into economic, political, and social. The negative effects of corruption 
on the economy are as follows: Corruption distorts incentives; In a corrupt environment, able 
individuals allocate their energies to rent seeking and to corrupt practices, not to productive 
activities.72The authors of “Corruption and Development in Africa from Country Case-Studies”, 
Hope and Chiculo73 argue that rent seeking activities tend to have the effect of inflating the cost 
of doing business. Hope and Chiculo point out that kickbacks and illegal commissions which 
have to be paid to public officials are simply added to the final costs of contracts, equipment, 
supplies and so on. The immediate consequence of such a situation is that entrepreneurs and 
potential entrepreneurs withdraw from engaging in investment and the affected economy loses 
the multiplier benefits that would have been forthcoming with those investments.74  
 
 
                                                          
72 See Tanzi, V., Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cure, International Monetary 
Fund Staff Papers 45(4) Washington, DC at 36 (1998). 
73 See Hope, K.R. and Chiculo, C.B. (eds) Corruption and Development in Africa from Country Case-Studies, 
London: Macmillan Press (2000). 
74 Id.  
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To build upon  this point made by Hope and Chiculo and  focusing  on my interactions 
with Nigerians and foreigners who do business in Nigeria, the cost of illegal commission are 
always included in the final budget for proposed contract because the payment of kickbacks are 
inevitable when doing business there. The reason for this is to enable the contractor break even 
and make massive profit.75 For those who want to keep doing business under these conditions 
continue while others withdraw, as a consequence corruption reduces investment, reduces the 
rate of growth,  reduces expenditure on education and health.76  
Corruption acts as arbitrary tax due to its unpredictable nature creates high excess 
burdens resulting from the cost of searching for those to whom the bribe must be paid and the 
cost of negotiating as well as paying the bribe.77 Corruption reduces or distorts the fundamental 
role of government in such areas as enforcement of contracts and protection of property right. 
When a citizen can buy his her way out of a commitment or out of a contractual obligation, or 
when one is prevented from exercising one’s property rights because of corruption the 
fundamental role of the government is distorted and growth may be negatively affected.78 
Corruption slows economic growth, the first investigation of the impact of corruption on 
investment in cross-sectional study of countries found that corruption negatively impacts on the 
rate of investment on GDP.79  
 
 
                                                          
75 See chapter five of research for landmark cases of facilitation payments by United States corporations to Nigerian 
officials. 
76 See Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H.R. Corruption, Public Investment and Growth, IMF Working Paper, No. 97/139 
(Oct. 1997). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Mauro, P. Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics CX at 681–712 (1995). Cited in J.G. 
Lambsdorff , TI working paper, Corruption in Empirical Research. 
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Mauro in his writing called “Corruption and Growth” 80also collaborated the fact that 
corruption lowers expenditures on education, arguing that other expenditures offer public 
servants better opportunities to collect bribes. In a cross-section of thirty seven countries, a 
significant positive impact of corruption on inequality was found, while taking into account 
various other exogenous variables.81 Theft, embezzlement and fraud by public officials reduce 
the availability of government funds for development-related activity.  
The  efforts to deal with corruption around the world is not a new phenomenon, policymakers 
around the world  have recognized its global nature and are now making efforts to coordinate 
their anti – corruption programs.82  During the last several years, many international institutions, 
government and nongovernmental alike have developed an interest in dealing with corruption 
and millions of dollars have being pumped into achieving that through various programs. 
Amongst such organizations notably are the United Nations (UN), the Organization for 
American States (OAS), the International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, 
Berlin Germany, the World Economic Forum (WEF), World Bank, Interpol and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).83 
 
 
                                                          
80 Mauro, P.  Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, Journal of Public Economics 69: at 263–
279 (1998). 
81 Gubta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 98/76( May 1998). 
82 The primary anti-corruption instrument of the United Nations (UN) is the Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC), adopted by General Assembly resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. It entered into force in late 2005. At 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime the UNCAC sits alongside other measures as part of its Global Programme 
Against Corruption (GPAC). These include: an annual Anti-Corruption Day (held on December 9) and an Anti-
Corruption Toolkit. 
83 Mbaku , supra note 137 at 117. 
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Since its founding, Transparency International (TI) has taken a very active role in the global 
struggle against bribery and other forms of corruption by raising global awareness on the 
destructive effects of overseas bribery on third world societies.84 Similarly, the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations now have anti – corruption policies 
which allow them to suspend loans and/or grants to government that are unwilling or unable to 
adequately address the problem of venality in their public sectors. Such developments are 
expected to have a positive impact on the struggle against corruption in Africa because these 
organizations have consistently included recommendations on corruption and good-governance 
in its policy advice to states.85 
Figure 1. Pyramid of Corruption 
 
                                                          
84 http://www.transparency.org/about_us. 
85 See Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Global anti corruption efforts: The Role of 
Nongovernmental Organizations at 9 (June 2007). 
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2.6 CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION; ANALYZING THE NIGERIAN 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND   ISLAMIC LAW (SHARIA) 
 
 
Nigeria is a land of over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups, each of these ethnic groups 
brings with it a distinct set of cultures and tradition that reflects the complexity of the country 
which makes up what is referred to as the Nigerian culture. Long before independence, these 
various ethnic groups in Nigeria had their own established way of life and culture, however, as 
the country progressively became independent the Nigerian culture was also progressively 
evolving to accommodate western influence of religion, language, civilization and economic 
changes, the line between culture and modernization is rapidly getting fuzzy especially in the 
southern part of Nigeria. In the northern part of the country, Islam has greatly influenced what is 
allowed and what is not allowed in the society and thereby has shaped the lifestyle and culture of 
the people. 
Customary law is the starting-point of Nigeria’s legal history, before the emergence of 
colonial rule customary law enjoyed massive application in the geographical territory, composed 
of erstwhile politically and legally independent nationalities. The different regions of Nigeria are 
under different customary law systems, which may overlap in certain specific matters. For 
instance, the Ibo customary law applies to the Ibos in eastern Nigeria, the Yoruba customary law 
to the Yorubas in western Nigeria and Islamic law is regarded as customary law   by the Hausas 
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and Fulani in northern Nigeria.86 Even within a particular nationality or region, like the Ibos in 
eastern Nigeria, variations are noticeable in the customary laws of its various communities or 
groups. 
Customary law refers to a body of customs, practices and norms which are largely 
unwritten or  handed down from generation to generation by oral tradition, because of this,  proof 
of these customs are sometimes very difficult and great reliance is placed on the testimonies of 
chiefs, elders and other people deemed to be conversant with the custom. Additionally, 
customary law has proved very flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances. This fact was 
given judicial recognition in Lewis v. Bankole.87 
In Owonyin v Omotosho, Bairamian FJ described customary law as “a mirror of accepted 
usage”.88 Thus, the acceptance of the customary practices is a crucial factor in any inquiry of a 
custom's validity. This fact was given judicial recognition in the well known case of  Eshugbayi 
Eleko  v. Government of Nigeria.89 In this case, Lord Atkin said that it is the assent of the native 
community that gives a custom its validity. This view of customary law as a system of norms 
emanating from the common consciousness of traditional African society is no doubt the 
generally accepted understanding of customary law. 
The Supreme Court in Zaidan v. Mohssen90 also defined customary law from the 
Nigerian perspective as any system of law not being common law and not being a law enacted by 
any competent legislature in Nigeria but which is enforceable and binding within Nigeria as 
between the parties subject to its way. In a similar streak, Obaseki J.S.C. in Oyewumi v. 
                                                          
86 See Adesubokan v. Yunusa, 1 ALL N.L.R. 225 (S.C. Nigeria) [1971]. Also see The Relevance of the Judiciary in 
the Polity – In Historical Perspective  Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (1987) at 31.   
87 1 N.L.R. 81 at 100-101 (1908), Osbourne, C. J. said "One of the most striking features of West African native law 
and custom is its flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of expediency, and it shows 
unquestionable adaptability to altered circumstances without entirely losing its character." 
88 1 All NLR 304(1961) (Nigeria). 
89 A.C. 622 (1932) (Nigeria). 
90 11 S.C. 1 (1973) (Nigeria). 
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Ogunesan91 defined it as “the organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria 
regulating their lives and transactions”. It is indeed reasonable for me to argue that since our anti 
corruption commissions have not produce the desired results, an appeal to the enduring values of 
our customary laws may have more valuable effects because corruption is also a social problem. 
Recently, in Bilewu Oyewumi v. Amos Owoade Oginesa92the judge gave a more detailed 
definition of customary law as” the organic or living law of the Indigenous people of Nigeria, 
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static, it is regulatory in that it 
controls the lives and transactions of the community subject to it. It is said that custom is the 
mirror of the culture of the people, I would say that customary law goes further to impart justice 
to the lives of those subject to it. Similarly, in Aku v. Aneku,93 the Nigerian Court of Appeal 
defined customary law as “the unrecorded tradition and history of the people which has ‘grown’ 
with the ‘growth’ of the people to stability and eventually becomes an intrinsic part of their 
culture. It is a usage or practice of the people which by common adoption, acquiescence, by long 
and unvarying habit has become compulsory and has acquired the force of a law with respect to 
place or the subject matter to which it relates”.  
At this point, I must differentiate between a custom and a customary law to make a clear 
distinction between the two in order to avoid both phrases been used interchangeably. A custom 
is a rule of conduct and when such a rule of conduct attains a binding or obligatory character it 
becomes customary law.94 It is the assent of the community that gives a rule of conduct its 
obligatory nature and entails that it is supported by a sanction and enforceability which ordinary 
means that a breach of custom does not occasion any injury to the infringer, because it is not 
                                                          
91 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.137) 182 at 207 (1990) (Nigeria). 
92 3 N.W.L R 182, Pt. 196 at 207 (1990) (Nigeria). 
93 8 N.W.L.R, Pt. 209 at 280 (1991) (Nigeria). 
94 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law In The Making, 67 -70 ,Oxford University Press (1964)   
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backed by sanction, but a breach of customary law attracts the imposition of the appropriate 
traditional sanction.  
Customary Courts are set up by the Laws enacted by the Houses of Assemblies of the 
thirty-six states in Nigeria,95 the courts which are specie of indigenous courts were established to 
administer the customary law of the communities in which they are situated. It should be noted 
however, that the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria has empowered each state of the federation to 
establish its own Customary Court of Appeal.96 The various Customary Court Laws expressly 
provide for the establishment of Customary Courts in each state and direct such courts to 
administer customary laws of the various communities comprising each state.97 
I will like to illustrate the various conceptual aspects of customs as it applies to the 
typology of corruption using the Ibos which is one of the two hundred and fifty ethnic groups in 
Nigeria as a case study. The Igbo people constitute one of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria. 
According to the colonial geography the Ibos occupy mainly the eastern part of the country, they 
are today found in high concentration in Anambra, Abia, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo states of 
Nigeria. Due to the lack of the unification of customary law there is obviously no codification of 
its laws therefore every ethnic group has its own customs or customary laws as it were. It is my 
opinion that the codification of these laws will bring about reliability and certainty of the legal 
system, in addition it will definitely clarify the multiply systems of customary law. 
Every society has its own means of controlling the social behavior of its citizens in order 
to reach its desired goals, thus law provides, among other things the penal technique by which 
those who are found guilty of acts prohibited by the society are punished. The Ibo society of 
                                                          
95 Examples of such Laws include the Customary Court Edict of Imo State of 1984 and Customary Law (Cap 41) 
Laws of Oyo State of 2002. 
96 Constitution, Art. 280 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
97 Id.  
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Nigeria has in its body of customary laws a rich penal system, though largely unwritten, this 
legal regime integrated the Igbo society into its development.98 The key ingredients of the Ibo 
traditional justice system include consensus among the members of each Ibo community and 
their general acceptance of the law making, law application (case management) and enforcement 
procedures applied to them. The consensus and general acceptance are grounded on the Ibo 
faithfulness to their history which is manifested by the fact that they continue to borrow norms, 
rules, regulations, and laws from previous generations.99  
The Ibos recognize two main classes of offences; the first group of offences is often 
identified as abomination (alu) which consists of acts regarded as violations against the divine 
laws like murder, incest to theft. The second group of offences comprises the natural crimes such 
as other forms of stealing, failure to join in the community projects, and disobedience to other 
man-made laws.100 The Ibo retributive and penal justice is demonstrated in the punishments 
meted to the respective offenders which include death penalty in very extreme cases, ostracism, 
banishment, restitution, fine, compensation, forfeiture, seizure of valuable property and 
caricature,  above all the Ibo criminal and penal justice systems are premised on the important 
value of reconciliation and peace-making.101 
Now, with reference to corruption, the Ibos like most other traditional society have clear 
views about what acts are corrupt and unacceptable. The most severe of such acts are called 
"mpu" that is an act that is so mindless that it bankrupt’s moral virtues and deserves total 
condemnation, ostracism or severe punishment. The corrupt act is discouraged through a 
                                                          
98 See Ikenga K. E. Oraegbuna, Crime and Punishment In Ibo Customary Law: The Challenge of Nigerian Criminal 
Jurisprudence, 1. 
99 See Simon Ottenberg, Leadership and Authority in an African Society: The Afikpo Village-Group, University of 
Washington Press, 246 – 269 (1971). 
100 See Ikenga K. E. Oraegbunam, The Principles and Practice of Justice in Ibo Jurisprudence, 63. Available at 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/viewFile/52335/40960 
101 Id. 
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ritualistic approach of communal dissent, community does not just express the view that the act 
is unjust it makes it clear that the act destroys the basis of the community such that the 
perpetrator is removed from the spiritual fellowship and protection of the community. The guilty 
person will need reconciliation through self purgation in a ritualistic manner and restitution so as 
to enter back into fellowship.102 
In an article,103 J.P. Olivier de Sardan revisited the social mechanisms and the processes 
of legitimization of corruption in Africa. He pinpointed certain social norms widely represented 
in modern Africa which seem to communicate with or influence the practices of corruption. He 
contended that while these norms, in and of themselves, have nothing to do with corruption, they 
do provide a favorable ground for generalizing and trivializing corruption like gift giving. In line 
with Sardan’s article, the giving of a gift as a symbol of appreciation is a common practice 
among Nigerians,  gifts are sometimes given in anticipation of a favor and to refuse or neglect to 
give a gift when deserved is not only considered to be a sign of miserliness it also carries a risk 
of attracting misfortune.  
Sardan pointed out that the multiple forms and uses of “gift” in everyday life blurs the 
distinction between charity and corrupt practice; as gifts multiplies, room is created for the 
drowning of illicit gifts within the mass and in essence, gifts are sometimes misconstrued as 
bribes Sardan states.104To clarify the characteristic between gift and bribe, the Nigerian 
constitution has helped in making a clear-cut distinction on when receiving gifts by a public 
officer is acceptable. Section 6105 states that a public officer shall not ask for or accept property 
                                                          
102 Phone interview with Dr. Sam Amadi, a consummate attorney and an ibo indigene from Anambra State, Nigeria, 
August 20, 2011. 
103 J. P. Oliver de Sardan, A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa? (1999). 
104 Id. 
105 Constitution, Art 6, fifth Schedule, Part 1 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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or benefits of any kind for himself or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to 
be done by him in the discharge of his duties.  
It further states that the receipt by a public officer of any gifts or benefits from 
commercial firms, business enterprises or persons who have contracts with the government shall 
be presumed to have been received in contravention of the section unless the contrary is proved. 
Finally, a public officer shall only accept personal gifts or benefits from relatives or personal 
friends to such extent and on such occasions as are recognized by custom, provided that any gift 
or donation to a public officer on any public or ceremonial occasion shall be treated as a gift to 
the appropriate institution represented by the public officer, and accordingly, the mere 
acceptance or receipt of any such gift shall not be treated as a contravention of this provision. 
Jabbra, the author of “Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and 
Remedies”, stated that corruption arises from clashes between traditional cultural values and the 
norms that were imported from the developed countries with modernization.106 Jabbra 
successfully hit the nail on the head which brings me back to differentiating between our cultural 
norm of gift giving and bribes which the Nigerian constitution clearly differentiated as already 
noted.  In Nigeria, it is customary that the rights of the individual are usually subordinate to those 
of the extended family and loyalty to the family is considered more important than individual 
rights or personal accountability. Such particularistic attachments are quite strong in many 
African societies and are said to have a significant impact on corruption.  
                                                          
106 Jabbra, J.G., Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and Remedies, Indian Journal of Public 
Administration 35,  2 at 1 – 24 (1982). 
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A successful civil servant is expected to share the benefits of his position in the modern 
sector with members of his extended family and the ethnic group he belongs to.107  Extended 
family assistance and high level of community spirit encourage those who are economically 
better placed to act as their brothers’ keepers through financial and other support to relatives and 
community members. Thus, the average person’s financial and other forms of resources must be 
seen to assist others in his immediate community and even beyond. This often determines the 
status given to any individual and in particular the level of political support due to a person. 
Culture eases to be one once it has a negative effect on the society, this kind of cultural practices 
described above breeds corruption and should not be encouraged, people should learn to live 
within their means. Some civil servants have admitted to being corrupt to enable them meet up 
with family obligations, corruption in Nigeria cannot be radically separated from the culture 
because it is inherent in the culture.   
Corruption thrives in Nigeria because the society sanctions it, no Nigerian official would 
be ashamed let alone condemned by his people because he or she is accused of being corrupt. In 
fact any government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself corruptly but 
failed to do so will in fact, be ostracized by his people upon leaving office. He would be regarded 
as a fool. The widespread corruption is a reflection of the profound changes in the value-system, 
in the past the value-system was founded on honesty, hard work, trust, good name and selfless 
service. Cultures change, but they change relatively slowly. Where cultural orientations are 
concerned, there are no quick fixes, our value system in Nigeria needs to be reassessed, a value 
                                                          
107 On a personal account, a family member of mine amongst many others was made the Commissioner of Education 
in Kaduna State in 1992; my state of origin in Nigeria. Many years later, he decided to run for the governor of the 
state but lost out at the primaries. The reason he lost out was the fact that when he was Commissioner, he did not 
share the benefits of his position with his “people”. He did not assist his people get jobs, he did not give kick backs 
etc., rather, he enriched only himself. The fact remains that he will never be able to win an election in the state 
because he was not corrupt enough. This is also the same pressure suffered by many public holders in Nigeria. 
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system which glorifies and endorses corruption is very troubling, civil service codes need to be 
reviewed to include those cultural values that we have always had in Nigeria, high school and 
college curriculums should teach cultural reorientation to its students.108Gift giving is a formal 
valued aspect of African tradition, it is essentially a self perpetuating system of belief and 
grounded in a society’s value system, it is safe to say that people hide underneath the umbrella of 
customary gift giving to endorse corruption. It should be noted, however, that although gift-
giving and tributes to leaders may lead to corruption, not every gift-giving should be constituted 
with corruption.  
Now, I shall discuss the cultural analysis of corruption from the Islamic Law’s (Sharia) 
point of view. The word Sharia literally means 'the way to the watering place' described by 
Muslims as a way of life.109 Sharia is a system of Islamic law based on four main sources: the 
Qur’an , which is God’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunna, also referred to as 
actions of the Prophet, described in the Hadith,  the Qiyas which is the  process of analogical 
reasoning based on understanding of the principles of the Qur’an or the Hadith and the Ijma, also 
known as the  consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars.110  
 
 
                                                          
108 The general directives of cultural policy provided by the Department of Culture in Nigeria states that the 
rights and various attempts of the people of Nigeria to develop their culture have been given consideration in the 
Nigerian Constitution. However, neither the systematized cultural policy, nor the set of main aims of cultural 
policies within the states have been presented. Some of the clearly set directions of cultural policies are: Analysis, 
understanding of the Nigerian cultural life, cultural values and cultural needs and expectations of people; affirmation 
of the authentic cultural values and cultural heritage; building up of a national cultural identity and parallel 
affirmation of cultural identities of different ethnic groups; development of cultural infrastructure and introduction 
of new technologies in cultural activities; establishment of links between culture and education, as well as between 
education and different cultural industries particularly mass media. 
109 Abdur Rahman I Doi, Shari'ah: The Islamic Law, op cit, 2 and Ado-Kurawa, op cit, 22, 'Shari'ah' has an 
important symbolic meaning to desert peoples where water is a matter of life and death. It symbolizes access to 
water on a daily basis. 
110 Awd Ahmad Idris, Al-Wajizfil Usul al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dar wa Maktab Al-Hilaal, 1992), 88-90 and Abd Wahab 
Khallaf, Ilm Usul al-Fiqh (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1996), 20-2. 
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Unlike customary law, Islamic law is principally written, justice is a central value in 
Islamic teaching and is considered to be the foundation for all God’s creation.111 According to 
the teachings of the Quran,112 any actions and deeds of humankind that flout justice is an act of 
corruption on earth, and the Quranic teachings focus on promoting and enforcing a code of 
ethics and morality for human behavior.113 In the Qur’an and Sunna, corruption refers to a range 
of behavioral digressions that threaten the social, economic and ecological balance.114 Such acts 
are explained at various places in the Qur’an in plain language, in terms of being just or unjust, 
with reference to their detrimental impact on social organization and/or in relation to the 
universally respected standards of moral virtue.115 
From the angle of Sharia, bribery is taken extremely seriously in Islam. For example, the 
Hadith116  states that ''Damned is the bribe-giver (or 'corrupter'), the bribe-taker (or 'corrupted') 
and he who goes between them'', which illustrates the severity with which bribery and corruption 
is viewed. In terms of generation and creation of wealth, fair trade and the creation of wealth for 
the benefit of all is positively encouraged in Islam – but even more important is the sharing of 
that wealth: “O ye who believe! Give of the good things which ye have honorably earned.” 117  
 
 
 
                                                          
111 Surty, M. ‘Islam, the Qur’anic Overview’ UK, QAF: Qur’anic Arabic Foundation (2007). 
112 Verses (Y) quoted or cited from a Chapter (X) in the Quran will be referenced in one of the following formats: 
(Chapter X, Verse Y), (Quran X:Y), (Verse X:Y) or (X:Y) 
113 In the Quran, many verses promote universal values, which should define the relationship that humans have with 
God and all creation, among which are: justice and equality, which are important for human happiness, peace, 
progress and prosperity. Verses that relate to the ecosystem and justice (verse 10:5, verse 21:33, verse 36:40), verses 
that relate to human behavior, governance and ethics (verse 55: 7-9). 
114 See chapter 11 verse 85; chapter 28 verse 4, chapter 29 verse 28-30; chapter 30 verse 41; chapter 89 verse 12. 
115 Zafar Iqbal and Mervyn K. Lewis, Governance and Corruption: Can Islamic Societies and the West Learn from 
Each Other? The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 19:2. 
116 Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH). 
117 Surat Al Baqarah, verse 267. 
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In understanding corruption in terms of the abuse of public office for private gain, the 
Qur’an in chapter 2 verse 188 prohibits rulers, judges, decision-makers and parties to a conflict 
from facilitating the unjustified appropriation of the property of others or public property by 
obtaining a favorable ruling in exchange for bribery. It calls such behavior “batil” meaning false 
or deceptive on the one hand and “ithm” meaning criminal, sinful, and inappropriate on the other 
hand. In the realm of ethics and morals in business, there are repeated injunctions in the Quran to 
“weigh with accurate scales”, the Quran warns against those who do not weigh fairly. Here the 
"weighing" applies not only to scales in the sense of merchandise, but also in the sense of 
passing of judgment.118 These values that have been stated in the Quran and Hadith obviously 
legitimize the Islamic approach to corruption but don’t determine how corruption is dealt with in 
practice.  
In Nigeria, there are cases on the application of Sharia in the area of personal-status laws, 
however, there is very limited information on how Sharia law and Courts deal with specific cases 
of corruption.  On this note, from the angle of customary and Islamic law, we must start to 
address the foundation of the Nigerian family system and culture by teaching the core value of 
integrity from the family level to university school level. A person who has been raised with 
good family values may afford to reject opportunities arising from unjust enrichment offers and 
corrupt opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 For example in Surat Al Rahman, verses 7 and 8. 
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3.0 THE NATION CALLED NIGERIA; A RENDEZVOUS OF HISTORY 
 
 
Developing nations must root out the corruption that is an obstacle to progress, for opportunity 
cannot thrive where individuals are oppressed and businesses have to pay bribes. That is why we 
support honest police and independent judges; civil society and a vibrant private sector.119 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this chapter, I shall be discussing the history of Nigeria and its evolution to its present 
state. A background of Nigeria will help in understanding the foundation of the country, setting, 
mindset and systems. It will also assist in painting the picture of how public corruption has 
evolved to its current state and what went wrong along the way. The history of public corruption 
in Nigeria is as old as Nigeria itself even before it became independent in 1960. Nigeria was a 
creation of the British, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, It is a country in West 
Africa.120 
According to the 2006 census, the population of Nigeria has been estimated to be about 
one hundred and forty one million. Nigeria consists of four regions officially known as; Northern 
                                                          
119 See Barrack Obama, U.S. President, Address before the United Nations General Assembly, (Sept. 23, 2009). 
120 Encyclopedia Britannica 449-508(16th ed.1973). 
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Nigeria; Eastern Nigeria; Western Nigeria and Mid - West Nigeria. English is the official 
language in Nigeria with three official ethnic languages namely Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. There 
are more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups and five hundred and twenty one different 
languages. The main religions in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam. Islam is most prevalent in 
northern part of the country with a sizeable Christian minority and Christianity is most prevalent 
in eastern, western and mid western Nigeria, a few numbers of Nigerians however practice 
traditional African religion such as idol worshipping. Though the Nigerian constitution prohibits 
state and local governments from declaring an official religion,121 a number of states have 
recently adopted various forms of the Islamic criminal and civil law known as Sharia.122  
There is a high degree of tension between Christians and Muslims with a record of 
violence against both groups and these religious and ethnic tensions have continued to brew in 
different parts of Nigeria,123 thousands have died over the past years in clashes between different 
ethnic and religious groups and separatist bids for independence. Since 1999, violence between 
Christians and Muslims has become increasingly common.124 Nigeria is divided into thirty-six 
states and one federal capital territory, which are further sub-divided into seven hundred and 
seventy four Local Government Areas (LGAs). Nigeria is ranked thirty seventh in the world in 
terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of 2007, it is also the United States' largest trading 
partner in Sub-Saharan Africa and supplies a fifth of its oil, eleven percent of oil imports comes 
from Nigeria.  
 
 
                                                          
121 Constitution, Art 10 (1999) (Nigeria). 
122 The States that have adopted Sharia law in Nigeria are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, 
Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. 
123 The States where religious and ethnic tension have been experienced are in Nigeria till date are Adamawa, 
Anambra,  Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Kaduna, , Kano, Lagos, Osun, Plateau. 
124 See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/49b91f0c2.pdf. 
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It has the seventh-largest trade surplus with the U.S. of any country worldwide. The 
United States is Nigeria’s largest foreign investor.125  Nigeria is the twelfth largest producer of 
petroleum in the world and the eighth largest exporter, it has the tenth largest proven reserves. 
Petroleum plays a large role in the Nigerian economy, accounting for forty percent of GDP and 
eighty percent of government earnings. However, agitation for better resource control in the 
Niger Delta, its main oil producing region, has led to disruptions in oil production and currently 
prevents the country from exporting at one hundred percent capacity.  
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country in 
the world.126 Health care and general living conditions in for the average Nigerian is very poor. 
Life expectancy is forty seven years (average male/female) and just over half the population have 
access to potable water and appropriate sanitation; the percentage of children under five has gone 
up rather than down between 1990 and 2003, infant mortality is 97.1 deaths per one thousand 
live births.127 Education is also in a state of neglect, though education is provided free by the 
government, the attendance rate for secondary education is only twenty nine percent (average 
male thirty two percent, female twenty seven percent). The education system has been described 
as "dysfunctional" due largely to decaying institutional infrastructure coupled with frequent 
strikes by teachers for poor working conditions and inadequate salary. Sixty eight percent of the 
population is literate, and the rate for men (75.7%) is higher than that for women (60.6%).128 
 
 
                                                          
125 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. 
126 See http://www.worldreport-ind.com/nigeria/index.htm. 
127 Federal Research Division, Country Profile-Nigeria, United States Library of Congress. 
128 Id. 
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3.2 THE NIGERIAN SETTING 
 
 
3.2.1 Southwestern Nigeria 
 
Ife is located amid dense forests in the southwest of contemporary Nigeria, it remains the 
heart of the Yoruba civilization. Order was kept through policy coordination between Obas also 
known as kings and senior chiefs, with the Oni of Ife and the Alafin of Oyo being the most 
respected leaders in that region. 129 In the 1700s, the power of Oyo Empire weakened due to 
internal strife and increasing European intrusions. In the early 1800s, Fulani invaders from the 
north extended the influence of Islam to Ilorin and Oyo, without completely subjugating the 
latter, thus fostering internal political and economic struggles between Yoruba groups that still 
resonate.130 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129 Stephen Wright, Nigeria; Struggle for Stability and Status, West view Press (1998). 
130 Id. 
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3.2.2 Southeastern Nigeria 
 
In the southeast of contemporary Nigeria, a related though more vague, social group, were 
the Ibo people. Amongst the Ibos, ancestors controlled village life and it remained the task of the 
head of the household to converse with these ancestors to maintain political as well as social 
order. Village government was maintained by family heads or elders sitting together in 
consultation with the senior elder, or Okpara,131 who chaired meetings. The region lacked 
centralized authority, such localized democracy made the imposition of colonial authority and 
indirect rule over the Ibos a very difficult matter.132 
 
3.2.3 Northern Nigeria 
 In the northern part of the country, a thousand years or more of Islamic influence and 
Sahelian trade had fashioned very different, though no less distinguished, civilizations in the 
Bildad as – Sudan (Arabic for the “land of the blacks”).133In the “Scramble for Africa” at the end 
of the nineteenth century, strong independent identities and oral histories were ignored in the 
pursuit of an empire, European technology and ambition overcame the resistance of these 
                                                          
131 Okpara means first born son in Ibo language. 
132 Id. 
133 Wilfrid D. Hambly, Culture Areas of Nigeria, Chicago: Field Museum Press (1935). 
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peoples to colonial incorporation. Existing states were destroyed and the new state of Nigeria 
was created.134 
On January 1, 1901 Nigeria became a British protectorate, part of the British Empire, the 
foremost world power at the time.135 In the early years of British rule, there were complaints that 
emirs in the north and chiefs elsewhere were difficult to trust with money, that guards stole 
money and fled, even the local clerks were considered unreliable.136 Colonial rule provided the 
conditions for the chiefs and kings to continue to receive bribes, those who assisted the British in 
conquering the country and maintaining their control were rewarded with regular salaries for 
incorporation to the colonial system. Before the British administration, the chiefs and kings were 
the wealthiest and most privileged in society, thanks to a good revenue base. Colonial rule 
undermined or destroyed the indigenous revenue base.137 
 
3.2.4 Post-Independence 
On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom. The new 
republic incorporated a number of people with aspirations of their own sovereign nations. The 
nation parted with its British legacy in 1963 by declaring itself a Federal Republic.138 As time 
went by, Nigeria experienced a major civil war popularly called the Nigerian –Biafra war  
between 6th  July, 1967  till the 13th  January,  1970,  an oil boom  between 1971 till 1977, 
various structural adjustment programs, five successful coups  1966, 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 
                                                          
134 Id.  
135 Report on the Administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate August 1891 to August 1894, Cmnd. 7595 (1895) 
in Akintunde Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System¸4 (2007) Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
136 Toyin Falola, Corruption in the Nigerian Public Service in John Mbaku, Corruption and the Crises of Institutional 
Reforms in Africa ,137-138 (1998). 
137 E.A Keay & H Thomas, West African Government for Nigerian Students¸ 143(3rd ed. 1977) London: 
Hutchinson. 
138 Id. 
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respectively, two civilian governments and twenty - nine years of military rule which ended in 
1999. Remaining in power after independence, civil servants continued to use their power in 
order to advance individual and group interests.  
 
3.3 PRESENT DAY NIGERIA 
 
The story of Nigeria is harrowing as far as democratic transition is concerned. During the 
oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and billions of dollars generated by production in the oil-rich Niger Delta flowed into 
the coffers of the Nigerian state.  As oil production and revenue rose, the Nigerian government 
created a dangerous situation as it became increasingly dependent on oil revenues and the 
international commodity markets for budgetary and economic concerns eschewing economic 
stability that spelled doom to federalism in Nigeria.139 
Nigeria re-achieved democracy in 1999 when Obasanjo took office as the head of the first 
elected democratic government in Nigeria since he relinquished power in 1979, ending almost 
twenty nine -years of military rule of Nigeria’s fifty one years of existence as an independent 
state. The elections which brought Obasanjo to power in 1999 and again in 2003 were 
condemned as not free and fair, the 1999 elections was marred by violence and intimidation, as 
well as widespread of fraud and rigging same can also be said about the 2003 elections. Violence 
                                                          
139 Watts Michael, State, Oil and Agriculture in Nigeria (1987) Institute of International Studies Press U. C.  
Berkeley 
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became such an accepted part of political competition and a form of retaliation in some part of 
Nigeria during the 2003 elections that politicians did not even attempt to conceal it.140 
President Obasanjo’s government showed remarkable improvements in attempts to tackle 
government corruption and to hasten development by establishing the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC).141 While Obasanjo showed willingness to fight corruption, he was 
also accused of corruption by his peers and the media. Umaru Yar'Adua, of the People's 
Democratic Party, came into power in the general election of 2007, again, an election that was 
witnessed and condemned by the international community as being massively flawed. Yar’Adua 
died in office on the May 6th, 2010 after a prolonged illness and his Vice President Jonathan 
Goodluck was sworn in as President. On April 18th, 2011, Jonathan Goodluck was elected as 
President for another term of four years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604/ 
141 The Obasanjo’s government pioneered the campaign against corruption and it was during his dispensation that 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was established to help tackle corruption. 
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4.0 NIGERIA LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
“In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success - strong 
parliaments and honest police forces; independent judges and journalists; a vibrant private 
sector and civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what 
matters in peoples' lives”.142 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the fundamental rights of humankind is the expectation of reciprocity of treatment 
in the conduct of one’s affairs and this translates into being just and fair, and to be treated in 
court with justice and fairness. In discharging this obligation, the streams of justice must be kept 
pure and unadulterated. The right to be treated fairly is recognized in international human rights 
treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights143 stipulates that every human being is 
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in 
the determination of his rights and obligations of any criminal charge against him. 
                                                          
142 See Barrack Obama, U.S. President, Address on his visit to  Ghana at Fort Slave (July 2009), available at  
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/07/President_obama_tells_africans.html 
143 Article 10. 
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The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its relevance to 
my dissertation is the function and impartiality of courts or tribunals. The objective of every 
court in the judicial system of any nation is to administer justice by protecting the rights of its 
citizens. Preservation of the integrity of the judicial system is a sine qua non of its effectiveness, 
and this can be tarnished by corruption. Judicial corruption or the abuse of judicial power for 
private gain is no longer an isolated conduct,144it is disturbingly a recurrent feature of the 
Nigerian judicial system. Judicial corruption often involves a vicious dynamic in which judges 
trade in justice for favors and personal gains.  
Corruption seems to be the systemic disease of the Nigerian judiciary and has generated 
complaints from all segments of the society, including social commentators,145 lawyers,146 
judges,147 and even former President Olusegun Obasanjo.148 A study conducted in 2002 by A.J. 
Owonikoko reported that since 1999, more than fifty-five cases of corrupt practices have been 
processed by the National Judicial Council, the body charged with enforcing discipline in the 
judiciary.149 In 2004, many more allegations of judicial corruption were investigated by the 
                                                          
144Pette Langseth, Judicial Integrity and its Capacity to Enhance the Public Interest 20 (2002), 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp8.pdf (describing judicial corruption as the use of 
adjudication authority for the private benefit of court personnel in particular and/or public officials in general). 
Judicial corruption is not limited to giving and receiving bribes. It includes the use of official position to gain an 
advantage or to secure a benefit. 
145A. J. Owonikoko, Law and Human Rights: Tackling Corruption in the Administration of Justice, VANGUARD 
(Nig.), (Apr. 3, 2003), available at Westlaw: Africa News database (“Such perception makes the average Nigerian 
believe that the judiciary is corrupt, and so they expect that corruption is part of the pricing component of our justice 
system.”).  See generally Francis A. Okongwu, Nigeria’s Judiciary Requires Sanitation, DAILY CHAMPION (July 
13, 2004), available at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
146Joseph Chu’ma Otteh, Restoring the Nigerian Judiciary to its Pride of Place, THIS DAY (Apr. 13, 2004). 
147See Lillian Okenwa, Corruption in the Judiciary Threatens Democracy, THIS DAY (Jan. 25, 2003). 
148President Obasanjo, in a paper delivered at Berlin to mark the 10th Anniversary Celebration of Transparency 
International, stated that “The persisting perception of the public is that it is still battling with the widespread 
corruption that made prosecution and the judicial process less than effective under the military.” Olusegun 
Obasanjo, President, Republic of Nigeria, Nigeria: From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity, Address at the 
10th Anniversary Celebration of Transparency International, Berlin 7 (Nov. 7, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.dawodu.com/obas35.htm). 
149 Owonikoko, supra, note 67. 
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National Judicial Council which led to the disbarment of some top judicial officers in the Court 
of Appeal.150 
Recently, on February 22, 2011, the Nigerian Bar Association named a thirteen member 
panel of senior lawyers to investigate the corruption charges against the Chief Justice of Nigeria, 
Justice Aloysious Katsina-Alu and the President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Salami. The 
NBA probe panel, chaired by a former President of the lawyers’ body, Chief Thompson Okpoko 
(SAN), was  also mandated to look into the corruption that have allegedly pervaded the entire 
judicial system. It will equally consider the matter of legal practitioners who allegedly promote 
corruption in the system, the NBA panel represents a major step in unraveling the crisis of 
confidence in the Nigerian judicial system.151 
At this point however, I shall briefly discuss some institutional problems associated with 
the Nigerian judicial system; 
• Justice delayed is justice denied:  The right to a fair trial in Nigeria is 
guaranteed by the Constitution, which provides in Section 36(1) that “In the 
determination of their civil rights and obligations, including any question or 
determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be 
entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal 
                                                          
150 See Lillian Okenwa, Election Petition: NJC Probes Appeal Court Judges, THIS DAY (June 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/06/07/20040607news02.html (“The National Judicial Council has 
commenced investigation into the allegation of perversion of justice and unethical conduct leveled against the 
President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Umaru Abdullahi, seven other Justices of the court, and the Registrar, 
Enugu Court of Appeal.”); See Kola & Oladunjoye Aramide, Anambra: Judicial Body Probes Enugu Judge, THIS 
DAY (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/01/20/20040120news03.html 
(reporting that the Vice Chair-man of the National Judicial Council, Supreme Court Justice Belgore, informed the 
press that “the council has initiated an investigation into the complaint against Justice Stanley Nnaji . . . .”); See 
Lillian Okenwa, Supreme Court Justices, Tribunal Members Under Probe, THIS DAY (Nig.), (Apr. 21, 2004), 
available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/04/21/20040421news01.html (reporting that the Supreme 
Court invited Interpol to investigate allegations by Derivation Front, a non-governmental organization, that some 
Justices of the Supreme Court collected a five billion Naira bribe from one of the parties in a case involving the 
governor of Delta State). 
151 Corruption: NBA begins probe of CJN, Salami¸ The Punch (February 23, 2011). 
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established by law.”152 Unfortunately, trials in Nigeria are neither speedy nor 
heard within a reasonable time.153 Studies conducted by a human rights 
organization identifies delay as one of the major obstacles to the search for justice 
through the courts.154  
Dr. Jedrzel George Frynas, a Professor at Coventry University, United Kingdom 
conducted a survey on the problems of access to courts in Nigeria and top on his list was the 
issue of delay as one of the impediments exasperating access to the courts. He stated that;  
 
“Delay in the disposal of cases is perceived as the fourth most important problem 
of access to courts in Nigeria. This appears to be due primarily to the congestion in the 
courts, which manifests itself through the high number of pending cases. Cases in 
Nigerian courts including appeals may take over ten years before reaching a final 
verdict. Sometimes the original litigants will have died by the time the judgment is 
made”.155 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
152 Constitution, art. 36 (1999) (Nigeria). 
153 See generally Niki Tobi, Delay in the Administration of Justice, in Justice In the Judicial Process; Essays In Honor of 
Honorable Justice Eugene Ubaezonu, (2002). 
154 HURILAWS, Legislative Agenda for Good Governance in Nigeria 1999– 2004, at 9 (1999). HURILAWS found 
that extreme delay in litigation in the courts is routine. On the average, hearing in a case at first instance in a 
Nigerian superior court can take as long as 5–6 years with another 3–4 years consumed in appellate proceedings. 
155 Jedrzej George Frynas, Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal Practitioners, 10 
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 397, 410 (2001). 
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To curb the delays in court proceedings, the 1999 Constitution imposed a time limit for 
judgments to be delivered after hearing the addresses of counsel.156 Judges are now required to 
deliver judgment not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final address by 
counsel.157 However, the Supreme Court in Egbo v. Agbara158 manage to render this provision 
powerless by ruling that  failure to deliver a judgment within the ninety-day period specified by 
the Constitution is not fatal where the case is entirely documentary or rests mainly on 
interpretation of some document where the credibility or demeanor of witnesses is not 
involved.159 It is because of these delays in prosecuting cases that one of my recommendations to 
be discussed later is for the establishment of special courts to prosecute corruption cases. 
• Inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure:  Justice can hardly be speedy when 
judges lack adequate facilities to enable them to function effectively and 
efficiently.160 Infrastructural deficiencies in Nigeria undermine the search for a 
fair trial and poor infrastructure permits corruption.161 Absence of modern 
                                                          
156 Constitution, art. 294(1) (1999) (Nigeria) states that every court established under this Constitution shall deliver 
its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all 
parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the 
delivery thereof. 
157 Id.  
158 1 N.W.L.R. 293 (1997) (Nigeria). 
159 Justice Iguh, delivering the lead judgment stated that in a case for instance, which is entirely documentary or rests 
mainly on the interpretation of some documents without the demeanour or credibility of witnesses coming into play, 
delay cannot be any matter of great moment. So, too, where credibility of witnesses is not involved, delay may not 
be material. It therefore seems to me that delay, per se is not sufficient reason for the interference with the judgment 
of a trial court. For the complaint to succeed, it has to be further established that the delay occasioned a miscarriage 
of justice in that the trial judge did not take a proper advantage of having seen or heard the witnesses testify or that 
he had lost his impressions of the trial due to such inordinate delay 
160 Former President Olusegun Obasanjo accurately captured the deplorable state of the judiciary in his address to 
the 1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference: “We are in sympathy with the judiciary. The conditions under which you 
have had to work over the years are appalling, deplorable and intolerable. Courtrooms are old and dilapidated. There 
are no good libraries, and court proceedings, including judgments and rulings are taken in long hand. Basic facilities 
like stationery, file jackets are not available. Litigants are compelled to purchase files for their cases. In most cases, 
your residential accommodations are poor and poorly furnished. Some of you have no serviceable vehicles. Some 
are obliged to commute to and from your offices by public transport. You are frustrated by these unsavory 
conditions under which you perform your duties. 
161 Statement by late Chief Gani Fawehinmi, one of Nigeria’s leading lawyers and foremost human rights activist, 
during his investiture with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria, pointed out the problems of inadequate facilities 
in the judiciary:  “As a result of long-hand notes, there is little or no access to record of proceedings to court users, 
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facilities provides an enabling environment for corrupt and unethical court 
officials to tamper with evidence even court records.162 Allegations of tampering 
with court records forced the Court of Appeal to order that a handwritten 
judgment delivered on the matter must be tendered for scrutiny.163 The task of 
taking notes by judges in long hand is painfully cumbersome due to lack of 
stenographers. Judges struggle with recording all the evidence in long hand, while 
trying to get impressions on the demeanor of the witnesses, listening to legal 
arguments, objections and interjections from Nigerian lawyers.164 It is little 
wonder that most cases take years to hear. The problems of the judiciary, 
especially corruption and manipulation, exact substantial and enduring costs on 
the citizens, the legal profession, the judiciary and the Nation.  
The judiciary is in dire need of reform, an honest, competent and efficient judiciary will 
benefit all. More importantly, an honest judiciary will help Nigeria consolidate and deepen its 
democracy. For the purpose of my dissertation, I shall not be focusing much on judicial 
corruption, rather, I shall be discussing a brief historical perspective of corruption in Nigeria, the 
Nigerian legal system in its entirety and whether or not they have jurisdiction to hear corruption 
cases with reference to domestic legislations against corruption and some institutional problems 
predominated with the judiciary as regards to prosecution of cases before the Courts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which in turn promotes corruption and other forms of manipulations. The judicial officers control their records and 
can therefore control outcomes to larger extents . . . . Mechanizing judicial record taking and record keeping 
will not only address delays in court proceedings but also promote transparency and integrity in the judicial process. 
162 See Chino Obiagwu, Anniversary Special: Judiciary Score Card 1999–2003, Vanguard (May 30, 2003). 
163 See Charles Onyekamuo, Anambra: Appeal Court Requests Handwritten Judgment, THIS DAY ( Feb. 11, 2004).  
164 See Mobolaji Sanusi, Why We Oppose Anti-Graft Commission—Senator Udo Odoma, Vanguard (Jan. 7, 2003), 
available at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
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4.2 FROM THE BEGINNING THERE WAS CORRUPTION! A BRIEF HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Corruption of public office has arguably existed in Nigeria since the establishment of 
modern structures of public administration in the country by the British colonial government.165 
Its escalation coincided with the expansion of administrative structures and the full development 
of the public sector associated with political independence in 1960.166 I have decided to discuss 
where grand corruption commenced in Nigeria to put to rest debates as to whether corruption 
was introduced into the Nigeria society by democratically elected governments or military 
regimes. My analysis commences from 1956 before Nigeria became independent till 1999 when 
the then President General Abubakar Abdulsalam handed over to a democratic government 
ending twenty nine years of military rule.  
Corruption in public life manifested in 1950’s when the first panel of inquiry was set up 
to look into African Continental Bank (ACB). The charges were that Dr. Azikiwe, the first 
President of Nigeria abused his office by allowing public funds to be invested in ACB which Dr. 
                                                          
165 For example, it was reported that in Lagos demand for bribes and the acceptance of gratification were, in 1952, 
common practices among nurses in hospitals, police officers of the Motor Traffic Unit, pay clerks, produce 
examiners, etc: Commission of  Inquiry in to the Administration of Lagos Town Council, 1953 (The Storey Report, 
Lagos, 1954); see also, for similar revelations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry in to the Working of Port 
Harcourt Town Council, 1955 (Port Harcourt, 1956), and Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into  
allegations reflecting on the official conduct of the premier  and certain persons holding  ministerial and other public  
offices in  the Eastern Region of Nigeria, London, 1957. See also R. Tignor, Political Corruption in Nigeria Before 
Independence, 31 Journal of Modem African Studies1 75-202 (1993). 
166 See V. Eker, On the Origins of Corruption: Irregular Incentives in Nigeria 29 Journal of Modern African Studies 
(1981) 173-182. 
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Azikiwe had an interest in contravention. He was found guilty of misconduct under the Code of 
Conduct for Ministers which stated that a government officer was required to relinquish his 
holdings in private business when he assumed public office. The subsequent indictment of Dr. 
Azikiwe by the Justice Strafford Forster – Sutton Commission of enquiry on July 24, 1956 led 
him to transfer all his rights and interest in the bank to the Eastern Nigeria Government.167  
In 1962, the Court of accountability and transparency held Chief Obafemi Awolowo a 
Nigerian nationalist, a political leader, and a principal participant in the struggle for Nigerian 
hostage when some aggrieved members of his party, Action Group (AG) sprung allegation of 
corruption against him on the floor of the federal parliament.168 In pursuit of accountability, the 
aggrieved men informed that some government establishments had been employed in various 
ways to divert public money into unauthorized projects. 169 Following up such allegation, the 
Justice G.B. Coker commission  was set up to look into the matter, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was 
indicted to the effect that there was evidence of reckless, indeed atrocious, criminal 
mismanagement and diversion of public funds.170 
Turning to the northern region of Nigeria, the existence of political corruption in Muslim 
areas was recognized by all the nationalist parties, as well as by the British, but the latter, in 
league with their traditional allies, kept the issue from becoming excessively public and 
political.171 In 1953, the Governor- General of Nigeria informed the Colonial Office that the 
Lieutenant- Governor of the North, Bryan Sharwood-Smith, was attempting to save the Native 
                                                          
167 See Dr. Godwin Chukwudum Nwaobi, Corruption And Bribery In The Nigerian Economy: An Empirical 
Investigation, Quantitative Economic Research Bureau Gwagwalada, Abuja Nigeria, West Africa, at 30. 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0401/0401003.pdf. 
168 Nwankwo, Arthur, Nigeria: The Stolen Billion, Fourth Dimension Publishers Ltd., Enugu, (2000) 
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Tignor, supra note 221 at 197. 
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Authority system by purging it of corrupt elements. He admitted that the administration of Bornu 
was a public scandal and expected far-reaching reforms in Kano.172 
By I954 the Northern Government had enacted the Customary Presents Order, designed to 
eradicate the practice of plying officials with gifts.173 It had also created a new and more 
representative system of local government.174  
Entering the 1960s, the startling pace of oil based economy from the late 1960s to the late 
1970s, facilitated corruption in Nigeria, as oil revenues built up exports of agricultural product 
declined and production fell. In 1960, agriculture contributed eighty per cent of the value of 
exports but twenty years later, it produced only five per cent. During the 1970s, money was 
literally pouring in and out of government coffers, between 1967 and 1977 federal revenues 
increased twenty-two fold.175 By March 1974, the nation was rocked by a cement scandal, the 
federal government placed an order for two million metric tons of cement with various firms in 
the United States, Romania and USSR. The supply was to be made through the National supply 
company. However, in a sudden change, the ministry of defense that ordered for 2.9 million 
metric tons for its construction projects placed an additional order for 16.23 million metric tons.  
Despite the fact that the price for a ton of cement at that time stood at twenty five dollars 
and freight at fifteen dollars, Nigeria paid one hundred and fifteen dollars per ton, somebody 
therefore stood to gain seventy five dollars per ton for 16.23 million tons. Consequently, the state 
instituted Justice M.B. Belgore Panel to investigate the alleged irregularities and the probe 
seriously indicted the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defense which led to his dismissal 
                                                          
172 Macpherson to Williamson, 4 March I953. 
173 See C. S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: continuity and change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966, 
Princeton, 102 (1970). 
174 See A. D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, 1950-I970:  A study in political relations 
with particular reference to the Zaria Native Authority at 36 (1980). 
175 Williams, supra note 192 at 67. 
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along with other officers. Surprisingly, criminal proceedings were never brought against the 
dismissed men.176 
In an atmosphere of moral and social decay, the plot to over throw Gowon thickened and 
eventually, the coup took place on July 19, 1975. After consolidating his hold on power, 
Brigadier Murtala Mohammed set up a federal assets investigation panel on September 16, 1975 
to probe the assets of all former governors, the administrator of East Central State and some 
Federal Commissioners who served in the Gowon’s regime. On February 3, 1976, the panel 
released its report and all the governors with the exception of Mobolaji Johnson, the governor of 
Lagos State and Oluwole Rotimi, the governor of the Western State, who were acquitted were 
found guilty of gross abuse of office. The confiscated assets stood at about ten million naira.177 
Towards, the dying days of 1975, a disturbing three page circular said to have emanated 
from supreme headquarters in Lagos had facts about Brigadier Murtala Mohammed’s 
government since Gowon’s outing on July 29, 1975. This circular alleged that looting and 
plunders of national wealth thought to be the hallmark of the Gowon’s era had started in earnest. 
The circular also deposed that the Mohammed’s regime was as corrupt as the Gowons’.   Indeed, 
the failure of Dimka’s coup paved the way for the emergence of Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo as 
Head of state.178 One of the first actions Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo performed on coming into 
power was the promulgation of decree No11 of 1976 (Public officers Protection against False 
Accusation). Hence, making corrupt government officials above the law. This retroactive decree 
in all intent and purposes was a clever plan to provide cover and immunity for corrupt public 
servants and thus deter members of the public from exposing such public figures in his regime.179 
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178 Id.  
179 Id  
 60 
 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as the President of Nigeria on October 1, 1979. 
Indeed, the Shagari’s scorecard was a parchment of corruption, a shocking and sad commentary 
on how unpatriotic leaders would sink a nation into an irredeemable abyss of destruction. 
Between 1979 and 1983, Nigeria earned about forty and half billion naira at the same time 
squandered it. The external reserve of N2.3 billion, it inherited in 1979 was wiped out and 
replaced with a staggering external debt of N 10.21 billion as the curtain fell on this criminally 
corrupt government. The life of Shagari as the civilian administration was terminated on 31st 
December 1983, paving way for Buhari/Idiagbon military administration. Politicians were held 
under the state security (Detention of persons), Decree 2 of 1984 and many were tried by the 
Recovery of Public Property Special Military Tribunals established by Decree 3. Some were 
convicted for various offences and duly sentenced, specifically, Justice Mohammed Bello’s 
tribunal convicted fifty one politicians and placed refund orders on them for their ill-gotten 
wealth. 180 
On August 27, 1985, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power, as he unfolded his 
policies on the political and economic fronts, discerning observers of the nation sociopolitical 
condition observed that Nigeria was in for a period of deceit. In 1986, Babangida administration 
rejected the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bank loan but adopted most of the reforms 
contained in the package called the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). 181 The transition to 
civil democracy kicked off in 1986 with the establishment of a political bureau. The June 12, 
1993 Presidential elections and Chief Moshood Abiola’s comprehensive electoral landslide win, 
its annulment by the then head of state General Babangida plunged the nation into chaos.  
 
                                                          
180 Id at 34. 
181 Id. 
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An Interim National Government was formed and Ernest Shoneken was sworn in as its 
interim President.  In November 1993, Shoneken met with General Sani Abacha and other army 
staff thus ending Shoneken’s important regime after 82 days.182 In January 1994, General 
Abacha’s administration instituted a panel under the chairmanship of respected economist, Dr. 
Pius Okigbo. The panel was expected to come up with practical solutions that would lead to the 
reform and reorganization of the Central Bank of Nigeria, grossly abused under Babangida’s 
regime. The panel’s report exposed the outrageous frittering away of $12.4 billion income from 
oil using the conduit of special accounts.183 
Abacha on the other hand was able to perpetuate one of the most comprehensive plunder 
and looting of the resources of the state in contemporary history through intimidation, brigand, 
and a plethora of conduits. At the center of his scam schemes was the Chagouri and Chagouri, an 
international consortium owned by five Lebanese brothers,184 their substantial interest cut across 
oil aluminum, smelting, flour milling, commodity trading, fertilizer importation, and real estate. 
The company’s total assets totaled at eighteen billion dollars.185 
The sudden death of General Sani Abacha, on June 8, 1998,186 pulled the nation from the 
brink of assured civil war and paved the way for the emergence of General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar as Head of state.187 He pledged to return the nation to democratic rule in ten months, a 
pledge he fulfilled. Even in the face of mass evidence pointing to an extraordinary looting spree 
under the regime of Gen. Abubakar, he struggled to salvage an anticorruption crusade gone awry 
and the staggering evidence and circumstances made his unpopular. Three days before he left 
office, Abubakar signed a decree causing Abacha and some influential men under his 
                                                          
182 Id at 37. 
183 Id at 38. 
184 http://www.nigeriatoday.com/chagouris_of_lebanon_are_back.htm. 
185 http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/1218/121897.opin.opin.1.html. 
186 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/109265.stm. 
187 http://www.onlinenigeria.com/abubakar.asp. 
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administration to forfeit varying sums of money and property running into billions of Naira. At 
the end of this military rule, one sad conclusion is that the nation was once again taken for a 
ride.188 
Nigerian political scene is plagued with political instability and corruption, some of these 
behaviors associated with political instability include, but are not limited to, vote-rigging, 
registration of unqualified voters, falsification of election results, buying and selling votes, 
assassination of opposition elites, and the intimidation of supporters of the opposition.189 
Participation in politics is a long time investment and a way of securing a comfortable future for 
ones descendants, most political office contenders go through almost anything to get into office.  
The pervasive role of political violence in Nigeria leads to political instability which in turn 
helps exacerbate the nuances of corruption in the country and because of this instability, the 
focus of the leadership becomes narrow with the overriding consideration for personal survival 
rather than national development.  
I have come to accept the fact through the course of my research that corruption in 
Nigeria cannot be completely eliminated but it can progressively be controlled and managed. Its 
population and economy, presence of natural resources and the lack of established rule of law, 
will make it difficult to completely eliminate corruption. Using Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index of 2010 as a yardstick, the three squeaky clean countries, 
Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden190 all have some elements in common; they have small 
sized economies, no natural resources, dependent on their ability to trade and engage with 
                                                          
188 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531402. 
189 See the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) Final Report on the National Assembly, 
Presidential, Gubernatorial and State Houses of Assembly Elections in Nigeria available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/nigeria/rep03.pdf (accessed 
March 12, 2007). 
190 All three countries rated 9.3, 9.3 and 9.2 respectively by TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index of 2010. Available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 
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foreign countries and a well established rule of law. In other words, these countries have been 
able to manage corruption because of all these qualities that are obviously alien to Nigeria. Let 
me briefly discuss these said qualities. 
Denmark has a population of a little over five and a half million people, this thoroughly 
modern market economy features a high-tech agricultural sector, state-of-the-art industry with 
world-leading firms in pharmaceuticals, maritime shipping and renewable energy, a high 
dependence on foreign trade.191 Danish legislation and regulations conform to European Union 
standards on almost all issues.192 New Zealand on the other hand, has an estimated population of 
approximately four and a half million people,193 New Zealand economy historically has been 
based on a foundation of exports from its very efficient agricultural system and has a free market 
economy that can compete globally.194 Sweden’s population, stand at approximately 9.1 million 
people,195 aided by peace and neutrality for the whole of the 20th century, Sweden has achieved 
an enviable standard of living under a mixed system of high-tech capitalism and extensive 
welfare benefits.196 Sweden carries on a large foreign trade, the value of exports usually slightly 
exceeds that of imports.197 
Corruption in Nigeria is a classic case of systemic corruption,198 and systemic corruption 
occurs where corruption pervades the entire society and in the process becomes an accepted 
means of conducting everyday transactions. It affects institutions and influences individual 
behavior at all levels of a political and socio-economic system. The rule of law no longer exists 
                                                          
191 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/da.html. 
192 Id.  
193 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nz.html. 
194 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35852.htm#econ 
195 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sw.html 
196 Id. 
197 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0861384.html 
198 S Ekwowusi Curbing Corruption in Nigeria Thisday Newspaper (Nigeria), 15 October 2000, quoted in NA 
Goodling Nigeria’s Crisis of Corruption; Can the U.N. Global Program hope to resolve this Dilemma? 36  VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’l L at 999  (2003) 
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as the institutions whose job it is to ensure compliance to the rules have been compromised by 
corruption.199 In Nigeria, the Police Force has proved to be highly incompetent, there have been 
instances of members of the Police Force perpetrating crimes and letting known criminals walk 
away. The Police are known for harassing innocent citizens for bribes and setting up 
unauthorized road blocks to harass motorist,200 they are known for their laxity and nonchalant 
attitude to pursue justice.  
There have been some concerns among Nigerians about the integrity and uprightness of 
the Judiciary, It has been alleged also that Court papers disappeared from the Court room without 
any trace as seen in the prosecution of high profile persons, the judiciary is known for its laxity 
and time wasting. Going to Court to seek for redress in Nigeria is like walking on hot coal, it is 
painfully slow and a typical civil matter can drag for years hence, Nigerians have lost faith in the 
judicial system and has blamed it on the impunity enjoyed by the corrupt rich and powerful in 
Nigeria.201  
Systemic corruption is so persistent and difficult to combat not only because of its inner 
workings but also because it is embedded in a wider political and economic situation that helps 
sustain it. In Nigeria, major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and 
used by corrupt individuals as well as groups, this makes anti corruption task very difficult. I 
believe that systemic corruption is like cancer, like cancer I mean that corruption slowly starts to 
spread which eventually becomes widespread that it is difficult to battle.   
 
                                                          
199 Id 
200 See generally the Human Rights Watch Report “Everyone’s in on the Game”  Corruption and Human Rights 
Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force (August 17, 2010). 
201 The Federal Court in Asaba Delta State  in December 2009 said there was no clear evidence against James Ibori, 
governor from 1999 to 2007. The former governor of Nigeria's oil-rich Delta State has been cleared of 170 charges 
of corruption - involving the laundering of millions of dollars. In 1997 a UK Court froze assets allegedly belonging 
to him worth $35m (£21m). His annual salary as a governor was less than $25,000. 
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The current laws and institutions against corruption are not efficient enough and there is 
no way the operation of the current anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria namely the Code of 
Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) would have 
any credibility in a situation where the corrupt enjoy impunity. Enforcement blossoms only 
where there is political will and this political will must come from the top of any government and 
the momentum for change must come from within the government. There are instances around 
the world where courageous leaders have made progress against corruption because the political 
will was there. For instance; 
In 1974 when the Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption was 
launched, one of its first steps was to capture and punish a former police commissioner, who 
symbolized impunity.202 Within three years, the ICAC smashed all corruption syndicates in the 
government and prosecuted two hundred and forty seven government officials, including one 
hundred and forty three police officers.203 This act sent a strong message that the government 
meant business as regards corruption.  
Just after he assumed power in Colombia in 1998, President Andrés Pastrana’s anti-
corruption team flew to several regions and held hearings about supposedly corrupt mayors and 
governors. The team had the power to suspend people from these offices something that leaders 
in other countries may not have and the team used this power to send a signal not only to the 
local leaders but to the whole country. The President’s anti-corruption team also went after a 
                                                          
202 http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/icac.pdf. 
203 See Tony Kwok Man-wai, former Deputy Commissioner and Head of Operations, Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy - The Experience of 
Hong Kong ICAC, 
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specific case of corruption in the Congress—choosing as the big fish people from the President’s 
own party.204 
 In 2001-2002, President Enrique Bolaños of Nicaragua went one step further when he 
put in jail the former President Arturo Alemán, under whom Bolaños had served as Vice 
President, on charges of corruption.205 Political will is vital for any anti – corruption effort to 
succeed. The next part of my dissertation examines the evolution of the Nigerian legal system, 
sources of law and hierarchy of courts.  
By virtue of colonization, the Nigerian legal system draws heavily from the English 
Common Law legal tradition, it is essentially based on and frequently carried or copied from 
English Common Law which forms a substantial part of Nigeria law. Each of Nigeria’s thirty six 
states including the Federal Capital Territory has its own legal system206 with a general federal 
legal system applicable throughout the country. However, the complexity of Nigerian legal 
systems is further revealed by the application of local customs as law in each state thereby 
causing legal pluralism.  Hence, a striking feature of our legal system is the unique co-existence 
of English law and customary laws.207 
 
 
                                                          
204 The American Enterprise Institute Working Paper Series on Development ,Addressing Corruption in Haiti, Policy 
Number 2, April 2010, pg. 19. 
205 Id.  
206 The thirty six states including the federal capital are Abuja, Anambra, Enugu, Akwa Ibom, Adamawa, Abia, 
Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, 
Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, 
Yobe. 
207 Customary law is a system of law that reflects the culture, customs, values and habits of the people whose 
activities it regulates. It has been described as a mirror of accepted usage. Customary law is particularly dominant in 
the area of personal and family relations like marriage, divorce, guardianship and custody of children, and 
succession. Customary law can be established before the Courts either by proof of it to the Court by calling 
evidence, or by the Court taking judicial notice of a custom that is so obvious that it needs no further proof. 
Moreover, before a custom can be relied on by the Court, it must pass the three validity tests. Thus, it must not be 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience; it must not be contrary to public policy; and it must not be 
inconsistent with any law for the time being in force. See Lewis v. Bankole INLR 81 (1908) (Nigeria). 
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Plurality of laws permits a situation where one system applies to one transaction and 
another system to another. For example different laws and incidences apply to Christians and 
customary law marriages, as well as the devolution of property upon intestacy.208A customary 
law may also apply to a transaction and dispute may arise as to whether or not that law applies to 
the parties in the transaction, cases involving a native and a non-native often give rise to such a 
problem. Nevertheless, the approach of the Court has been that the customary law would apply 
where statutes so provide. In other cases, the test is which law serves justice better.209 
However, these rules are not absolute and may be displaced where: 
(a) The parties expressly agree that the customary law shall not apply. Sometimes the yardstick 
for applying customary law may differ. For example in the Northern States and Lagos State, the 
test for the application of a customary law is “Nativity Test”. In the Eastern States, the test is 
“Nigerian descent test”. In the Western States, the High Court laws provide expressly where 
customary law should apply. 
(b) In every case, application of a customary law is displaced where the nature of the transaction 
does not admit customary law 
(c) Where the transaction is unknown to the customs of the people, customary law would not 
apply .Typical examples of these transactions are statutory marriage cases. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
208See Cole v Cole, 1 NWLR 15 (1898) (Nigeria), Olowu v Olowu, Suit No AB/51/71 H/Court of Western States, 
Abeokuta (1973) (Nigeria), R v Princewill, NNLR 54 (1963) (Nigeria). 
209See See Lewis v Bankole, INLR 81 (1908) (Nigeria), Edet v Essien, 11 NLR 47 (1932) (Nigeria), Nelson v 
Nelson, 13 WACA 248 (1951) (Nigeria), Agidigbi v Agidigbi, 2 NWLR Pt 221 98 (1992) (Nigeria). 
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4.3 SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 
 
 
The sources of Nigeria law are;  
1. Nigerian legislation; 
2. English law which consists of: 
  (a) Received English law comprising of: 
(i) Common law 
(ii) Doctrines of equity 
(iii) Statues of general application in force in England on January 1, 1900210 
(iv) Statutes and subsidiary legislation on specified matters. 
(b) English law made before October 1, 1960 and extending to Nigeria. 
3. Customary law 
4. Judicial precedents 
 
4.3.1 Nigerian Legislation 
 
 
Nigerian legislation consists of statutes and subsidiary legislation. Statues are laws 
enacted by the legislature which is the legislative arm of government and subsidiary legislation is 
law enacted in the exercise of power given by a statute.211 Nigerian statutes consist of;  
                                                          
210 By virtue of section 4 of the Law of England (Application) Law and the States (Creation and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 1976 (No. 12 of 1976). 
 69 
 
a. Ordinances,  
b. Acts, 
c.  Laws.  
Ordinances are laws that were passed by the Nigerian Constitutional order in council of 
1954212 introducing a federal Constitution into Nigeria.  By virtue of section 57 of the 
Constitution of the Federation scheduled to the Order, any Ordinance in force on October 1, 
1954 was to be deemed to be a law made by the Federal Legislature or a Regional Legislature or 
made separately by the Federal and Regional Legislatures, roughly in accordance with the 
distribution of legislative powers under the Constitution.213  An Act is an enactment made or 
deemed to be made by the Federal Legislature before January 16, 1966.214 In general, a Law is 
simply any enactment made by the Legislature of a region or having effect as if made by that 
legislature, or any subordinate legislation made under such an enactment.215  
 
4.3.2 Received English Law 
 
The received English Law as a source of Nigerian law216 consists of the common law, 
doctrine of equity, statutes and subsidiary legislations.  English law extending to Nigeria is the 
law introduced into Nigeria directly by English legislation, this class of English law should be 
clearly distinguished from the received English law. The latter is introduced into Nigeria directly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
211 Obilade, supra note 136 at 64. 
212 Id. 
213 Obilade supra note 136. 
214 A military revolution occurred in Nigeria on January 15, 1966, Federal Military Government (Supremacy and 
Enforcement of Powers) Decree 1970 (No. 28 of 1970), Preamble. 
215 Obilade, supra note 136 at 65.  
216 The received English Law as a source of Nigerian law excludes English received law received by been enacted or 
re enacted as Nigerian legislation. English law extending to Nigeria is the law introduced into Nigeria directly by 
English legislation. 
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by Nigerian legislation. English law extending to Nigeria consists of statutes217 and subsidiary 
legislation made on or before October 1, 1960 and not yet repealed by an appropriate authority in 
Nigeria.218 
 
4.3.3 Customary Law 
 
Customary law consists of customs accepted by members of a community as binding 
amongst them. In Nigeria, customary law may be divided in terms of nature into two classes, 
namely, ethnic or non – Sharia customary law and Sharia law.  Ethnic customary law in Nigeria 
is indigenous, each system of such customary law applies to members of a particular ethnic 
group. Ethnic customary law for the most part is unwritten, and of course, may adjust with the 
times. Sharia law on the other hand is religious law based on the Moslem faith and applicable to 
members of the faith.219 
The diversity of customary law systems is an obstacle to uniformity of customary law 
systems in each state because of its unwritten nature and rules of customary law are subject to 
test of validity prescribed by statute. An applicable rule of customary law is not to be enforced 
by the Courts unless it passes the test and there are three such tests.220 The first is that the 
customary law is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience; the second is that 
it is not incompatible either directly or by implication with any law221 for the time being in force, 
                                                          
217 The statutes consisted of Acts of the U.K Parliament and prerogative Orders in Council. Prerogative Orders in 
Council are not subsidiary legislation. They are original laws made by the Crown as a legislature and are, therefore, 
statutes. Such Orders were made for the Colony of Lagos. 
218 Nigeria Independence Act 1960 (8 and 9 Eliz. 2, c.55). See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1960/55/pdfs/ukpga_19600055_en.pdf . 
219 Obilade, supra note 76 at 83. 
220 Ibrahim v. Amalibini 1 G.L.R. 368 (1978) (Nigeria). 
221 In the relevant enactments in force in former Bendel, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo States, the words “written law” are 
used in the place of the word “law”, Article 12(1) of the High Court Law (W.R.N. Laws Cap.44 (1959). “Written 
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and the third is that it is not contrary to public policy. All the statutory provisions on the first two 
tests are similar in wording and all the statutory provisions on the test of public policy are 
identical in wording. Section 26(1) of the High Court Law of Lagos State222 provides that the 
“High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of every customary law which is 
applicable and is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience nor incompatible 
either directly or by implication with any law for the time being in force.”223 
The repugnancy doctrine was applied in Edet v. Essien,224 where the plaintiff had paid the 
dowry for a woman and married her, she later left him and entered into a new marriage with 
another man, to whom she subsequently had two children. The plaintiff then alleged that, under a 
rule of Native law and custom, he was entitled to the custody of these children, since his dowry 
had not been repaid to him. It was held that such a rule of customary law was not conclusively 
proved and even if proved to exist, it was repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.  
In Mariyamo v. Sadiku Ejo,225 the High Court held that the custom which entitled a man to a 
child born by his former wife ten months after the marriage was repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience. Similarly, in Meribe v. Egwu,226 the Supreme Court held obiter that 
a ″woman to woman” marriage under customary law was repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience. This was without a consideration of the customary benefit of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
law” includes local legislation and excludes English statutes extending to Nigeria, Article 3 of the Interpretation 
Law W.R.N. Laws, Cap. 51 (1959). 
222 Lagos Laws Cap 52 (1973). 
223 High Court Law (N.N. Laws, Cap 40(1963) Article 34(1); High Court Law (E.N. Laws, Cap 61(1963), Article 
20(1) High Court Law, W.R.N. Laws, Cap 44 (1959), Article 12(1) High Court Law (1964) No. 9 of M.W.N, Article 
13(1) (1964). 
224 11 N.L.R. 47(1932) (Nigeria). 
225 N.R.N.L.R. 81 (1961) (Nigeria). 
226 1 ALL N.L.R. 266 at 275 (1976) (Nigeria). 
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arrangement, such as a wife marrying another wife for the husband, thus helping a barren woman 
to get a child indirectly, through the second woman.  
Like questions of fact in any judicial inquiry, customary law may be proved by calling 
witnesses who are vast in the customary law. They become expert witnesses as far as that 
customary law is concerned and are usually chiefs or traditional rulers of the community whose 
customary law is at issue and by virtue of their customary offices or positions are expected to 
know the customary law of their people.227 The Court is however not bound by such evidence.228 
For instance, in Ricardo v. Abal,229 concerning priority of choice on partition of the deceased’s 
estate in accordance with customary law, the Court commented as thus:  
 
“Now both of these witnesses were called by the plaintiff and knew, of course, what 
evidence they were expected to give. Nevertheless in the absence of any other evidence, I 
cannot reject their testimony on that ground, nor do I consider it inherently improbable. I 
quite believe that they have correctly described the proper procedure in cases of partition 
of family property, and it is not unreasonable to believe that priority of choice should be 
given to the eldest born, irrespective of sex” 
 
In addition, a party who wishes the Court to recognize and enforce a particular customary 
law may request the Court to take judicial notice of the law, instead of proving it as a fact. 
Section 14(2) of the Evidence Act laid down conditions that must be fulfilled before judicial 
                                                          
227 In Lewis v. Bankole, 1 N.L.R. 100-101(1909) (Nigeria), there was a huge assemblage of famous traditional rulers 
and chiefs who served as expert witnesses in that case.   
228 In Ewa Ekeng Inyang v. Efana Ekeng Ita 9 N.L.R. at 84-85 (1929) (Nigeria). Berkeley, J. observed: “A good deal 
of evidence was given by both sides on this question of Native law and custom. This kind of so-called expert 
evidence must always be treated with very great caution. The evidence of these experts is invariably colored each by 
his own personal interests. The only way in which such testimony can be safely treated is to refrain from attempting 
to estimate individual credibility and to concentrate on drawing conclusions from the general trend of the evidence”.   
229 7 N.L.R. 58 at 59 (1926) (Nigeria).  
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notice is taken of a custom, It states that a custom may be judicially noticed by the Court if it has 
been acted upon by a Court of superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same area to an extent 
which justifies the Court  to apply it in assuming that the persons or the class of persons 
concerned in that area look upon the same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to those 
under consideration. 
Unlike customary law, Sharia law is principally in a written form. The version of Sharia 
law in force in Nigeria is the Sharia law of the Maliki School230 which is being enforced in some 
states in Northern Nigeria where the population is predominantly Moslem. The scope of 
operation of Islamic law has been broadened since the introduction of the Sharia legal system in 
the present democratic dispensation and the principal feature of this new development is the 
introduction of religious based criminal offences, especially on matters of morality and the 
introduction of punishments sanctioned by the Quran.231 Sharia law is not applicable to non 
Muslims.  
At this point, I will like to point out the differences between Islamic law and customary 
law to avoid any misconceptions between both sets of laws, also to set the record straight that 
Islamic law is not and should not be regarded as customary law.  As categorically stated in the 
pronouncement of Justice Wali in the Supreme Court case of Alkamawa v Bello,232 “Islamic law 
was not customary law”. His Lordship in the concluding part of the judgment said:  
 
                                                          
230 The Sharia Court of Appeal Law (N.N. Laws 1963, Cap. 122), Article 14 empowers the Sharia Court of Appeal 
of each of the northern States to administer Moslem law of the Maliki School as customarily interpreted at the place 
where the trial at first instance took place. 
231 http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/nigeria.htm 
232 6 SCNJ 127 [1998) (Nigeria). 
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“Islamic Law is not the same as customary Law as it does not belong to any particular 
tribe. It is a complete system of universal Law, more certain and permanent and more 
universal than the English Common Law”.233  
 
Under Islamic law, customary law is recognized as a separate law. Here, customary law 
may be applicable to non-Muslims living under the protection of an Islamic State and since Islam 
does not impose its laws or way of life on non-Muslims, they enjoy a large measure of judicial 
autonomy in the conduct of their civil affairs.234 Justice Bairamian FJ described customary law in 
Owonyin v Omotosho,235 as a mirror of accepted usage because the validity of a customary law 
depends on its acceptance by the community. In the case of Islamic law, it is the law that shapes 
the community and not the community that shapes the law.236  
While the origin of customary law is the community, that of Islamic law is divine. 
Islamic Law unlike customary law has basic elements that do not change with time. In Lewis v 
Bankole,237 Osborne C J described customary law as one of the most striking features of West 
African native custom. .. Is its flexibility, it appears to have been always subject to motives of 
expediency, and it shows unquestionable adaptability to altered circumstances without entirely 
losing its character.238 
                                                          
233 Id.  
234Non Muslims pay jizya (tribute tax), in exchange for State protection. See Said Ramadan, Islamic Law: Its Scope 
and Equity (1970) and Muhib O Opeloye, The Quranic Guidelines in Inter-Religious Relations: An Overview, in, Ile 
Ife (1992) (Nigeria). 
235 1 All NLR 304(1961) (Nigeria). 
236 See Oba., 'Law as an Instrument of Social Change: The Common Law and Islamic Law Perspectives' (paper 
presented at the Annual Award Luncheon of the National Association of Muslim Law Students (NAMLASS) held at 
Ilorin, Nigeria on 17 Feb 2001. 
237 1 NLR 81(1908) (Nigeria). 
238 Id.  
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While a particular customary law is usually limited, more or less to particular ethnic groups and 
communities,239 Islamic law is not an indigenous phenomenon in Nigeria. It transcends national, 
ethnic, racial and language barriers.240 Unlike customary law which is unwritten and uncodified, 
Islamic law is written and its contents are ascertainable from written sources which include the 
Qur'an, Hadith and countless books written from the earliest era of Islam up to the modem era 
wherein, Islamic law matters are discussed and expound 
 
Table 2: DIFFERNCES BETWEEN CUSTOMARY LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW 
(SHARIA) 
 
CUSTOMARY LAW ISLAMIC LAW (SHARIA) 
• Customary law is unwritten and 
uncodified. 
• Islamic law is written. 
• It applies to non Muslims.  • It applies to only Muslims. 
• The community shapes the law. • Islamic law shapes the community. 
• The origin of customary law is the 
community. 
• The origin of Islamic law is divine. 
• Customary law changes with time, it 
is very flexible. 
• Islamic law has basic elements that do 
not change with time. 
• Customary law is limited to a 
particular ethnic group or community. 
• Islamic law is not indigenous. 
                                                          
239 Saka Salau v Aderibigbe WNLR 80, (1963) (Nigeria), Nsirim v Nsirim  9 NWLR (Pt. 418) 144 (1995) (Nigeria); 
Usman v Umaru 7 NWLR (Pt. 254) 377 (1992) (Nigeria) and Obi v Obijindu 1 NWLR (Pt. 423) 240 (1996) 
(Nigeria). 
240 Kharie Zaidan v Fatima Mohsen  UILR (Pt. II) 283 at 292 (1971) (Nigeria). 
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4.3.4 Judicial Precedent 
 
 
Judicial precedent or case law consists of law found in judicial decisions. A judicial 
precedent is the principle law on which a judicial decision is based. It is the ratio decidendi 
otherwise known as the reason for the decision. It is not everything said by a judge in the course 
of his judgment that constituents a precedent, only the pronouncement on law in relation to the 
material facts before the judge constitutes a precedent.241 The doctrine of judicial precedent as a 
common law doctrine applies to only those Courts which are empowered to administer adjective 
common law of which forms part of the doctrine.  
Customary Courts, Sharia Courts of Appeal and area Courts are not empowered to apply 
adjective common law.242 Therefore, the common law doctrine does not apply to them nor does 
any legislation provide for a precedent system in customary Courts. As a general rule under the 
doctrine of stare decisis, a Court is bound to follow decisions of a higher Court in the hierarchy. 
But a lower Court is not bound to follow a decision of a higher Court which has been overruled. 
Furthermore, a lower Court is not bound by a decision of a higher Court where that decision is in 
conflict with a decision of another Court which is above such higher Court in the hierarchy. In 
principles, a lower Court is entitled to choose which of the two conflicting decisions of a higher 
Court of equal standing it would follow.243It should be noted that a binding precedent may be 
abolished by legislation.244 
 
                                                          
241 Obilade, supra 76 at 111.  
242 S. 20(3) of the Area Court Edict 1968 (No. 4 of 1968). 
243 See Chime v Elikwu N.M.L.R. 71 (1965) (Nigeria). 
244 See Lakanmi v Attorney  General  1 U.I.L.R. 201 (1971) (Nigeria). 
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4.4 GOVERNMENT BODIES 
 
 
The system of government in the Federal Republic of Nigeria is modeled after the American 
Presidential system with the following arms of government: 
• The Legislature 
• The Executive  
• The Judiciary 
4.4.1 Legislature 
The federal legislature is responsible for law making by following the law making 
procedures as specified in Sections 58 and 59 of the 1999 Constitution. The legislature is 
bicameral and is made up of the Senate and House of Representatives.245 The Senate is made up 
of one hundred and nine elected members while the House of Representatives has three hundred 
and sixty members. The membership of the Senate is on the basis of equality of states with each 
state having three Senators. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is represented by one senator. 
The number of Representatives elected by each State is determined on the basis of population.246 
Each state also has its own law making organ known as the House of Assembly, the members 
elected into the Houses of Assembly represent the various state constituencies usually delineated 
on the basis of population.247 
                                                          
245 http://www.nigeriacongress.org/senate.htm 
246 Id.  
247 Id. 
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4.4.2 Executive 
 
The executive power of the federation is vested in the President by virtue of Section 5(1) 
(a) of the 1999 Constitution, such powers can be administered directly or through the Vice-
President or Ministers or officers of the Government. Similarly, in the states the executive power 
of a state is vested in the Governor and may be exercised directly by the Governor or through the 
Deputy Governor, Commissioners or other public officers.248 
 
4.4.3 Judiciary 
 
Nigeria operates the adversarial system of Court proceedings similar to what is obtainable 
in other common law countries. The 1999 Constitution makes provisions for the establishment 
and Constitution of the following Courts;249 By virtue of Section 6 (1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution 1999, the following Courts are established in the Federal Republic of Nigeria: 
1. The Supreme Court of Nigeria;  
2. The Court of Appeal;  
3. The Federal High Court;  
4. The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja;  
5. The High Court of a State 
6. The Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; 
7. The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State;  
                                                          
248 http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm 
249 Constitution, Chapter IV (1999) (Nigeria). 
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8. The Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja;  
9. The Customary Court of Appeal of a State. 
 
4.5 HIERARCHY OF COURTS IN NIGERIA 
 
The Courts established by the Constitution are the only superior Courts of record in Nigeria, 
the Constitution also empowers the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly to establish 
Courts with subordinate jurisdiction to the High Courts.  
4.5.1 The Supreme Court of Nigeria 
The Supreme Court is the highest Court for Nigeria,250 established in 1963 by the Nigerian 
Constitution.251 This is the apex Court in the hierarchy of Courts and is situated in the Federal 
Capital Territory, Abuja. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria are binding on all other 
Courts. The common law doctrine does not apply to Customary Courts, area Courts or Sharia 
Courts of Appeal. In principle, by virtue of the appellate systems whereby decisions of these 
Courts can ultimately reach the Supreme Court, the Courts should follow decisions of the 
Supreme Courts. 252 
The Chief Justice of the Federation heads the Judiciary of Nigeria and presides over the 
Court. The Court has limited but exclusive original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction is to 
determine appeals from the Court of Appeal and this is also to the exclusion of any other Court. 
                                                          
250 Constitution, Art 120 (1999) (Nigeria). 
251 Act No. 20 of (1963). 
252 See Obeya v Soluade N.N.L.R. 17 (1969 ) (Nigeria). 
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253The Court consists of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and such number of Justices not exceeding 
twenty one as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, presently there are seventeen 
justices at the Supreme Court.254 The decision of the Supreme Court on any matter is final and is 
not subject to an appeal to any other body or person. This is however without prejudice to the 
power of the President or Governor of a State exercise of Prerogative of Mercy in appropriate 
cases. The decisions of the Court are binding on all other Courts in Nigeria.255 The Supreme 
Court does not in any capacity entertain corruption cases. 
4.5.2 The Court of Appeal  
This Court, a superior Court of record was established on October 1, 1976256 and is next in 
the hierarchy of Courts in Nigeria. Its decisions are binding on all other lower Courts. The Court 
of Appeal is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. It is composed of the 
President of the Court of Appeal and other Justices of the Court of Appeal not being less than 
forty-nine.257 The Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction, 258 It also has appellate 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the High Courts of the States and the Federal 
Capital Territory, Federal High Court, the Sharia Courts of Appeal of the States or of the Federal 
Capital Territory, Customary Courts of Appeal of the States or of the Federal Capital Territory as 
well as from decisions of a Court martial or other tribunals as specified by an Act of the National 
Assembly.259 The Court is duly constituted by not less than three Justices for the purpose of 
                                                          
253 Constitution, Art. 232(1) (1999) (Nigeria). 
254 http://www.nigeria-law.org/Supreme%20Court%20of%20Nigeria.htm. 
255 Constitution, Art. 235 (1999) (Nigeria). 
256 No. 42 of (1962). 
257 Constitution, Art. 237(a) & (b) (1999) (Nigeria). 
258 Constitution, Art. 239 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
259 Constitution, Art. 241(1) (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
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exercising any of its stated jurisdictions.260 The Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from the Federal High Court or High Court of a State on corruption matters. 
4.5.3 The Federal High Court  
The Federal High Court comprises of a Chief Judge and such number of Judges as the 
National Assembly may prescribe.261 The Court has limited but exclusive jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal causes or matters as set out in the Constitution,262 It however has no appellate 
jurisdiction. In exercising its jurisdiction, the Court is duly constituted by one Judge of the 
Court.263 Like the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court is divided into Judicial Divisions for 
administrative convenience but has a wider geographical spread as these Divisions are currently 
situated in over seventeen states of the Federation with plans to establish a Division of the Court 
in all the States of the Federation.264 The EFCC Act provides that the Federal High Court has 
jurisdiction to try offenders under the Act.265 
4.5.4 High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja consists of a Chief Judge and such 
number of Judges as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.266 Subject to the 
provisions of section 251 and any other provisions of the 1999 Nigerian  Constitution and in 
addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, this Court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a 
                                                          
260 Constitution, Art. 247(1)  (1999) (Nigeria). 
261 Constitution, Art. 249(1) & (2) (1999) (Nigeria). 
262 Constitution, Art. 251 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
263 Constitution, Art. 253 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
264 http://www.fhc-ng.org/. 
265 Section 18(1). 
266 Constitution, Art. 255 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
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legal right, power, duty, liability privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and 
determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment 
or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.267  
This Court shall be duly constituted if it consists of at least one Judge of that Court. 268 
Subject to the provisions of any Act of the National Assembly, the Chief Judge of this Court may 
make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja.269 The ICPC Act vest jurisdiction in the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory to hear corruption matters.270 
4.5.5 Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
This Court consists of   a Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal and such number of 
Kadis as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.271 The Sharia Court of Appeal 
shall in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National 
Assembly exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving 
questions of Islamic personal law. 272 For the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred 
upon it by this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly, this Court shall be duly 
constituted if it consists of at least three Kadis.273 It is also important to note that since Islam 
does not impose its laws or way of life on non-Muslims, they enjoy a large measure of judicial 
autonomy in the conduct of their civil affairs.274 
                                                          
267 Constitution, Art. 257(1) (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
268 Constitution, Art. 258 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
269 Constitution, Art. 259 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
270 Section 61(3). 
271 Constitution, Art. 260 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
272 Constitution, Art. 262(1) (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
273 Constitution, Art. 263 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
274 S.O. Mohammad, op cit, 244-8 & Said Ramadan, op cit, 115-20, 146, 152-70. 
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4.5.6 The Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
This Court consists of a President and such number of Judges as may be prescribed by an 
Act of the National Assembly.275 This Court shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as may 
be conferred upon by an Act of The National Assembly exercise such appellate and supervisory 
jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of customary law. 276 For the purpose of 
exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or any Act of the National 
Assembly, the Customary Court of Appeal is duly constituted if it consists of at least three 
Judges of that Court.277 
4.5.7 The High Court  
All high Courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and the Court of 
Appeal. There is a High Court in each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. 
A judge of a High Court in Nigeria sitting as a Court of first instance is not bound by the 
decisions of another judge of the High Court sitting as a Court of first instance.278 Each Court is 
made up of a Chief Judge and such other number of judges as the State House of Assembly or 
the National Assembly (in the case of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory) may 
prescribe.279 The Court is duly constitutes by one judge, each High Court is divided into Judicial 
Divisions for administrative convenience. 280 The EFCC Act provides that the High Court of a 
                                                          
275 Constitution, Art. 265(1999 ) (Nigeria). 
276 Constitution, Art. 267 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
277 Constitution, Art. 268 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
278 Supra Note 128. 
279 Constitution, Art. 270 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
280 Constitution, Art. 273 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
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state has jurisdiction to try offenders under the Act281 on corruption matters. The ICPC Act also 
vests jurisdiction in the State High Court to hear corruption matters.282 
4.5.8 The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State 
This Court shall consist of a Grandi Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal and such member of 
Kadi as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State.283   This Court shall, in 
addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of the State, exercise 
such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic 
personal Law which the Court is competent to decide in accordance with the Provisions of the 
Constitution.284 For the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this 
Constitution or any law, a Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall be duly constituted if it 
consists of at least three Kadis.285 
4.5.9 The Customary Court of Appeal of a State 
There is a Customary Court of Appeal for any State that requires it.286 This Court has 
appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of customary 
law287 comprises of a President and a number of Judges as the National Assembly or the State 
Houses of Assembly (as the case may be) may prescribe.288 In addition to these Courts created 
by the Constitution, there also exist inferior Courts like the Magistrate Courts, District Courts, 
Area Courts and Customary Courts established in various states by state laws. These Courts are 
                                                          
281 Section 18(1). 
282 Section 61(3). 
283 Constitution, Art. 275 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
284 Constitution, Art. 277 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
285 Constitution, Art. 278 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
286 Constitution, Art. 280(1999 ) (Nigeria). 
287 Constitution, Art. 282 (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
288Constitution, Art. 280(2)(a)&(b) (1999 ) (Nigeria). 
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4.6 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Like all jurisdictions of the world, legal literature of Nigeria is made up of primary and 
secondary sources.289 
4.6.1 Primary Sources 
There are many law reports that have been published over the years, there is no government 
organ solely responsible for law reporting. However, individual law reports published on a 
commercial basis are thriving, even though the life-span of some of these publications is 
epileptic because of the high cost of production.  The following is a list of law reports that have 
been published over the years;290 
 
•  Nigeria Law Report  
• All Nigeria Law Reports 
•  Nigerian Monthly Law Reports  
• Law Reports of Nigeria 
• Federation of Nigeria Law Selected Judgments of the West African Court of Appeal 
(WACA) 
• Western Region of Nigeria Law Reports  
• Eastern Region of Nigeria Law Reports 
• Northern Region of Nigeria Law Reports 
• Sharia Law reports of Nigeria 
                                                          
289 http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/nigeria.htm. 
290 Id. 
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• Customary law in Nigeria through the cases 
• Quarterly Law Reports of Nigeria Nigerian Weekly Law Reports Nigerian 
Constitutional Law Reports  
• Supreme Court of Nigeria Judgments  
•  Nigerian Supreme Court Cases 
•  Supreme Court Reports  
• Nigerian Commercial Law Cases 
• Nigerian Revenue Law Reports 
• Failed Banks Tribunal of Nigeria Law Reports  
• Weekly Reports of Nigeria  
• Supreme Court Monthly 
• Monthly Judgments of the Supreme Court of Nigeria  
• Federation Weekly Law Reports  
• All Federation Weekly Law Reports 
• Nigerian Supreme Court Quarterly Law Reports  
• Federal Reporter 
• Election Petition Reports  
4.6.2 Secondary Sources 
Members of Nigerian academia, the bench, and the bar have written a lot of legal 
textbooks, for an exhaustive list of secondary sources, see appendix 2. 
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4.7 JURIDICTIONAL CONFLICTS IN PROSECUTING CORRUPTION CASES 
There are cases of conflicts of jurisdiction amongst the various agencies and institutions 
involved in anticorruption crusade, major conflicts of jurisdiction can be observed in the 
relations between or amongst Courts in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Civil and 
criminal cases jurisdictional conflict in corruption cases sometimes results in situations where 
criminal and civil elements of the acts that constitute the corruption lead to questions of criminal 
or civil jurisdiction of the trial Court. The landmark case on jurisdictional conflict amongst 
anticorruption commissions is the case of former governor of Bayelsa state, Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha and the Code of Conduct Tribunal. 
In 2007,  Mr. Alamieyeseigha was convicted by a Federal High Court, Lagos Division, 
over allegation of money laundering after a plea-bargain was entered between him and the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. Mr Alamieyeseigha was later arraigned before the 
Code of Conduct Tribunal on similar charges bordering on false declaration of assets and abuse 
of office. Accordingly, the case against Alamieyeseigha was withdrawn because the accused 
would have suffered double jeopardy if the Tribunal had tried him again.291 
The old rule in Smith v. Selwyn292 has continued to generate controversy as there are now 
two Court of Appeal cases namely AG Federation & 4 Ors v. Dawodu & 7 Ors293 and  Ndibe v. 
                                                          
291 FG Drops Charges Against Almieyeseigha, Punch Newspaper (December 14, 2007).  
2923KB 98 (1914). The common law rule in Smith v. Selwyn states that where a civil wrong is also a crime, 
prosecution of the criminal aspect must be initiated, or reasons for default of prosecution given, before any action 
filed by the plaintiff can be heard. Thus, it was the position that where a tort was also a crime, the filing of criminal 
proceedings against the wrongdoer, preceded the filing of a civil suit by the aggrieved party. This is known as the 
rule in Smith v. Selwyn. When the rule in Smith v. Selwyn was not observed, the civil action by 
the plaintiff could not proceed and it was bound to fail as long as the defendant had not been prosecuted or a 
reasonable excuse given for the lack of prosecution. However, the rule in Smith v. Selwyn which has been abolished 
in Britain, also no longer apply in Nigeria because the rule was a breach of the Nigerian Constitution (sections 
6(6)(b), 17(2)(e), 46(1) and 315(3), which provisions forbid the blocking of access to Court.), Criminal Code Act 
(section 5)and the  Interpretation Act (section 8).  
2932 NWLR pt 380, 712 (1995) (Nigeria). The fact in issue was whether the Court was right in dismissing the 
appellant’s application for stay of proceedings in the civil suit pending the determination of the criminal charge 
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Ndibe294 with opposing conclusions as to its continued applicability to Nigerian legal system.  
The differences also touch on the applicable rules of Court and procedure in Alamieyeseigha v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.295  
Federal offences are to be prosecuted in Federal High Courts only and same for state law 
offences. There are situations however where Federal and State laws exist and the crime violates 
simultaneously both laws. By the principle of covering this field, such state laws are supposed to 
be in abeyance for as long as the federal legislation applies. Besides these Federal and State High 
Courts have a long history of jurisdictional conflicts bordering on such issues like the presence 
or lack of criminal jurisdiction of Federal High Courts, implication of the unlimited jurisdiction 
of the State High Courts under the 1999 Constitution and the implication of section 251 (1) of 
the 1999 Constitution on the jurisdiction of the State High Courts over matters involving Federal 
agencies.   
Another area of jurisdictional conflict of the Courts as institution for enforcing anti-
corruption laws is that involving Magistrate Court especially when it is dealing with indictable 
offences for which the accused must elect summary trial before the Court can be invested with 
jurisdiction. Going further, section 4 of Police Act296 provides Police with omnibus powers to go 
into any crime investigation, corruption inclusive and by its general investigative powers, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
against the 4th defendant. Based on the Rule in Smith v Selwyn. In dismissing the appeal, Per Akanbi PCA held that 
“modern thinking in our Courts today is that the rule in Smith Vs Selwyn can no longer be seen as furthering public 
justice, public policy or public interest. An attempt to apply the principle would amount to infraction of Section 236 
of the 1979 constitution. 
2945 NWLR  pt 551, 632 (1990) (Nigeria). The appellant in this case filed a motion for a stay of proceedings pending 
the completion of the criminal prosecution. The High Court refused a stay of proceedings at that stage. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeal per Salami, JCA in a well reasoned and properly articulated judgment dismissed the appeal 
holding that it would be inequitable to do so in the circumstances of the case. 
295 7 QCCR 1, (2006) (Nigeria). The fact in issue here was whether the trial Court was wrong in refusing to stay 
proceedings in the criminal charge against the appellant pending the hearing and determination of the civil suits filed 
by the appellant against the Attorney General of Federation and Chief Justice Bayelsa state respectively and whether 
the charge against the appellant was initiated in substantial compliance with provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Act and the Federal High Court Act. The Court of Appeal  held that  the trial Court was right. 
296 http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFN-1990.htm 
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Police can handle virtually all provisions of laws, including but not restricted to Criminal Code 
and Penal Code, dealing with corruption.297  Similarly, a fraud or corruption violating the 
provisions of EFCC or ICPC Act would naturally activate these bodies and trigger off 
investigation by any of these Commissions established under it.   
There is therefore a fundamental problem of jurisdictional conflicts, overlapping powers, 
confusion and conflict about their functions that needs to be addressed between all anticorruption 
agencies. This is particularly important because of the constitutional requirement of the rule 
against double jeopardy which states that once a person has been investigated and prosecuted by 
one agency, it precludes other agencies from revisiting the subject of investigation again in any 
form or disguise. It is mandatory to state that the varied conflicts surrounding these laws, 
agencies and the institutions for their enforcement must be resolved if the anti-corruption crusade 
is to continue beneficially. Therefore, the issue of streamlining the operations of these agencies 
must be addressed.  
4.8 LEGISLATIONS AGAINST CORRUPTION 
4.8.1 Domestic Legislation 
4.8.1.1 Constitutional provisions on corruption; The Nigerian 1999 Constitution 
I shall be pointing out sections of the Constitution that relate to corruption.  The Nigerian 
1999 Constitution contains provisions aimed at preventing corruption in Nigeria, Section 15(5) 
of the 1999 Constitution under the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy 
                                                          
297 Section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers the Police to interpose and prevent the commission of any 
offence apparently under any law. 
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require the state to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of power.298 Similarly, section 13 of the 
same Constitution states that all organs of the government are required to conform to and 
observe the provisions of the chapter on fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy.299 
On declaration of assets and liabilities, Section 140 (1) and Section 185 (1) states that a 
person elected to the office of President shall not begin to perform the functions of that office 
until he has declared his assets and liabilities as prescribed in this Constitution and he has taken 
and subscribed the Oath of Allegiance and the oath of office prescribed in the Seventh Schedule 
to this Constitution. Similarly, a person elected to the office of the Governor of a State shall not 
begin to perform the functions of that until he has declared his assets and liabilities as prescribed 
in the Constitution and has subsequently taken and subscribed the Oath of Allegiance and oath of 
office prescribed in the Seventh Schedule to this Constitution. 
Also, section 149 and Section 194 states that a Minister of the Government of the 
Federation shall not enter upon the duties of his office, unless he has declared his assets and 
liabilities as prescribed in this Constitution and has subsequently taken and subscribed the Oath 
of Allegiance and the oath of office for the due execution of the duties of his office prescribed in 
the Seventh Schedule to this Constitution. Further, a Commissioner of the Government of a State 
shall not commence the duties of his office unless he has declared his assets and liabilities as 
prescribed in this Constitution and has subsequently taken and subscribed the oath of Allegiance 
and the oath for the due execution of the duties of his office prescribed in the Seventh Schedule 
to this Constitution. 
                                                          
298 Constitution, Art. 15(5) (1999) (Nigeria). 
299 Constitution, Art. 13 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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On gifts and benefits, the fifth schedule, part 1, Section 6 of the Constitution states that a 
public officer shall not ask for or accept property or benefits of any kind for himself or any other 
person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his duties. 
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the receipt by a public officer of any 
gifts or benefits from commercial firms, business enterprises or persons who have contracts with 
the government shall be presumed to have been received in contravention of the said sub-
paragraph unless the contrary is proved. 
It further states that a public officer shall only accept personal gifts or benefits from 
relatives or personal friends to such extent and on such occasions as are recognized by custom,  
provided that any gift or donation to a public officer on any public or ceremonial occasion shall 
be treated as a gift to the appropriate institution represented by the public officer and 
accordingly, the mere acceptance or receipt of any such gift shall not be treated as a 
contravention of this provision. 
 On bribing public officers and the abuse of office, Sections 8,9,10 of the fifth schedule, 
part 1 state that no persons shall offer a public officer any property, gift or benefit of any kind as 
an inducement or bribe for the granting of any favor or the discharge in his favor of the public 
officer’s duties. A public officer shall not do or direct to be done, in abuse of his office, any 
arbitrary act prejudicial to the rights of any other person knowing that such act is unlawful or 
contrary to any government policy. A public officer shall not be a member of, belong to, or take 
part in any society the membership of which is incompatible with the functions or dignity of his 
office.  
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On the issue of punishment for corrupt practices, Section 18(1), part 1, schedule 5 state 
that where the Code of Conduct Tribunal finds a public officer guilty of contravention of any of 
the provisions of this Code it shall impose upon that officer any of the punishments specified 
under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph and such other punishment as may be prescribed by 
the National Assembly. Sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph states that the punishment which the 
Code of Conduct Tribunal may impose shall include any of the following; vacation of office or 
seat in any legislative house, as the case may be; disqualification from membership of a 
legislative house and from the holding of any public office for a period not exceeding ten years; 
and seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office. 
Even though the Constitution has done a fantastic job in promulgating provisions that 
will help in preventing corruption, the Constitution still contains some structural weaknesses. 
The first issue I have with the Constitutional provision on corruption is in section 15(5) where 
the Constitution failed to enumerate what it means by corrupt practices, because of the 
complexities associated with corruption, it is been interpreted and perceived differently by 
individuals. Hence, what one party may perceive as corruption may not be corruption to another 
party. Therefore, the failure of the Constitution to state what its interpretation of corrupt practices 
is a lacuna that needs be addressed. 
Consequently, the 1999 Constitution contains several provisions that subject the 
government to accountability and transparency. However, it must be noted that some of the 
constitutional provisions have had the effect of protecting some public official from any civil 
proceedings or criminal prosecution relating to acts or practice of corruption. Most significant in 
this light is the immunity provisions of section 308 of the Constitution.300 To recap, section 308 
(1) of the 1999 Constitution offers a virtual carte blanche to the executives to get away with 
                                                          
300 Constitution, Art 308 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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anything. What it confers on them is that they are free from criminal and civil prosecution, no 
matter what offence they committed whilst in office. They cannot be compelled to appear in 
court, be arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned if they commit any criminal or civil offence whilst 
they enjoy the privilege of being in office. 
There are however a few exceptions to the Immunity clause as decided by case laws. 
Immunity of governors from civil proceedings does not mean that the person protected cannot be 
investigated for alleged crime as decided in the case of Fawehinmi v 1.G.P.301 Another exception 
is that State governors are not immuned from legal proceedings in respect of election petition as 
decided in  Alliance for Democracy v. Fayose.302 Obviously, the immunity clause does not apply 
to investigations and election petition matters. The immunity clause is a constitutional provision 
right that is vested in the constitution and cannot be taken away or interfered with by any other 
legislation except the constitution.303 In light of the above, anti corruption commissions cannot 
interfere or take away a constitutional provision which provides for the immunity of the 
president, vice president, state governors and other public officers from civil and criminal 
proceedings while in office. 
The idea in respect of section 308 of the 1999 Constitution is to ensure that the 
beneficiary, the head of government or executive concentrates fully on the business of 
governance and is not distracted by civil or criminal suits against him in the law courts. 
However, I believe that the removal of this much abused immunity clause would be a step in the 
right direction because  in a corruption-ridden society like Nigeria, the immunity clause has 
proved to be more evil than good because it has been abused by irresponsible public officers. 
 I decided to develop this analysis as to whether the National Assembly has legislative 
                                                          
301 5 SC (Pt. 1) 63 at 81- 82, (2002) FWLR (Pt.108) 1355 at 1386 (SC). 
302  ALL FWLR (Pt.218) 951 at 956 -960 (2004). 
303 FWLR (Pt.118) 1385 at 1404 -1405 (CA) (2003). 
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powers over anti corruption statutes according to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution because there 
have been arguments in the past as to whether the National Assembly had legislative powers 
over anti corruption statutes or not. The general legislative powers of the National Assembly are 
contained in section 4 of the 1999 Constitution, the section states that the legislative powers of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in the National Assembly which consists of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives.304  The National Assembly shall have powers to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect 
to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule 
to the Constitution.305  
Now, the  power of the National Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the Federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative 
List shall, save as otherwise provided in the Constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of 
Assembly of States.306 The Constitution does not provide for the sharing of legislative powers 
between the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly of States in respect of matters in 
the Exclusive Legislative List. The Constitution further stated that in addition and without 
prejudice to the powers conferred by section 4(2), the National Assembly shall have powers to 
make laws with respect to; any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first 
column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution to the extent prescribed in the 
second column opposite thereto and any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to 
make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Also, Section 4(6) of the Constitution provides that the legislative powers of a state of the 
federation shall be vested in the House of Assembly of the State which shall have power to make 
                                                          
304 Constitution, Art. 4(1) (1999) (Nigeria). 
305 Id, at Art 4(2). 
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laws for the peace, order and good government of a State or any part thereof with respect to the  
any matter not included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule 
to the Constitution and any matter included in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first 
column of Part II to the Second Schedule to the extent prescribed with respect to which it is 
empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.307 
Due to this confusion, the Supreme Court decided to deliberate as to whether the National 
Assembly has the constitutional power to legislate on corruption in the light of the federal 
arrangement in the 1999 Constitution. The fact in issue before the Court was the constitutionality 
of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 in the case of Attorney-General of 
Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation.308 By an originating summons filed, the 
plaintiff asked for the following six reliefs:   
• A determination of the question whether or not the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act, 2000, is valid and in force as a law enacted by the National Assembly and 
in force in every State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (including Ondo State). 
• A determination of the question whether or not the Attorney-General of the Federation 
(1st defendant) or any person authorized by him can lawfully initiate legal proceedings in 
any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of any of the criminal offences created by any 
of the provisions of the said Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. 
• A declaration that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, is not in 
force as law in Ondo State. 
                                                          
307 Id, at Art 4(7). 
308 9 NWLR  Pt. 772, 222 (2002). 
 97 
 
• A declaration that it is not lawful for the Attorney-General of the Federation (1st 
defendant) or any person authorized by him to initiate legal proceedings in any Court of 
law in Ondo State in respect of the criminal offences purported to be created by the 
provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. 
• An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Federal Government, its functionaries or 
agencies (including the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission) from executing, 
applying or enforcing the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Act, 2000 in Ondo State whether by interfering with the activities of any person in Ondo 
State (including any public officer or functionary or officer or servant of the Government 
of Ondo State) in exercise of powers purported to be conferred by or under the provisions 
of the said Act or otherwise howsoever. 
• An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Attorney-General of the Federation 
including his officers, servants and agents whosoever or howsoever from exercising any 
of the powers vested in him by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
or by any other law in respect of any of the criminal offences created by any of the 
provisions contained in the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. 
In resolving the conflict, the Supreme Court referred to and construed relevant provisions of 
the 1999 Constitution, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 and the 
Interpretation Act of 1964.309 The Court held that where an enactment is in relation to a matter 
within the enumerated classes of subjects expressly assigned to the National Assembly by 
section 15(5) and Item 60(a) on the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution. The 
National Assembly may by that enactment provide for matters which, although are within the 
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legislative, or even executive, competence of the states, are necessarily incidental or ancillary to 
effective legislation by the National Assembly in relation to that enumerated matter.310 
The Court also stated that it is the construction of the constitutional provisions under which 
powers are allocated to the different governments that determines whether an Act of the Federal 
or National Government has gone beyond limits to interfere with the affairs of a State in matters 
reserved to it under the Constitution. The Court further stated that going by the definitions of 
“State” and “Government” in section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the directive under section 
15(5) of the Constitution states that “the State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of 
government” applies to all the three tiers of government. In that case, the power to legislate in 
order to prohibit corrupt practices and abuse of power is concurrent and can be exercised by the 
Federal and State Governments by virtue of section 49(2), 4(4)(b) and 4(7)(c) of the 
Constitution.311 
The Court added that although the power to legislate on the subject of corruption and abuse 
of office is given to the National Assembly and State House of Assembly, when both exercise 
the power, the legislation by the National Assembly will prevail by virtue of section 4(5) of the 
Constitution. Since by virtue of section 4(2) of the 1999 Constitution the National Assembly has 
the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation with respect 
to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List.  It follows that the National Assembly is 
empowered to legislate under Item 60(a) of the Exclusive Legislative List for the power to make 
laws in respect to “any other matter which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution.”  
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In conclusion, the Court stated that the issue of corruption and abuse of power has become 
international, it is a declared state policy in Nigeria to combat it and so it has assumed a national 
issue of high priority which is considered best suited for the National Assembly to be addressed 
through a federal agency like the ICPC.312Reading these provisions of the 1999 Constitution 
together and construed liberally and broadly the Court noted that it can easily be seen that the 
National Assembly possesses the power both “incidental” and “implied” to promulgate the 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, to enable the State, which for this 
purpose means the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to implement provisions of Item 68 read 
together with section 15(5) of the Constitution which confers power on the National Assembly to 
enact the Act.313 
 4.8.1.2 Code of Conduct Act, 1989 
The Code of Conduct Bureau was set up by the Federal Government under the Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act.314  Under Sections 172 and 209 of the Constitution, persons 
in both Federal and State public services are required to conform to and observe the Code of 
Conduct.315 The Code also makes it mandatory for public officers to declare their assets 
immediately after taking office and at the end of his or her tenure,316 it requires a public officer 
to abstain from putting himself in a position where his personal interests will conflict with his 
official duties.317 It prohibits a public officer, except where he is employed on a part-time basis, 
                                                          
312 Id.  
313 Id. The Supreme Court also considered the same issue in Chief Olafisoye v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 4NWLR 
Pt. 864, 580 (2004). 
314 See Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Cap 56 (1990). 
315 Id. at Art. 172, 209. 
316 Para 11 of the Code of Conduct Fifth Schedule Part I 
317 Id. at Fifth Schedule, Part I, Art 1 
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from engaging or participating in the management or running of any private business, profession, 
or trade, except farming.318  
However, this provision is essentially unenforced, the country's wage policy appears to 
be fictional, and employees accept it with a tacit understanding that they will pursue other 
income generating opportunities. For instance, the new minimum wage in the public service is 
=N= 18,000 per month (approximately $120)319 which is insufficient compared to the cost of 
living in Nigeria. In Okoye v. Santilli,320 the Supreme Court held that a public officer is 
precluded by the Code of Conduct from engaging in any other business, in violation of Section 
20(1) of the Code of Conduct Bureau Act.   
For the purpose of clarification, In Nwankwo v. Nwankwo,321 the Supreme Court 
clarified the meaning of engaging in business when it held that the provision of paragraph 2(b) of 
part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1979 Constitution is not intended to prevent any public officer 
from acquiring an interest in a business (e.g., a partnership). However, it did prohibit a public 
officer from engaging or participating in the management and running of any private business, 
profession or trade (to hold a managerial or other position in such an undertaking or solely to run 
the same).322 Even though the Code of Conduct Bureau Act has a broad mandate its enforcement 
measures have routinely been mostly at the level of asset declaration. 
4.8.1.3 Nigerian Criminal Code Law against Bribery 
Section 98, Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77; Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 
provides for corruption and abuse of office by Nigerian public officials.323 The Act prohibits 
demanding and receiving of bribes by public officers, they also penalize persons who either give 
                                                          
318 Constitution, Fifth Schedule, Part I, Art 112 (1999) (Nigeria). 
319 The N18,000 minimum wage bill was signed into law by President Jonathan Goodluck in May, 2011. 
320 Okoye v. Santilli, [1994]4 N.W.L.R. (pt 338) 256,289 (Nigeria). 
321 Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, [1995] 5 N.W.L.R. (pt 394) 153 (Nigeria). 
322 Id.  
323 http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-PartIII-IV.htm#Chapter%2012 
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or offers bribe to public officers and prohibits the activities of agents, relatives and other close 
associates of public officers who exploit their relationship with such officers to demand or 
receive gratification either for themselves or any other person. 
Section 98 generally states that, any public official324who corruptly asks for, receives or 
obtains any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person or bribes, corruptly 
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any 
other person is guilty of the felony of official corruption and is liable to imprisonment for seven 
years.325 The Criminal Code Act has a very broad mandate that covers explicitly incidences of 
corruption and bribery and I particularly like the fact that the Act is not asymmetric in nature in 
that they penalize, exclusively or to a greater extent, the bribe-giver/payer, rather than the bribe-
taker, it is important not to underestimate the impact of a clear and vigorous law by making it 
impartial between giver and taker. 
4.8.1.4  Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission Act 2000 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria held326 that the legislature can in terms of a constitutional 
duty on all organs of government abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power and to create 
effective institutions for this purpose, the National Assembly established the Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission.327 The Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offenses Act (ICPC Act) of Nigeria was adopted on 13 June 2000, it renders both 
receiving and offering a bribe a criminal offence. It prohibits and prescribes punishment for 
corrupt practices and other related offences, the Act also established the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC).  
                                                          
324 As defined in Criminal Code Act  Chapter 77, Art 98(d), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1990) 
325 Id at Art 98. 
326 Supra, note 309. 
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While the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission is vested in the 
President subject to Senate confirmation,328 section 3(8) of the ICPC Act provides that the 
President can only remove the chairman or a member upon an address supported by two-thirds 
majority of the Senate praying that the member or Chairman be removed for inability to function 
arising from ill-health or misconduct. This removal process in my opinion is one of the 
distinguishing elements between ICPC and EFCC, clearly making the removal process of ICPC 
more transparent and independent than the process employed by EFCC. 
 
4.8.1.5  Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is a commission that 
investigates financial crimes such as advance fee fraud and money laundering. By contrast, under 
the EFCC Act the Chairman and members of the Commission are appointed by the President 
subject to the confirmation of the Senate, and section 3 provides that a member of the 
Commission may at any time be removed by the President for inability to discharge the functions 
of his office for misconduct or if the President is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the 
Commission or the interest of the public that the member should continue in office. 
 
4.8.1.6   Money Laundering (Prohibition Act) 2004  
The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of Nigeria was adopted on 24 March 2004.This 
Act provides for the repeal of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2003 and makes 
comprehensive provisions to prohibit the laundering of the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act; 
and provides appropriate penalties and expands the interpretation of financial institutions and 
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scope of supervision of regulatory authorities on money laundering activities, among other 
things.  
 
4.8.1.7 Advance Fee Fraud & Fraud Related Offences Act 2006 
The Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act of Nigeria was enacted by the 
National Assembly on the 5th June 2006. This Act prohibits and punishes certain offences 
pertaining to Advance Fee Fraud and other fraud related offences and to repeal other Acts related 
therewith. 
 
4.8.2 REGIONAL TREATIES AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
4.8.2.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty on Exchange of 
Information on Criminal Matters.  
The treaty of which Nigeria is a signatory to states that with a view to strengthening 
national legal instruments on mutual legal assistance, extradition and making them more 
functional and efficient,  all member states shall harmonize their domestic law in accordance 
with the relevant ECOWAS Conventions on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and 
Extradition. It further states that member states should undertake to adopt a convention to 
incriminate and make punishable the most commonly committed crimes in the sub-region”.329 In 
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essence, this treaty will enable countries gain access to public officials who may seek for refuge 
in other ECOWAS countries in other to evade prosecution for corruption and other related 
matter. 
 
4.8.2.2 African Convention on Prevention & Combating Corruption. 
The aim of the convention is to promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each 
state party.  They are required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related 
offences in the public and private sectors. They should promote, facilitate and regulate 
cooperation among the state parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to 
prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and other related offences in Africa. State parties 
are expected to coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between state parties for 
the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the 
continent.330 Nigeria became a signatory to this Convention in 2003 and ratified it in 2006. 
 
 
4.8.3 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
4.8.3.1 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the first legally binding 
international anti-corruption instrument. In its eight chapters and seventy one articles, UNCAC 
obliges its states parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption measures 
                                                          
330 http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf. 
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affecting their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim to promote the prevention, 
criminalization, law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, technical assistance, 
information exchange, and mechanisms for implementation.331 Nigeria became a signatory to 
UNCAC in 2003 and went ahead to ratify in 2004.  
Even though Nigeria has ratified all these treaties and Convention, they are not yet 
operative because of the legal provision contained in section 12 of the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution, which requires the National Assembly to “domesticate” a treaty, or convention, that 
is, to formally incorporate the treaty or convention into the domestic legal framework. Basically, 
the 1999 Constitution stipulates that no treaty shall have the force of law except to the extent 
such treaties have been enacted into law by the National Assembly. This means that the National 
Assembly may not only refuse to enact a law “domesticating” treaties but can also just give 
partial consent by excising part of the provisions of the treaties and conventions. In that event, 
only the part approved by the National Assembly becomes part of the domestic law.332 My point 
here is that Nigeria should commence the domestication of these treaties and Convention so as to 
take advantage of the provisions they provide in curbing corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
331 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_unodc_convention-e.pdf. 
332 The domestication process commences with the signing of the instrument by the designated official. The 
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the Federal Ministry of Justice Nigeria. Thereafter, the document may pass through several ministries and 
government departments whose mandate and activities are relevant to the subject of the Treaty or Convention. At 
the end of the review process, a legal instrument to enact the provisions of the treaty into law is then presented to the 
National Assembly for deliberation.  
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4.9 UNDERSTANDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BRIBE, GIFTS, GREASE 
PAYMENT, AND FACILITATION PAYMENT 
At this point, I believe it is important to distinguish between all these different terms 
because people have attached their own interpretation to them, used them interchangeable to the 
extent that that they are now hackneyed words. The terms bribe, grease payment and facilitation 
payments are all different forms of corruption  People ask questions like “what if I give a gift or 
tip after an act has been performed for me is that the same thing as bribe and being corrupt? 
What if one makes a facilitation payment just to accelerate the process, is that the same as bribe? 
To answer these questions, an understanding of how to identify these terms and deciding where 
to draw the line between permissible and prohibited actions is imperative. 
As already defined by the Nigerian Criminal Code in Section 98, a  bribe occurs  when a 
person corruptly gives, confers or procures any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a 
public official and is guilty of corruption. On what a gift is, the fifth schedule, part 1, Section 6 
of the Nigerian Constitution states that a public officer shall not ask for or accept property or 
benefits of any kind for himself or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be 
done by him in the discharge of his duties.  In other words, a gift is something of value given 
without the expectation of return.  Facilitation payment or grease payment on the other hand is a 
payment to a foreign official, in order to expedite performance of duties of non-discretionary 
nature which they are already bound to perform.333  
Although the most classic cases of bribery concern political officials and civil servants, 
however one need not be a political official or a civil servant to be bribed.  Payments, whether in 
money or in kind, can be characterized along two dimensions; first does an explicit quid pro quo 
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Exchanges S. F (1) S 78dd- 2 (b). 
 107 
 
exist? If so, the transaction can be labeled a sale even if there is a long time lag between payment 
and receipt of the benefit. Both market sales and bribes involve reciprocal obligations, gifts to 
charities or loved ones often do not explicitly involve reciprocity, although many do generate 
implicit obligations. The second dimension is the institutional positions of payers and payees, are 
they agents or principals? 334 Gift connotes voluntariness, Nigerians and indeed most Africans 
are habitual gift-givers which they do voluntarily, no strings attached.  
By the same token, the equation of bribe or gratification of gifts which citizens were 
obliged to present to chiefs and kings under the traditional social and political system is 
mistaken. Citizens presented tributes to their political overlords as a form of tax which went to 
the upkeep of the royal home,335 presentation of tribute was compulsory in the traditional 
dispensation, not so with gift-giving, which remains a sign of charity and hospitality on the part 
of the giver.336 Till this day, the practice of paying tribute and giving gifts to traditional leaders 
in Nigeria is still practiced but not compulsory. Against this background, it is clear that a gift 
differs from a bribe or a facilitation payment because it is not intended to obtain a direct benefit 
for the giver while the latter is intended to obtain a direct benefit from the receiver. 
The main distinction between facilitation payments, ordinary bribery and extortion is that 
facilitation payments tend to be made to obtain something to which the payer is already entitled 
to.  In other words, what the payer wants the corrupt official or employee to do is not something 
improper or something that exceeds their authority such that the normal course of business would 
be perverted through dishonest or unlawful behavior but rather to do what it is their duty to do in 
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the procedure for resolving a particular matter.  There are many different kinds of gifts, and 
therefore the similarities and differences between gifts and facilitating payments can be very 
varied:337  
• As with facilitating payments, gifts may consist of money, goods, services, discounts 
etc.  
• They may be large or, like facilitation payments, small.  
• In principle, the initiative in gift-making comes from the giver; although there may be 
a prior spoken or unspoken demand - for example, in the form of a long-standing 
custom.  
• As with facilitation payments, gifts may be given once, occasionally, or on a regular 
basis.  
• Gifts may be made to the office or company or, as with facilitation payments, to an 
individual official, manager or employee - either at their place of work or home 
depending on how secretive they have to be.  
• Unlike bribes or facilitation payments, gifts tend to be public, or at least they could be 
without drawing attention, whereas bribes and facilitating payments tend to be made 
in secret. 
I believe that I can rightly conclude to the extent that a gift is something of value given 
without the expectation of return while bribe, facilitation payment, grease payment on the other 
hand is something of value given with strings attached. Ultimately, the terms bribe, facilitation 
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payment and grease payment can be categorically and unequivocally grouped as corrupt acts 
which lead to corruption.   
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5.0 A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION 
 
 
Corruption is condemned by all religions, all ethical code, and all legal systems. It hinders all 
development, slows all progress and impedes all advancement. It strikes hardest at the poor and 
vulnerable, siphoning scarce resources away from those most in need. Corruption erodes trust in 
government and private institutions alike; it undermines confidence in the fairness of free and 
open markets; and it breeds contempt for the rule of law. Corruption is, simply put, a scourge on 
civil society.338 
 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is Nigeria’s biggest single problem. It has not only shattered public trust in 
government, but it has cost the government and the people of Nigeria billions of naira due to 
corrupt management of public funds, unrealized public projects and deteriorated infrastructure 
caused by looted maintenance budgets.339  History has showed that Nigeria has had anti 
corruption institutions in one form or the other since the 1970s and there has been debate about 
the effectiveness of institutions such as anti-corruption agencies. Some argue that anti-corruption 
agencies ‘may provide an effective means of promoting probity in government and protection of 
state income and expenditure’, Transparency International states  that such bodies are more often 
                                                          
338 Eric Holder , U.S. Attorney General address at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial Global Forum on 
Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity, Doha, Qatar ( Nov. 7, 2009) available at 
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failures than successes340  and I believe that where such anti corruption agencies are truly 
independent, it can help in curbing corruption. 
The preamble to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution demonstrates the sweeping aim of the 
country’s system of justice.341 It aims to promote good governance and welfare of all persons in 
Nigeria, on the principles of freedom, equality and justice.342 Section 14(1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution proclaims that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on principles of 
democracy and social justice and all public officers are sworn into office in accordance to the 
Nigerian Constitution343  and the oath of office in the 7th Schedule talks about discharging the 
duties in a manner that does not permit personal interest to influence official conduct or official 
decisions.344  
However, one of the lapses I observed with the 7th schedule of the Nigerian Constitution 
is that it provides no means of attaching criminal sanctions for noncompliance with these oaths 
of office, all it does is establishing  a rhetoric promoting the ideals of a just and equitable state. 
Whereas Section 98 of the Nigerian Criminal Code (1990), proscribed persons from giving or 
promising to give payment to a public official in order to obtain “contract, license or permit” or 
face a seven – year prison sentence.345 The Constitution which is the grundnorm of the country 
has failed in this area. 
 
 
                                                          
340 Pope, Jeremy, TI Source Book, Transparency International, Berlin. (ed.) (1999). 
341 Constitution, The Preamble (1999) (Nigeria). 
342 Id. 
343 Constitution, 7th Schedule (1999) (Nigeria). 
344 The 7th Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution generally talks about Oath of Allegiance, starting from the office 
of the President, vice -President, governors, deputy governors, ministers and commissioners. Also, there are set of 
oaths for members of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly and the final one, which is the judicial 
oath of office for judicial officers. 
345 See Schedule to the Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. Revised Edition (1990). 
This code is applicable only in the southern part of Nigeria. 
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5.2 WHAT IS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY? 
 
 
An Anti Corruption Agency should be a separate, independent and permanent bureau whose 
key function is to provide leadership in core areas of anticorruption activity. I am emphasizing 
on the word independent because Independent and non-partisan officers are necessary to ensure a 
high level of neutrality when investigating corruption cases. It is therefore imperative that the 
influence of political affiliations and conflicts of interest be kept to an absolute minimum in such 
cases. 
De Sousa in his book stated that the operational definition of an anti corruption agency is; 
“publicly funded bodies of a durable nature whose specific mission is to fight corruption, 
associated crimes and to reduce the opportunity structures favorable to its occurrence through 
preventive and repressive strategies.”346 De Sousa however failed to include the word 
independent in his definition. The issue of independence is important because of the danger of 
political interference, issues of political accountability and allocation of resources for the 
commissions are raised to establish such independence. 
On a broader spectrum, Doig et al347pointed out that Anti Corruption Agencies have one or 
more of three common features as thus; 
• Investigation and enforcement duties. Independent investigative power is a common role 
among the vast majority of Anti Corruption Agencies, undeniably an essential one for 
maintaining the credibility of the body’s assessments and findings of corruption in a society. 
• Corruption prevention responsibilities. Most Anti Corruption Agencies offer advice on macro 
and micro strategies for averting corruption via corruption prevention departments. Furthermore, 
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education and training provide evidence that knowledge about corruptive behavior beforehand 
can aid in preventing the act. Such capacities include workshops on anti-corruption with 
consultative assistance to public and private sector employees. 
• Public awareness and responsibility to educate on matters of corruption. In addition to 
prevention and investigation, certain agencies undertake a broader role to conduct research, 
monitor and promote reform in the public service and/or the criminal justice system generally.  
Just to build on what Doig et al has identified, the Nigerian Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act of 2004 has all three features as identified by Doig in 
its Act. Section 6 of the Act generally provides for the investigation, enforcements of all 
financial crimes, corruption prevention and public awareness and education on matters of 
corruption. If major anti-corruption initiatives are to be firmly anchored, they need to be distinct 
national government agencies dedicated to curbing corruption. These agencies must command 
public respect and be credible, transparent and fearless.348 Building upon what Pope and Vogl 
stated, an anti corruption agency must also include the following characteristics; independence, 
permanence, broad mandate and corruption prevention mission. By independence I mean that an 
anti corruption commission should be free from any interference by the executive branch of 
government or political affiliation. By permanence I mean the commission should have a quality 
of been permanent and sustainable. Having a broad mandate is essential to the success of an anti 
corruption commission because it would enable the commission to instigate and pursue 
corruption charges without limitation.  
Take for instance the Independent Corrupt and other Related Offences Commission in 
Nigeria, it can only institute actions based on petitions, this has limited the powers of the 
                                                          
348 Pope J & Vogl F , Making anticorruption agencies more effective, Finance and Development:  Quarterly 
Magazine of the IMF 37(2) (2000). 
 114 
 
commission. It is easier to have measures that prevent corruption by enhancing integrity and 
transparency rather than cure it; it is better to always nip issues in the bud before they 
materialize. Independence is a key issue in the design of most Anti Corruption Agencies and a 
continuous concern during their lifetime. Independence does not necessarily mean free will but 
rather refers to the capacity to carry out its mission, vision and goals without political 
interference, which is, operational autonomy.  
As bodies entrusted with the implementation of anticorruption policies/strategies, Anti 
Corruption Agencies cannot act in a completely independent way, they are expected to transform 
policy into action and therefore they share with the political class the onus of success or failure. 
Political interference can be exerted directly by threatening to terminate the agency’s work, 
frustrate its work, dismiss its senior officers or limit its financing. 
As intense as the incidence of corruption is in Nigeria, the country has always had 
agencies, programs and mechanisms to combat the plague. The first form of mechanism was in 
the form of customary law and later legislative enactments.349 Bribery was forbidden in the 
Yoruba tradition350 under the native law and custom, a person who received or offered bribes in 
order to pervert the judgment of the law was liable to either a heavy fine, imprisonment, or 
both.351 History also has it that the penalties for conduct amounting to egregious corruption often 
included banishment and death sentences, even for traditional rulers.352 At this point, I shall be 
discussing the progressive realization of anti corruption commissions in Nigeria, relevance, 
impacts and their present status from the 1970s till date. 
                                                          
349 Akinseye George & O Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus at  34,  
N.Y.U.J. INT’l L.&POL at 397,  424 – 54 (2002). 
350 Oyewo and OB Olaoba, A Survey of African Law and Custom – With Particular Reference to the Yoruba 
Speaking People of South – Western Nigeria, Jator Publishing Company, Ibadan  at 180 (1999). 
351 AK Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People, George Routledge & Sons, London  at 32 (1924). 
352 B Akinyemi, Corruption, a Battle Nigeria Must Win, This Day Online(Nigeria) 22 August, 2004 available at  
http://thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/08/22/20040822dis01.html. 
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5.3 EVOLUTION OF ANTI CORRUPTION AGENCIES IN NIGERIA 
Huther and Shah353 have developed a framework for the evaluation of anti-corruption 
initiatives, they argue that ombudsmen and anti-corruption agencies must be assessed in the 
context of the wider political and governance environment of a particular country. They conclude 
that the likelihood of such institutions succeeding is dependent on the pervasiveness level of 
corruption in the country and the overall quality of governance. This is true to the fact that where 
there is pervasive corruption and a low level in the quality of governance fighting corruption will 
be a huge challenge where the necessary institutions that have the mandate to fight corruption are 
not efficient, corruption will persist.  The key point is that an anticorruption body will be 
effective only to the extent that it operates within a framework of accountable and transparent 
institutions. 
Manning354 stresses the importance of strong political backing from all arms of government, 
combined with independence from executive government intervention, adequate financial and 
human resources. The effectiveness of any particular anti-corruption agency cannot be assessed 
in isolation from other institutions of accountability and law enforcement, viewing from the 
political environment in which it was created to that which it operates. Building on Manning’s 
strong points and speaking from the stance point of a Nigerian, almost all the anti corruption 
efforts in Nigeria have failed because of lack of political will, lack of independence and 
insufficient funding.  
 
 
                                                          
353 Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah, Anticorruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 2501 at 12  (2000). 
354 Manning, Nick, Using an Ombudsman to Oversee Public Officials,  PREM Notes, 19, World Bank Institute, 
Washington DC. (1999). 
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5.3.1 Operation Purge the Nation 
This was one of the first military sponsored anti – corruption program was launched by 
General Murtala Muhammad.355 Operation Purge the Nation was designed to rid Nigerian 
political system of incompetent, corrupt, unethical, depraved, morally delinquent civil servants 
and politicians and to return respectability and professionalism to the country’s public service. 
As part of the new program, heads of fifty government departments were forcefully retired and 
over eleven thousand people were purged from the national civil service.356 Unfortunately the 
impact of Operation Purge the Nation on corruption in Nigeria was short lived, absenteeism was 
reduced significantly, civil servants became more efficient, performed their duties diligently and 
incidence of corruption seemed to decrease. Operation Purge the Nation categorically failed for 
various reasons; many of the civil servants that were sacked were paid full benefits. 
 
5.3.2 Public Complaints Commission (PCC) 
The Public Complaints Commission otherwise known as the Nigerian Ombudsman is an 
independent organization established by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1975 through 
Decree No. 31 of 1975, amended by Decree 21 of 1979, now Cap 377 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990 and revalidated in Section 315(5) of 1999 Nigerian Constitution. With a nation-
wide network of offices, it became the first West African country to set up such a system and the 
largest federal government to have it at national and state levels.  Although the creation of the 
PCC was widely acclaimed in Nigeria, this initial enthusiasm appeared to have been short-lived 
as the publicity about the Commission has dwindled over the years. The PCC tends to operate in 
secret because its reports are inaccessible to the public, with the result that the average Nigerian 
                                                          
355 Toyin Falola, Corruption in the Nigerian Public Service at 40. 
356 Id.  
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knows almost nothing about what it is, what it does, how it performs, and why it continues to 
exist.357 
According to the PCC Act, Chapter 377 L.F.N. 1990, the chief commissioner and 
commissioners in the states are appointed by the National Assembly. The chief commissioner 
appoints all other officers at the headquarters and state offices, including the national secretary at 
the headquarters and the directors of investigation at the state level.358 Part of the motivation for 
setting up this constitutional body is to provide citizens with a framework through which they 
could improve governance in the country by making certain that civil servants who engaged in 
illegal, unfair, or irregular practices were investigated and if necessary, brought to justice.  
The Public Complaints Commission therefore provides an opportunity for Nigerians and 
non-Nigerians resident in Nigeria particularly the less privileged to seek and obtain redress for 
their grievances at no cost and with minimum delay. They can obtain redress for wrongful 
dismissal from service, wrongful termination of appointment, delay or refusal by any 
government department to pay compensation for land, non- payment of or delay in payment of 
retirement benefits, difficulty in getting insurance companies to pay claim, loss of postal orders, 
money orders and parcels, non- release of results/ certificates by examination bodies, complaints 
against police, Nigeria armed forces for abuse of office such as brutality to civilians and 
complaints against Nigeria Electric Power Authority, Nigeria Telecommunications, for 
overbilling. 
Sadly, because of several exceptions to its mandate, PCC has been reduced to dealing 
primarily with petty issues, PCC cannot entertain matters pending before the National Assembly, 
                                                          
357 Ladipo Adamolekun  & E. L. Osunkunle , Nigeria's Ombudsman System: five years of the Public Complaints 
Commission, Ibadan Heinemann(I982). 
358 http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/nigeria/initiatives/public-anti-
corruption-initiatives. 
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the National Council of States and the Federal Executive Council, matters before any Court of 
law, Matters in which legal and administrative procedure have not been exhausted, anonymous 
petition and cases betweens two private individuals. Also, because the agency lack of police 
powers, it is unable to have any significant impact on the conduct of public officials and private 
agencies.359 The PCC is reported to have a significant backlog of cases, largely due to a lack of 
funding. The government usually acts on findings of the PCC, however many complaints are 
never investigated due to the lack of resources.360 
 
5.3.3 Code of Conduct Bureau 
The Code of Conduct Bureau was set up by the Federal Government under the Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act.361   The Bureau could not however become operational due to 
the inability of the National Assembly to pass the enabling bill into law until the demise of the 
second republic in 1983. The organization was however resuscitated in 1988 with the 
appointment of a ten-member board. In order to avoid the problems the body encountered in the 
Second Republic, General Babangida, the then head of state went a step further by promulgating 
Decree 1 of 1989 to give legal backing to the organization. In 1999, the Constitution affirmed the 
above thus permanently enshrining the organization.362 
The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Chapter 56 LFN 1990 gave the Bureau the 
mandate to establish and maintain a high standard of public morality in the conduct of 
government business and to ensure that the actions and behavior of public officers conform to 
                                                          
359 Olowu, D., Ethical Violations in Nigeria’s Public Services: Patterns, Explanations and Remedies in S. Rasheed 
and D. Olowu (eds.), Ethics and Accountability in African Public Services, Nairobi (1993). 
360 Supra Note 348. 
361 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Revised Edition, Cap 56 (1990).   
362 http://www.codeofconductbureau.com/aboutus.html. 
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the highest standard of public morality and accountability.363 It is important to note that the 
provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau should be lauded and should be taken seriously by 
civil servants, but in reality, civil servants have simply ignored these codes.  In Nigeria, most 
civil servants do not declare their assets and where they do it is usually overrated as to give room 
to loot.364 Civil servants have flaunted these codes and are still flaunting them because the 
penalties for noncompliance are either weak or non existence and impunity for violating these 
codes is common place in Nigeria.  
 
5.3.4 War against Indiscipline (WAI) 
In the aftermath of the 1983 military coup, Maj. General Tunde Idiagbon, initiated and 
implemented another anti – corruption program called, War against Indiscipline (WAI). The 
purpose of this program was to instill a sense of integrity and discipline in civil servants in an 
effort to improve professionalism in the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, WAI was poorly executed 
and capricious. Again, like its predecessor, WAI died a natural death. 
 
5.3.5 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was established to perform an oversight function 
over all the spending activities of all executive offices. PAC was expected to examine critically 
the annual report and comments on government accounts presented by the country’s Auditor 
General. Unfortunately, PAC could not function properly under the military regime, and during 
corrupt civilian governments, the committee was starved for funds. 
 
                                                          
363 To implement the above mandate, Section 3, part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria has provided an enabling legal environment for the Bureau. 
364 Interview with an officer of the Code of Conduct Bureau. 
 120 
 
5.3.6 Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) 
For the first time in the history of the Nation, the Corrupt Practices Act of 2000 
establishes a statutory body answerable to the National Assembly and whose main purpose is 
fighting corruption. Recognizing that corruption has become pervasive, the Act grants the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) considerable power for investigation, arrest 
and prosecution of suspected persons. The Act stipulates that the ICPC shall consist of a 
Chairman and twelve other members 365to be selected from each of the six geo- political zones of 
Nigeria.366 The ICPC Act provides that the Chairman and Members of the Commission, who 
shall be persons of proven integrity, shall be appointed by the President upon confirmation by the 
Senate and shall not begin to discharge their duties until they have declared their assets and 
liabilities as prescribed in the Nigerian Constitution.   
Section 6 (a-f) of the ICPC Act 2000 sets out the duties of the Commission as;  
• To receive and investigate complaints from members of the public on allegations of 
corrupt practices and in appropriate cases, prosecute the offenders. 
• To examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where such 
systems aid corruption, to direct and supervise their review. 
•  To instruct, advice and assist any officer, agency, or parastatals on ways by which 
fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimized by them. 
• To advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practice, systems or procedures 
compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of public bodies to reduce the 
likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related offences. 
                                                          
365 Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, No. 5 of 2000, Art. 3(3). 
366 South- East, South -West, South-South, North - West, North East and North Central. 
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• To educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; 
• To enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.  
The ICPC chairman is vested with additional powers, including the power to seize movable 
property in the custody or control of a bank or financial institution, where the property is the 
subject matter of any investigation under the Act;367 the power to obtain information from any 
person  including relatives, associates and their banks  suspected of having committed an offence 
under the Act;368 and the power to make an application to Court to prohibit  any person from 
dealing with any property which is the subject matter of an offence under the Act, where the 
property is held or deposited outside Nigeria.369 The Act collectively established and redefined 
nine offences relating to corrupt practices and abuse of office, among which are: 
• Accepting gratification (section 8). 
• Fraudulent acquisition of property (section 12). 
• Fraudulent receipt of property (section 13). 
• Making a false statement or return (section 16). 
• Bribing a public officer (section 8). 
• Use of office or position for gratification (section 19). 
• Bribery in relation to auction (section 21). 
• Bribery in relation to contracts (section 22). 
• Failure to report bribery transactions (section 23). 
 
                                                          
367 Id at Art. 45. 
368 Id  at Art. 44. 
369 Id at Art. 46. 
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5.3.7 Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC)  
Three years after the establishment of Independent Corrupt Practices Commission 
(ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) was established as a law 
enforcement agency that investigates financial crimes such as advance fee fraud and money 
laundering under the EFCC (Establishment) Act of 2004. The Commission is empowered to 
investigate, prevent and prosecute offenders who engage in money laundering, embezzlement, 
bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human 
trafficking, child labor, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange 
malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open 
market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes, and prohibited goods”.370 
The Commission is also responsible for identifying, tracing, freezing, confiscating, or 
seizing proceeds derived from terrorist activities. EFCC is host to the Nigerian Financial 
Intelligence Unit (NFIU), vested with the responsibility of collecting suspicious transactions 
reports (STRs) from financial and designated non-financial institutions, analyzing and 
disseminating them to all relevant government agencies and other Financial Intelligent Units all 
over the world.371  There is, therefore, no gainsaying that the Nigerian anti-corruption regime is 
very comprehensive. It covers a wide range of subjects such as institutional issues, definition of 
applicable offences and rules governing the prosecution and trial of offenders.  
One of the problems that face Anti-Corruption Commissions is how to secure convictions 
of accused persons in Courts especially high profile cases. In my recent interview with a top 
officer at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria he stated that the main 
challenge the commission faces is the prosecution of high profile cases. He blames the role 
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money plays in politics, the slow judicial process and the attitude of defense counsel in dragging 
the legal process by focusing more on procedural issues rather than substantial issues. In the light 
of the legislative and institutional mechanisms put into place to combat corruption in Nigeria, 
one would expect that the level of systemic corruption in the country would reduce. The 
question, therefore, is whether this is really the case, why are there systems in place that are not 
efficient and effective?  The most pertinent source of evaluation would perhaps be the agencies 
and authorities at the forefront of combating corruption in Nigeria.  
Thus, according to the EFCC and ICPC, the commission’s gains since inception include 
an increased societal confidence and it has been involved in the investigation of cases ranging 
from high profile corruption cases, advanced fee fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, contract 
scams, identity theft, illegal oil bunkering, bribery, looting, and foreign exchange 
malpractices.372 In reality, that does not seem to be the case, only one conviction has been 
secured by the EFCC,373 numerous plea bargains and hundreds of high profile cases pending in 
Court.374 
  
                                                          
372 Official statistics and the accounts of EFCC are, to say the least, not always available, reliable or up to date.  
373 Olabode George, a powerful figure in Nigeria’s ruling party George was convicted and sentenced to two and a 
half years in prison for corruption while he was chairman of the Nigerian Ports Authority. This case was the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission’s first and so far only conviction obtained after a full trial of a major 
political figure in October 2009. George emerged from a Lagos prison in February 2011, to a rapturous welcome by 
senior members of the ruling party despite his conviction. Far from being treated as a pariah because of his 
misdeeds, according to media reports, he was treated to a lavish welcome ceremony attended by prominent ruling 
party politicians. 
374 In December 2009, Nigerians watched in bewilderment and disappointment as the disgraced former governor of 
Delta State James Ibori was acquitted of all charges brought against him by EFCC. 
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6.0  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT (FCPA) AND IT’S EFFECTS ON NIGERIA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The FCPA prohibits payments (including promises to pay) of anything of value (including 
favors, perks, etc.) to influence  corruptly the discretion of a foreign official to do something in 
violation of his or her official duty, to obtain, retain, direct business, or to gain any improper 
advantage.375 The FCPA also prohibits indirect payments, as well.376 These provisions can 
transform acts of a non-U.S. representative, agent or business partner into a potential crime under 
U.S. law that is attributable to the U.S. party.377 The FCPA exempts “facilitating” payments 
which are usually small payments that are designed to get a foreign official to perform a non-
discretionary function.378 For example, if a company’s goods are being processed slowly through 
customs, a payment may be allowed to have the goods move more quickly. A payment to have 
the customs office open on a holiday, however, would not be permitted.  
                                                          
375 The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA") generally prohibits U.S. companies and citizens, 
foreign companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange, or any person acting while in the United States, from corruptly 
paying or offering to pay, directly or indirectly, money or anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain 
business (the “Anti bribery Provisions”). The FCPA also requires “issuers” (any company including foreign 
companies) with securities traded on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to file periodic reports with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to keep books and records that accurately reflect business transactions 
and to maintain effective internal controls (the “Books and Records and Internal Control Provisions).375 
376 Penalties for violation of the anti-bribery provisions can be significant. The Justice Department can pursue 
criminal sanctions of up to two million dollars per count for legal entities, with individuals facing fines of up to two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars per violation and imprisonment up to five years. (Each payment or act in 
furtherance of the violation can be considered a separate count or violation). Corporate indemnification is not 
permitted for fines imposed on individuals. An alternative sanctions schedule is possible. If the violation produced a 
gain for the offender or a loss for a third party, the maximum fine can be the greater of twice the gross gain or loss. 
See the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, United States Code Title 15. Commerce And Trade, Chapter 2b--Securities 
Exchanges S. F(1) § 78dd-2(g). 
377 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 78d-2 &78m. The FCPA is jointly enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Justice Department enforces the anti-bribery provisions, while the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has jurisdiction over the accounting requirements 
378 See the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, United States Code Title 15. Commerce And Trade, Chapter 2b--
Securities Exchanges S. F(1) § 78dd-2(b) 
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Accepted examples of Facilitation Payments under the FCPA are379; 
• Obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents;  
• Processing visas and work orders;  
• Providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery; 
• Providing phone service, power and water supply,  
• Loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products;  
• Scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or transit of goods across 
country. 
 
6.2 FACILITATION PAYMENTS UNDER THE FCPA; CORRUPTION OR NOT 
CORRUPTION! IT’S EFFECTS ON NIGERIA 
Facilitation payments are permitted in United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Korea but illegal in every country in which they are paid.380 Facilitation payment is an 
interesting issue in the anti-corruption world and there are debates as to whether facilitation 
payment can be tagged as corruption or not and this is where its effects on Nigeria becomes very 
worrisome. I believe facilitation payment within the context of  FCPA is a subtle phrase for 
bribery which promotes petty corruption because it consist of small payments or gifts made to a 
person with authority to obtain a favor such as expediting an administrative process, obtaining a 
permit, license or service.  
This practice is particularly burdensome for third world countries like Nigeria where 
corruption is entrenched and the culture of government bureaucracy is a problem, which makes 
facilitation payment only a step towards the culture of corruption, which we are desperately 
                                                          
379 Art Aronoff , Senior Counsel ,Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, Domestic and 
International Anticorruption Initiatives. 
380 https://www.traceinternational.org/documents/FacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults.pdf. 
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trying to curb. These foreign companies come in and take advantage of the already laxed system 
in Nigeria and impede the fight against corruption by creating more opportunities for corruption.  
Most of these foreign companies hide behind the veil of facilitation payment under the FCPA 
and engage in grand corruption, hence the high fines incurred on them by the Security and 
Exchange Commission and my argument here is that the FCPA act has done little to regulate U.S 
companies from going outside the intended meaning of facilitation payment as evident in the 
case of Nigeria. 
In Nigeria, there are numerous cases of foreign US companies doing business and bribing 
public officers with millions of dollars to secure contracts as will be discussed below. 
Facilitation payments while legal under the FCPA remain unethical and unacceptable. I believe 
facilitation payment will encourage laxity amongst public officials, they will not carry out their 
duty or resolve the issues entrusted to them as swiftly or efficiently as expected when they know 
they can be nudged by facilitation payment. This represents a step towards a culture of 
corruption in society hampering the fight against corruption because superior public officers are 
themselves corrupt.  
Nigeria should take such measures as may be necessary to establish under its criminal law 
that it is an offence  for any non Nigerian  or foreign organization to intentionally  offer, promise 
or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
Nigerian  public official, otherwise known as “foreign official” by the FCPA Act381 for that 
official or for a third party to act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official 
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.  
                                                          
381 The term foreign official is very important because without one, there can be no FCPA anti – bribery violation, 
criminal or civil. 
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Similarly, Section 98 of the Nigerian Criminal Code in criminalizing bribery should include 
“public official receiving bribe from foreign official, person or organization”.  In addition, such 
organizations should be sanctioned and fined. Nigerian legislation should not only focus on 
criminalizing bribery and corruption amongst Nigerians but should extend its jurisdiction to non 
Nigerians and their corporations because in the past few years, a large percentage of FCPA 
enforcement actions have involved transactions in Nigeria and this has exacerbated  the  
incidence of corruption in the country. In the interests of effectiveness, viable economy and good 
governance, it is only right that large-scale corruption should head the agenda of governments.  
In October of 2009, TRACE International, Inc. (TRACE)382  a non-profit membership 
association that pools resources to provide practical and cost-effective anti-bribery compliance 
solutions for multinational companies, their commercial intermediaries (sales agents, 
representatives, consultants, distributors, suppliers and etc.), conducted a benchmarking survey 
on facilitation payment. The survey revealed a clear trend by corporations to ban facilitation 
payments, coupled with awareness by survey respondents of the added risk and complexity 
presented by facilitation payments. 
 
6.3  LANDMARK CASES OF FACILITATION PAYMENTS UNDER THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (FCPA) BY UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS TO 
NIGERIAN OFFICIALS383 
Here, I shall discuss some landmark cases where US corporations have used the veil of 
facilitation payments under the FCPA to bribe Nigerian officials into getting contracts and 
preferential treatment from public officials to reiterate my point that the practice of facilitation 
payment is burdensome on Nigeria and creates a culture of corruption and therefore should not 
                                                          
382 https://secure.traceinternational.org/Default.asp. 
383 https://secure.traceinternational.org/compendium/search.asp. 
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be encouraged in any way.384 One of the cases that made news headline all over the world is the 
Halliburton case.  
The Halliburton bribery tale has been a worrisome issue since it broke in 2003, following an 
investigation of Kellog, Brown and Root ( KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary over payments to a 
range of high profile Nigerian government officials, politicians, including those of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Nigerian Liquefied and Natural Gas (NLNG). 
The sum of one hundred and eighty million dollars bribe was involved over a contract estimated 
at nearly seven billion dollars for the construction of the LNG plant in Bonny, River State. The 
bribe allegedly spanned the period from 1995 till when the contract was awarded to 2004 to 
KBR. On February 11, 2009, KBR LLC pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to 
four counts of violating the FCPA’s anti bribery provisions. Under the plea agreement, KBR 
LLC agreed to pay a four hundred and two million dollars criminal fine and to retain an 
independent compliance monitor for a three year period.  
In the wake of this scandal, the first move by the Nigerian government was the declaration by 
the former minister of justice and Attorney-General, Mr Michael Aondaoka (SAN) that a law 
suit would be filed against indicted foreign givers of bribes for ‘soiling the countries reputation’ 
as well as see if Nigeria can get some compensation and redress,385 while overlooking the 
prosecution of Nigerians who took the bribes and inevitably soiled Nigeria’s image. Due to 
pressure from the media and general public, the Nigerian government inaugurated  a committee 
of five security chiefs to investigate the involvement of Nigerians in the one hundred and eighty  
multi-million dollar scam.  The panel subsequently promised that it would complete the 
assignment and submit its report within eight weeks of commencing the investigation. Till date 
                                                          
384 For a comprehensive list of corruptions case see https://secure.traceinternational.org/compendium/search.asp. 
385  The punch, 8 April (2009). 
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no names have been provided, no indictments or arrests have been made either in connection to 
the Halliburton case. 
Another interesting case  I shall discuss is the corruption scandal that involved William 
Jefferson, who at the time of scandal was a serving Congressman in the United States House of 
Representatives for Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District from 1991 until 2009. Beginning in 
2001 and continuing until 2005, Jefferson solicited bribes from several businessmen in exchange 
for his assistance with securing business in several West African countries including Nigeria. 
According to the prosecution, Jefferson allegedly agreed to pay Nigeria’s former Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar and other Nigerian officials half a million dollars in cash to secure a contract in 
Nigeria and officials would later receive a percentage of the share of the profits after the business 
had been completed.  
Jefferson was given one hundred thousand dollars in marked bills to pass on to the Nigerian 
officials as first installment on the half a million dollars payment. The FBI recovered ninety 
thousand dollars from Jefferson’s freezer when they searched his home and on June 4, 2007, 
Jefferson was indicted on sixteen counts including conspiracy to solicit bribes by a public 
official, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to violate the FCPA, solicitation of 
bribes by a public official, wire fraud, violations of the FCPA, money laundering, obstruction of 
justice and racketeering. On August 5, 2009, Jefferson was convicted on eleven counts. 
The last case I shall discuss is the wide publicized Siemens scandal of 2007. Between March 
12, 2001 and December 30, 2007, Siemens used a variety of methods to make approximately 
four thousand two hundred and eighty three illegal payments to government officials, totaling 
approximately one billion one hundred million dollars and these payments caused the company 
to realize over one billion one hundred million dollars in profits during the relevant time period. 
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The payments made in various divisions of the company between 2001 and 2007 included 
amongst others cash payments to Nigerian officials in connection with four telecommunications 
projects. Siemens used a variety of methods to conceal these payments and improperly recorded 
all four thousand two hundred and eighty three payments on its books and records.  
Approximately nine hundred and eighty two million seven hundred thousand dollars in 
payments were funneled through third parties, Siemens routed more than two hundred and eleven 
million dollars in bribes through slush funds that were often maintained by former Siemens 
executives, third parties or affiliated companies. Siemens also used cash to pay approximately 
one hundred and sixty million four hundred thousand dollars in bribes. In addition to the other 
methods, Siemens used a number of internal accounts to make more than sixteen million two 
hundred thousand dollars in payments, these accounts were intended to make payments on 
transactions between two Siemens entities; however, Siemens often used these accounts to make 
payments to third parties. On December 15, 2008, Siemens settled charges with the DOJ, the 
SEC and the Munich Prosecutor’s Office for a record-breaking one billion six hundred million 
dollars billion in fines and penalties.386 
Nigeria illustrates both the national and the international aspects of current attempts to crack 
down on corruption as can be seen in the Halliburton, Jefferson and Siemens cases. Nevertheless, 
corruption remains a significant obstacle for companies doing business in Nigeria. For example, 
in the World Economic Forum’s 2008-09 Global Competitiveness Report, corruption emerged as 
the third most problematic factor for doing business in Nigeria, after ‘inadequate supply of 
infrastructure’ and ‘access to financing’.387 Senior business people expressed a similar view 
                                                          
386 For a full compendium of facilitation payments paid by US companies to Nigerian officials, see 
https://secure.traceinternational.org/compendium/search.asp. 
387 See https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCR08/GCR08.pdf 
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when interviewed for Control Risks’ Facing up to Corruption in Nigeria report, which was 
released in May 2009.388  
Obviously, the unavoidable corruption or facilitation payment as it were would discourage 
companies and foreign investors who want to do business in Nigeria but do not want to be 
saddled with bribing government officials to secure contracts.  Facilitation payments carry legal 
risks even if they are permitted under the anti-bribery laws of a particular country. US companies 
should recognize the waning of the argument supporting a facilitation payment exception and 
should develop compliance policies that do not permit any kind of grease payments.389  
Facilitation payments fosters a culture of corruption among governmental officials, Nigeria 
should enforce domestic bribery laws that prohibit such payments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
388 See www.control-risks.com 
389 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD’s February 2010 recommendation decries 
the “corrosive effect of small facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable economic development and the rule 
of law.” As a result, member states should “periodically review their policies and approach on small facilitation 
payments in order to effectively combat the phenomenon,” and should “encourage companies to prohibit or 
discourage” facilitating payments, “recognizing that such payments are generally illegal in the countries where they 
are made, and must in all cases be accurately accounted for in such companies’ books and financial records.” In 
March 2010, the OECD called directly on businesses to implement the recommendations. For a full text, see OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, § VI (Nov. 26, 2009, 
adopted by the Council Feb. 18, 2010 with amendments), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf. 
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7.0 STRENGTHING OF ANTI CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS AND LAWS IN 
NIGERIA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Anticorruption efforts should be synonymous with fundamental state building and this 
entails, first and foremost, developing the capacity of the state to deliver basic public goods, such 
as public order and stability, health care, social protection and anti poverty programs to elevate 
poverty. Enhancing the capacity of basic institutions of public administration and the civil 
service is necessary.390 To effectively tackle corruption in Nigeria the state of affairs in the 
country needs to be improved. By state of affairs I mean standard of living, the availability and 
access to basic infrastructures. Where people are impoverished, they will do anything to survive 
and that also involves been corrupt. Decades of development failure and the consequent 
escalation of poverty have created a desperate need among Nigerians to search for the cause(s) of 
their plight. 
In Nigeria, access to public goods and service is fraught with corruption and bureaucratic 
bottleneck, you find yourself paying for basic infrastructural and fundamental human rights 
services. You want a government clearance you are clearly entitled to, you have to bribery to 
expedite the process, you want basic health care, you have to pay to expedite the process of 
seeing a doctor on time. You want your child to get accepted into a university institution, you 
have to bribe to ensure he gets in, the list is endless. Crimes of corruption in Nigeria are 
protected by a code of silence, parties to the offence have no incentive to come forward to give 
evidence. Corruption is an enemy so elusive that the temptation to accept it as a necessary evil is 
a strong one.  
                                                          
390 http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Anticorruption5/$File/chapter5.pdf. 
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Corruption is a hidden crime, therefore, anti corruption institutions and other important 
components of government must have an intelligence function, that look  for new ways that has 
been abused by the system because the enemy is cognizant and will always come up with their 
own strategies to beat the system, when we fight corruption, corruption fights back. Anti 
Corruption Commissions must be independent (politically as well as operationally) from outside 
influence in order to enable it to pursue corruption allegations at all levels (this can be achieved 
through constitutionally guaranteed independence or through the establishment of adequate 
accountability/ oversight mechanisms) and they need to operate on the basis of solid and 
comprehensive legal frameworks.391   
On the issue of independence, International instruments such as the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (UNCAC) refer to the establishment of dedicated anti-corruption bodies as among 
measures to prevent corruption. UNCAC392  states that each State Party shall grant the body or 
bodies that prevents corruption the necessary  independence, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions 
effectively and free from any undue influence. Similarly, the African Union Convention on 
Prevention and Combating Corruption393 states that State parties should establish, maintain and 
strengthen independent national anticorruption authorities or agencies.  
 
                                                          
391 Without enforceable and effective laws, an agency is constrained. For example in Hong Kong, the authorities 
recognized the value of a legal framework within The Independent Commission Against  Corruption (ICAC). 
Similarly, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore and the New South Wales Independent 
Commission Against  Corruption (ICAC) also have the backing (after repeated amendments) of strong enabling 
legislation. 
392 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 6. 
393 African Union Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption, Article 5. 
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The Anti Corruption Commissions must have adequate financial,394 human395 and 
technical resources as well as  organizational capacity to effectively combat corruption,  it must 
operate under exemplary leadership which must be of the highest integrity, they must have 
adequate powers for investigation, i.e. to question witnesses, access documents, etc. as well as 
the possibility to prosecute as and where required. The experience of Nigeria is that one cannot 
rely on one single solution in fighting corruption because of the systematic nature of corruption, 
therefore, the whole system needs to be overhauled and strengthened because of the interwoven 
nature of the Nigerian system.  
In essence, giving the issues relating to political change, corruption is not likely to just 
disappear, however, the establishment of properly focused independent anticorruption agencies is 
imperative and may provide an effective means of promoting integrity in government. Such 
goals will only be achieved on an incremental and gradual basis but the use of an anticorruption 
agency may offer a medium and stepping stone with a number of corresponding roles that may 
offer with time a sustainable anti-corruption strategy to help progress toward good government. 
Corruption takes many forms and a one size fits all or cookie cutter approach is not the solution, 
each country is unique and each solution has to be tailor-made. These Commissions must have 
strong political backing at the highest levels of government, moreover, a serious anticorruption 
program cannot be imposed from the outside, it requires committed and credible leadership from 
within, ideally from the highest levels of the state.  
 
                                                          
394 For example, the budget for Hong Kong ICAC was US$94 million in 2002/US$90 million in 2001; The ICAC in 
New South Wales operates with an annual budget of about US$8.7 million. Botswana’s Directorate on Corruption 
and Economic Crime has a US$2.4 million budget. 
395 Hong Kong’s ICAC has a manpower of 1,300 staff for a total population of 6.8 million. Thailand’s NCCC has a 
manpower of approximately 500 for a total population of 65 million. It explains some of the difficulties the NCCC 
encounters in covering its mandate. 
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For the purpose of my dissertation, the anti corruption commissions I shall be focusing on  
are The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC), and The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). I shall give 
a legal analysis of these commissions to assess their effectiveness, lapses and recommendations 
on the way forward. I shall also discuss the role Freedom of Information Law in Nigeria in 
curbing corruption while looking at Freedom of Information developments in India and South 
Africa. 
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Table 3: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN ANTI CORRUPTION 
AGENCIES. 
 
 The Economic and 
Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) 
The Independent  Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act (ICPC) 
The Code of Conduct 
Bureau and Tribunal 
(CCB) 
Established 
to 
Investigate all financial 
crimes including advance fee 
fraud, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, illegal 
charged transfer, future 
market fraud, fraudulent 
encashment of negotiable 
instruments, computer credit 
card fraud, contract, 
scam.etc. 
To receive and investigate 
any report and in appropriate 
cases, to prosecute cases of 
fraud or corruption. 
 
To deal with complaints 
of corruption by public 
servants for the breaches 
of its provisions. To 
receive, examine, take 
and retain such assets of 
declarations by Public 
officers. Also to receive 
complaints about non-
compliance with or 
breach of this Act and 
where the Bureau 
considers it necessary to 
do so, refer such 
complaints to the Code 
of Conduct Tribunal. 
 
Established 
by 
Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission 
(Establishment) Act 2004 
Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act, 2000 
The Code of Conduct 
Bureau and Tribunal 
Act, Chapter 56 LFN 
1990 
Commenced 
on 
23rd March, 2004 1st June, 2000 1990 
Jurisdiction The Federal High Court or 
High Court of a State of the 
Federal Capital Territory 
The Chief Judge of a State or 
the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja 
Code of Conduct 
Tribunal 
Appointment The Chairman and members 
of the Committee other than 
ex – officio members shall 
be appointed by the 
President subject to the 
confirmation of the Senate 
The Chairman and members 
of the Commission shall be 
appointed by the President, 
upon confirmation by the 
Senate 
The chairman and the 
other members shall be 
appointed by the 
President, Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. 
Act is 
Applicable to 
Individuals, corporate 
bodies, organizations, 
groups 
Individuals, public bodies, 
parastatals,  
Public Officers. 
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7.2 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU (CCB), 
INDEPENDENT CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES 
COMMISSION (ICPC), AND THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 
COMMISSION (EFCC) 
Historically, the office of Director of Public Prosecutions occupied paramount status of 
prosecution in Nigeria and pre and post independence Constitutions referred expressly to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, investing in that office, the exclusive control over prosecutions.  
Also noteworthy is the fact that there existed under this Constitutional arrangement an office of 
the Attorney-General as a cabinet member. However it would seem that the notion of an 
independent prosecutor was too radical in these early stages of statehood for soon after, 
subsequent constitutions transferred to the Attorney-General the control over prosecutions.396 
Entering the 1970s, we saw the evolution of various agencies tasked with jurisdiction of 
prosecuting specific offences like corruption as it relates to my dissertation. 
In the 21st century, we now have three major anti corruption commission whose 
establishment mission is to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption. In this chapter, I shall 
be analyzing all three anti corruption commission by examining the acts in order to pick on areas 
I believe needs development or amendment as applicable and proffer my recommendations as 
appropriate. My general recommendation for all three commissions is the need to be structurally 
independent with sufficient power to act, adherence to the constitutional guidelines of the 
country as well as preserving the fundamental human rights of an accused person. 
 
 
                                                          
396 See e.g. section 97 1960 Constitution of Nigeria see also section 104 Constitution of the Federal  
Republic of Nigeria (1963) and further B.O. Nwabueze,  A Constitutional History of Nigeria, First edition, London, 
Hurst & Co  pg. 56 (1982 
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7.2.1 Legal analysis of The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB). 
As already discussed, The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Chapter 56 LFN 1990 
gave the Bureau the mandate to establish and maintain a high standard of public morality in the 
conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and behavior of public officers 
conform to the highest standard of public morality and accountability. To implement the above 
mandate, section 3, part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria has provided an enabling legal environment for the Bureau to: 
Receive declarations by public officers under paragraph 11 of part 1 of the fifth Schedule to 
the Constitution,  examine the declarations in accordance with the requirements of the Code of 
Conduct or any Law, retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection 
by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe, 
ensure compliance with and where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct or 
any law relating thereto, receive complaints about non – compliance with or breach of the 
provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law in relation thereto, investigate the complaints and, 
where appropriate, refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal, appoint, promote, 
dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the staff of the Code of Conduct Bureau in 
accordance with the provisions of an Act of the National Assembly enacted in that behalf and  
finally to carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by the National Assembly. 
 
Public officers for the purposes of the Code of Conduct Include;397 
• President of Nigeria. 
• Vice President of Nigeria. 
• President and Deputy President of the Senate. 
                                                          
397 http://www.codeofconductbureau.com/needCCB.html. 
 139 
 
• Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives and Speakers and Deputy 
Speakers of the House of State Assemblies, all members and staff of Legislative houses. 
• Governors and Deputy Governors of the States. 
• Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice of the Supreme Court, President and Justices of the Court 
of Appeal, all other judicial officers and all staff of law. 
• Attorney General of the Federation and Attorney General of each state. 
• Ministers of the Government of the Federation and Commissioners of the government of 
the States, Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Army staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air 
Staff and all members of the armed forces of the federation. 
• Inspector General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, all members of the 
Nigeria Police Force and other government security agencies established by law. 
• Secretary of the Government of the Federation, head of civil service, permanent 
secretaries, Director – General and all other persons in the civil service of the federation 
or of the state. 
• Ambassadors, high commissioners and other officers in Nigeria missions abroad. 
• Chairman, members of the boards or other governing bodies and staff of statutory 
corporations and of companies in which the Federal or State government has controlling 
shares. 
• All staff of universities, colleges and institutions owned and financed by the federal or 
state government or local government councils. 
• Chairman, members and staff of permanent commissions or councils appointed on full 
time basis. 
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However, the immunity clauses of section 308 of the Constitution that restricts the institution 
of civil or criminal proceedings against the President, Vice-President, Governor or the Deputy 
Governor have been employed successfully against the Code of Conduct Tribunal.398 This 
immunity clause makes both the Bureau and Tribunal ineffective. 
 
7.2.1.1  Establishment of Code of Conduct Tribunal 
 
The tribunal shall consist of a chairman and two other members, the chairman shall be a 
person who has held or is qualified to hold office as a judge of a superior Court of record in 
Nigeria and shall receive such remuneration as may be prescribed by law.399 A person holding 
the office of chairman or member of the Tribunal shall not be removed from his office except 
upon an address supported by two-thirds majority of each House of the National Assembly, 
praying that he be so removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office in question 
(whether arising from infirmity of mind or body) or for misconduct or for contravention of this 
Act. A person holding the office of chairman or member of the Tribunal shall not be removed 
from office before retiring age, save in accordance with the provisions of this section.400 
 
7.2.1.2 Powers of the Tribunal to Impose Punishment  
Where the Tribunal finds a public officer guilty of contravening any of the provisions of this 
Act,  it shall impose upon that officer any of the punishments specified under subsection 2 of the 
tribunal Act which shall include vacation of office or any elective or nominated office, as the 
                                                          
398 Attorney-General of the Federation, Code of Conduct Bureau, and Code of Conduct Tribunal V. Alh. Atiku 
Abubakar 8 NWLR (Pt 1035) 117 at 155 (2007), Atiku Abubakar V.Attorney- General of the Federation  3 NWLR 
(Pt 1022) 546 at 648 (2007). 
399 Supra note at 382. 
400 Id. 
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case may be,  disqualification from holding any public office (whether elective or not) for a 
period not exceeding ten years, seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in 
abuse or corruption of office. The punishments mentioned above shall be without prejudice to 
the penalties that may be imposed by any law where the breach of conduct is also a criminal 
offence under the Criminal Code or any other enactment or law. Also, where the Tribunal gives a 
decision as to whether or not a person is guilty of a contravention of any of the provisions of this 
Act, an appeal shall lie as of right. In addition, any right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from 
the decision of the Tribunal shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the rules of 
Court for the time being in force regulating the powers, practice and procedure of the Court of 
Appeal.   
 
7.2.1.3 Asset Declaration under the Code of Conduct Bureau 
This department has an important responsibility for the administration of asset 
declaration to all public officers and the verification of same. Over the years the administration 
of assets declarations has taken a large chunk of the energy and resources of the Bureau partly 
because the Bureau did not have the powers to investigate complaints until recently.401 Though 
assets declaration is a Constitutional provision for all public officers irrespective of status in 
service,402 the Bureau had for logistical reasons pegged the requirement to declare as it found 
convenient, a major function of the Bureau beyond taking custody of the forms is to verify the 
claims by declarant, personnel skilled in verification, investigation, other operations of the 
                                                          
401 See statement by Sam Saba, Secretary of the Nigerian Code of Conduct Bureau available at 
http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue8eng/button2.htm. 
402 Constitution, Third Schedule, Part 1, (1999) (Nigeria). 
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Bureau that involves a lot of resources and logistics which the Bureau has in very short 
supply.403   
Now, the judicial determination  of Section (3)(c) of Part I of the Third Schedule to the 
1999 Constitution 404as to whether access of declaration should be made available for inspection 
by every citizen of Nigeria was decided in the case of Incorporated Trustees of Media Rights 
Agenda(MRA)  v  The Code of Conduct Bureau and Attorney-General of the Federation. By an 
Originating Summons filed in August 1999 at the Federal High Court by MRA, the organization 
which is a nongovernmental organization in Lagos, Nigeria sought to compel the Code of 
Conduct Bureau to release the declaration of assets made by forty public officers, including that 
of former President Olusegun Obasanjo. MRA also asked the Court to make a judicial 
determination of the following questions: 
• Whether every Nigerian citizen has a right to ensure that Nigerian public officers comply 
with the provisions of the code of conduct for public officers set out in Part 1 of the Fifth 
Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. 
• If the answer is in the affirmative, whether the right of every Nigerian citizen to ensure 
compliance with the code of conduct for public officers also confers on every citizen by 
necessary implication, a right of access to assets declaration forms submitted to the Code 
of Conduct Bureau by public officers pursuant to Section 3[a] of Part 1 of the Third 
Schedule and Section 11(1)of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. 
• If the answer is yes, whether the true interpretation and effect of Section 3(c) of Part 1 of 
the Third Schedule to the Constitution is that every Nigerian, prima facie, has an 
uninhibited right of access to assets declarations made by public officers, which can only 
                                                          
403 Saba, supra note at 386. 
404 States that the Bureau shall have the power to retain custody of such declarations and make them available for 
inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe. 
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be circumscribed if and when the National Assembly imposes lawful conditions for that 
purpose; and 
• If the answer to this question is also in the affirmative, whether the Code of Conduct 
Bureau's refusal to give MRA access to the assets declarations made by the affected 
public officers, whose names are listed in the Schedule to the Originating Summons, is  
unconstitutional. 
In the suit, MRA contended that the true interpretation and effect of section (3)(c) of Part 
1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution is that every Nigerian citizen has an uninhibited 
right of access to assets declarations made by public officers, that the refusal of the Code of 
Conduct Bureau to allow it access to the assets declarations made by forty named public officers 
is unconstitutional.405 They also contended that it was concerned that there have been major 
violations of the provisions of the code of conduct for public officers set out in the Constitution, 
in particular that a number of executive and legislative public office holders have assumed their 
various offices without submitting declarations of their assets to the Bureau, as stipulated by the 
code of conduct for public officers.406 
In deciding the case, Justice Gbolahan Jinadu of the Federal High Court ruled that 
Nigerians cannot inspect the assets declarations made by public officers until the National 
Assembly prescribes the conditions for its exercise. He stated that the prescription of terms and 
conditions by the National Assembly is a pre-condition to the exercise of unimpeded right of 
access to inspect the declaration forms submitted to the Code of Conduct Bureau by public 
officers. He also  added  that members of the public have no right to ensure that public officers 
                                                          
405 http://www.mediarightsagenda.org/presssept_99.html 
406 Id.  
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comply with the code of conduct for public officers because that right is reserved for the Bureau 
by the provisions of Paragraph 3(d) in Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. The 
suit was struck out.  The contention of Section (3c) of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 
Constitution is the sentence…. “on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may 
prescribe”. Obviously till date, such terms and conditions are yet to be prescribed by the 
National Assembly, this lacuna has been overlooked over the years and needs to be addressed 
and amended by the National Assembly to afford a proper interpretation of the constitution. 
7.2.1.4  Investigative and Monitoring powers of the Bureau.  
The Bureau through its department of investigation and monitoring, receives complaints 
from members of the public on breaches of the code of conduct by public officers.  This ranges 
from indiscipline, abuse of office, lack of accountability, corruption and unethical conduct in 
government business, among others. The power of investigation is a very recent addition to the 
powers conferred on the Bureau, while the department has commenced its investigation on 
complaints and petitions sent to the Bureau, it has an urgent need to develop its capacity in this 
area through training and orientation on investigation and related matters. In the year 2000, for 
example, the Bureau received a number of petitions against public officers out of which forty 
nine are in various stages of investigation.407 
7.2.1.5  Education and Advisory Services Department  
Apart from handling staff training and public enlightenment, the education and advisory 
services department also promotes an educational system that motivates positive moral and 
social values.  The need for an effective and efficient Code of Conduct Bureau in Nigeria cannot 
                                                          
407 Id.  
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be emphasized enough, this is particularly against the backdrop of fraud and corruption that has 
taken over the economy. Nigerians have suffered physical deficiency and poverty directly as a 
result of the endemic fraud and institutional corruption that has besieged the country.  In other to 
confront this social menace, a set of ethics and rules of behaviors for public officers becomes 
necessary as a way of re-orientating the attitude of public officers away from the prevailing 
malaise. How many public officers actually declare their assets? Does the bureau go on a 
verification mission of claims made by public officers in their assets declaration to the Bureau? 
These questions I cannot answer for certain because of the unavailability of data and 
information. 
 
7.2.1.6  Maintaining bank accounts in any country outside Nigeria 
Section 7 of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act states that any public officer 
specified in the second schedule of the Act or any persons as the Armed Forces Ruling Council, 
may from time to time, by order prescribed shall not maintain or operate a bank account in any 
country outside Nigeria. Similarly, the Code of Conduct for public officers that is spelt out in the 
1999 Nigerian constitution fifth schedule, part I also states that public officers should not 
maintain or operate a bank account in any country outside Nigeria, despite the clear wordings of 
section 7 of the Code and the Constitution, there has been numerous cases of public officers been 
linked to foreign bank accounts in contravention to the code.408 
                                                          
408 In 2004, former governor of Plateau state, Joshua Dariya was found guilty of money laundering contrary to 
Section 14 (1) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, Illegal transaction in foreign exchange contrary to 
Section 29 of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring etc) Act, 1995, False Declaration contrary to Section 164 of the 
Penal Code, False Declaration contrary to Section 25(1 ) of The Corrupt Practices etc Act, False Declaration 
contrary to Section 11 (1) and (2) of the Code of Conduct for Public Officers contained in the 5th Schedule to the 
1999 Constitution, Maintaining foreign bank accounts contrary to Section 3 of the Code of Conduct for Public 
Officers contained in the 5th Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. See Former Attorney-General, Akinlolu Olujimi’s 
letter to Plateau State Speaker, Simon Lalong available at http://www.amanaonline.com/Articles/art_2411.htm. 
Also, in 2005, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha former governor of Bayelsa state was charged by a British Court with 
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7.2.1.7  Conclusion 
The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act provide for the retention of declarations 
and to make such declaration available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on “such terms 
and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe”. This provision should be amended to 
include those prescribed terms and conditions by the National Assembly whatever it may be. In 
addition, those terms and conditions should enable the Bureau to enforce open declaration of 
assets every two years in order to make the declaration process public and transparent, as such 
this law will enable Nigerians monitor the acquisition of wealth or not by public officials. For 
easy accessibility, asset declaration should be made public via an online asset registry because of 
the increased number of people who have access to the internet in Nigeria. I believe that asset 
disclosure program will enhance the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the public.  
Insufficient funding militates against the critical functions of the Bureau such as assets 
declaration administration, verification of assets exercise, investigation of cases, computerization 
of mass data generation of assets declared by public officers, publicity and enlightenment.  As 
such, adequate funding should be made available to the Bureau and Tribunal so that they can 
effectively execute their mandates. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
laundering 1.8 million pounds where he jumped bail and mysterious appearing in Nigeria. See 
http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/24d05648-b4b0-11dd-a1f9-
7986f5e51dc8.0;jsessionid=3E1DAA9BC8D402D673B4D12B1751D30A. Similarly, James Ibori, former governor 
of Delta State, several foreign accounts were linked to him. He is presently being shielded by some powerful people 
in Nigeria from prosecution and is still on the run from the law in Britain and America for money laundering 
charges. See Allegations of corruption against ex governor, James Ibori, Tell (Nigeria) Nov.23, 2007. 
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7.3 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED 
OFFENCES COMMISSION (ICPC) 
As already pointed out, section 3 of the Act409 establishes the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offences Commission to function independently of the direction or control of 
any other person or authority. Section 6 of the Act charges the Commission with extensive 
administrative, educational and investigatory duties, it has the duty to receive, investigate 
complaints and also to prosecute offenders in appropriate cases where reasonable grounds exist 
for suspecting that an offence has been committed under the Act.410 The Commission is also 
empowered to subject the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies to periodic review 
with a view to eliminating opportunities for fraud or corruption, to advise, assist public officers, 
agencies on ways to curtail the likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related 
offences, to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.411 
 
7.3.1 The Issue of Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof and Evidential Burden 
A number of provisions under sections 3-19 of the Act relate to presumption of innocence 
in the offences of corruption including bribery, gratification, fraudulent concealment of illicit 
benefit by a public officer. The legal obligation on suspects to give information that may 
eventually be used against them in a criminal trial gives rise to a perception that the Act runs 
ultra vires of constitutional safeguards. For instance, section 53 of the Act states that in any 
proceedings against any person for an offence under sections 3 to 19, and it is proved that 
gratification has been accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, 
                                                          
409 See the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000. 
410 Id at 6(a) 
411 Id 6(b) 
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solicited, given or agreed to be solicited or given, promised or offered, by or to the accused, the 
gratification shall be presumed to have been corruptly accepted or agreed to be accepted, 
obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be solicited or given, promised 
or offered as an inducement or a reward for or on account of the matters set out in the particulars 
of the offence, until the contrary is proved.  
Section 53(1) goes contrary to section 36(5) of the Nigerian constitution which clearly 
states that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
he is proved guilty. A fundamental principle of the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence is the 
presumption of innocence, an offender or accused person is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty, the onus for proving the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt rests on the 
Prosecution. Hence, section 53 of the ICPC Act runs ultra vires of this constitutional safeguard 
and should be amended. 
Still on section 53, it shows that once the elements of an offence under sections 3-19 are 
proved it will be presumed that the offence has indeed been committed, so therefore the burden 
shifts to the accused person to prove his innocence. What is really at issue here is the evidential 
burden which shifts constantly between an accused person and the prosecutor throughout a 
proceeding. This should not be the case because evidential burden has been described as the 
obligation to show if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to 
the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being the standard of proof 
demanded of the party under such obligation".412  
Analyzing section 40 of the act reveals the lack of safeguard regarding the information 
which a suspect is obliged to give to an investigating officer and this is very disturbing. Section 
40 states that subject to such limitation as is provided under this Act, every person required by an 
                                                          
412 Tapper, Collin, Cross & Tapper on Evidence, pg. 132. Oxford University Press. (2010). 
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officer of the Commission to give any information on any subject which is the duty of such 
officer to inquire into under this Act, which also is in that person's statutory power to give, shall 
be legally bound to give information, failing which he shall be guilty of an offence on conviction 
liable to imprisonment for six months or a fine of ten thousand naira. 
Now, under the constitution413 and the criminal procedure rules, a suspect not to say an 
accused person has the right not to be compelled to incriminate one self. Therefore, Section 40 
acts ultra vires to the constitution and should be amended. The presumption of innocence is a 
crucial part of the common law adversarial system of adjudication which is obtainable in 
Nigeria, it seems that barring some procedural refinement of section 40 by the investigating 
officers will make this section vulnerable to challenge on constitutional grounds.  
 
7.3.2 The Issue of  Protection of Whistle Blowers under the Act 
Section 64 of the Act states that where any complaint made by any officer of the 
Commission states that the complaint is made in consequence of information received by the 
officer making the complaint, the information referred to in the compliant and the identity of the 
person from whom such information is received shall be secret between the officer who made the 
complaint and the person who gave the information, and everything contained in such 
information. The identity of the person who gave the information and all other circumstances 
relating to the information, including the place where it was given, shall not be disclosed or be 
ordered or required to be disclosed in public but only to the trial judge and the defense lawyer in 
attendance in any civil, criminal or other proceedings in any Court or tribunal. Obviously, this 
provision limits this secret to the judge and defense lawyer only which is good for the sake of 
                                                          
413 Constitution, Art 35(2) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 
 150 
 
protecting the identity of informants. However, it is also important to protect the integrity of the 
process in order to prevent the process from degenerating into an instrument of personal 
vendetta. 
Section 64(3) further provides that “Any person who gives information leading to the 
investigation of a suspect for corruption knowing the information to be false shall be guilty of an 
offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and 
shall also be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand naira."  Whilst this provision 
discourages people from bearing false witness, I believe this punishment is too stiff and may 
discourage people from stepping forward to report corruption cases. In addition it is so 
unrealistic to sentence any person to ten years imprisonment for knowingly giving false 
information whilst section 8(1)(ii) prescribes punishment for official corruption as seven years 
imprisonment. This provision needs to be reviewed. I recommend imprisonment be reduced to 
six months imprisonment and fine should be increased to five hundred thousand Naira, lower the 
sentence, increase the fine. 
 
7.3.3 Conclusion   
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, is a good piece of legislation.  
However, it does not have proactive powers to function. The mandate of ICPC is to prohibit and 
prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences, to receive and investigate 
reports of corruption and in appropriate cases prosecute the offenders. However, for ICPC to 
carry out its mandate and prosecute corruption cases, it is only required to act upon petitions 
written by people to its commission. Section 27(1) of the Act explicitly states that every report 
relating to the commission of an offence under this Act may be made orally or in writing to an 
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officer of the Commission. In addition to my previous recommendations, it is in my opinion that 
the existence of this commission is a mere waste of time and resources because of its crawling 
pace in prosecuting offenses and I recommend it should be dissolved. My reasons shall be 
explained further in the accompanying pages. 
 
7.4 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 
COMMISSION (EFCC) 
Section 1 of the Act414 establishes the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and 
Section 6 of the Act states that the Commission shall be responsible for the enforcement and 
administration of the provisions of this act, the investigation of all financial crimes as stated in 
the act, the co-ordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crime laws conferred on 
any other person or authority.  The adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or 
seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial crimes related offences or 
the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. The adoption of measures to 
eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes, coordinated preventive and 
regulatory actions, introduction and maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the 
prevention of economic and financial related crimes. The facilitation of rapid exchange of 
scientific and technical information and the conduct of joint operations geared towards the 
eradication of economic and financial crimes. The examination and investigation of all reported 
cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies 
or groups involved. ..et al.  
                                                          
414 See generally the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission  (Establishment) Act 2004 
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Under Section 7 of the Act, the Commission has the power to cause investigations to be 
conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has committed any offence 
under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes and cause investigations to 
be conducted into the properties of any person if it appears to the commission that the person’s 
lifestyle and extent of the properties are not justified by his source of income. This special power 
of the Commission is what makes it distinct  from the Independent Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC) where petitions has to be written and submitted before it 
can take any action against the perpetrators. 
 
7.4.1 The Issue of Independence of the Commission 
Independence is a key issue in the design of most Anti Corruption Commissions and a 
continuous concern during their lifetime, by independence I mean the capacity to carry out its 
mission without political interference. Section 2(3) of the Act states that the Chairman and 
members of the Commission other than ex-officio members shall be appointed by the President 
and appointment shall be subject to the confirmation of the Senate. Section 3(2) further states 
that a member of the Commission may at any time be removed by the President for inability to 
discharge the functions of his office whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other 
cause or for misconduct or if the President is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the 
Commission or the interest of the public that the member should continue in office.  
The independence of an anti-corruption agency is fundamental to its success, 
Independence from the government can allow the agency to resist the influence of individuals or 
groups with specific agendas, political or otherwise that may be in conflict with the interests of 
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government transparency and accountability. Some countries have Constitutional provisions that 
guarantee an anti-corruption agency’s independence. Hong Kong is one instance illustrating the 
independence of an anti-corruption agency, Institutional safeguards, a legal mandate guarantee 
the independence of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). 
Legislation and the Hong Kong Constitution guarantee this independence.415 In addition, while 
the Commission reports directly to Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, four independent committees 
monitor the activities of the ICAC, these committees include representatives from civil society 
and an independent ICAC Complaints Committee, which reviews all complaints against the 
Commission itself.416  
Australia/New South Wales,417 Latvia418 and South Korea also use institutional mechanisms 
to ensure the independence of their states’ anti-corruption agencies, in Australia/New South 
Wales, a multi-party Parliamentary Joint Committees monitors and oversees the activities of the 
Independent Commission against Corruption and guarantees that the commission does not abuse 
its autonomy.419 In Latvia and South Korea, different branches of government share the selection 
and appointment of anti-corruption agency staff. In Latvia, the Parliament appoints the head of 
the anti-corruption agency after a recommendation by the Executive Cabinet.420 The President of 
South Korea appoints the Chairman and standing members of the agency, and the Parliament and 
                                                          
415 See the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Art. 57 (1997) (Hong Kong) available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm. 
416 See UNDP, Regional Centre in Bangkok, Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: A Comparative 
Study (2005) available at 
http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Corruption_Comparative_Study-
200512.pdf . 
417See Independent Commission against Corruption Act Act No. 35 (1988) (Australia) available at 
 http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/maintop/scanact/inforce/NONE/0. 
418 See Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (Latvia) (2002). 
 http://www.knab.gov.lv/uploads/en_htm/EN_bureau.htm. 
419 See John R. Heilbrunn, Anti -Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? World 
Bank Institute  available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf  
420 UNDP, supra note 417.   
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Chief Justice recommend three members each.421 
Mr. Nuhu Ribabu who was the pioneer chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) from 2003 till 2007 was appointed by the then President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo. Mr. Ribadu started off enthusiastically and was applauded by Nigerians, after a while, 
the popular view and concerns of Nigerians was that Mr. Ribadu was being used as a tool by 
President Obasanjo to taunt his political opponents. On May 2007, a new administration was 
sworn in and President Yaradua took over as the President of Nigeria, before Nigerians knew 
what was happening, Mr. Ribadu was removed from office, sent on training, survived two failed 
assassination tempt and was forced to go on exile.422 Some Nigerians I spoke to say Mr. Ribadu 
deserved what he got because he allowed himself to be used by the Obasanjo’s government and 
he was accused of selectively prosecuting Obasanjo’s political enemies. The point I am trying to 
emphasis here is that because the President appointed Mr. Ribadu, he was able to use him as he 
pleased, the President was Mr. Ribadu’s direct boss hence, Ribadu was on a tight leach. 
Having said that, the executive branch of government should not have the jurisdiction to 
appoint or remove heads of anti corruption commissions, where the President has the power to 
appoint and remove the chairman and other members of the commission, it takes from the 
commission its independence and makes the commission susceptible to interference by the 
President and the President’s political affiliations.   To secure the independence of the EFCC, I 
recommend that the appointment and removal of Executive Chairman should be the sole 
responsibility of the National Judicial Council of Nigeria. 
The National Judicial Council is one of the Federal Executive Bodies created by virtue of 
section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, it was established in order to insulate the 
                                                          
421 Transparency  International, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report – Korea ( 2001) available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/regional/asia_pacific (last accessed Sept. 23, 2007).   
422 I personally interview Mr. Ribadu in Washington D.C. 2010. 
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Judiciary from the whims and caprices of the Executive hence guaranteeing the independence of 
this arm of government. I recommend the National Judicial Council of Nigeria because it is 
independent enough to appoint the chairman and other members of the committee without bias.  
For inclusion, nominations for appointment should come from civil society. This is to ensure that 
the voice of the people is included in the process. As regards removal, such members should be 
removed with cause by the National Judicial Council. I suggest with cause so as to limit the 
discretionary powers of removal by the National Judicial Council. 
 
7.4.2 The Issue of Prosecution of Offences and Compulsory Interrogation 
Section 19 of the Act generally states that the Federal High Court or High Court of a state 
of the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to try offenders under this Act.  The Court shall 
have the power notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other enactment, to impose the 
penalties provided for in this Act. The Court should ensure that all matters brought before it by 
the Commission against any person, body or authority shall be conducted with dispatch and 
given accelerated hearing and the Court should adopt all legal measures necessary to avoid 
unnecessary delays and abuse in the conduct of matters brought by the Commission before it or 
against any person, body or authority.  
Section 19 of the Act also states that the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court or a High 
Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, as the case may be 
shall by order under his hand, designate a Court or judge he shall deem appropriate to hear and 
determine all cases under this act or other related offences under this Act, a Court or judge so 
designated shall give such matters priority over other matter pending before it.  
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In spite of the seeming arrests and arraignments of persons accused of corruption, the 
slow judicial process is very discouraging. The impunity in which people in power allegedly loot 
and steal is not only alarming but embarrassing, most Nigerians no longer express bitterness each 
time they hear of billions of naira being stolen from public coffers, what they feel is sadness and 
repulsion for a system which treats such cases with levity. If the Courts do not deliver rulings 
that will further render the existing acts upon which suspects are standing trial null and void, it is 
the defense counsel that will through frivolous applications frustrate the trial. The unduly slow 
pace of justice in Nigeria offers a safety valve for corrupt public officials as well as backlog of 
cases that are pending before various High Courts and the Federal High Court.423  
At this point, I believe Nigeria is in dire need of special courts to try corruption cases, 
one of the   advantages of the establishment of a specialized court or division is that the presiding 
judge will devote more time to corruption cases, the slow judicial processes by the courts do not 
allow the anti corruption commissions to achieve its goals. Just like the Nigerian electoral 
tribunals,424 the establishment of special courts to hear corruption cases should be explored.  
In Philippines, the government has a special court called Sandiganbayan to prosecute 
corruption cases, it is of the same level as the Court of appeal and it decides criminal and civil 
cases against government officials and employees accused of graft, corruption and other 
offences. The Court is composed of a presiding justice and fourteen other justices who sit in five 
divisions of three justices each in the trial and determination of cases. The Court has original and 
                                                          
423 See appendix 2 for a list of corruption cases pending in various Courts in Nigeria. 
424 Constitution, Art 285 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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appellate jurisdiction,425  the Court gives its final verdict on a case within three month from the 
date of registration of the case.426  
Another example of a special Court is the special anti-corruption Courts of Kenya which 
was established under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003 (ACECA) and 
presided over by a special magistrate,427 the innovative special anti-corruption Courts are 
established to deal with the corruption cases as a matter of priority. Section 4 of the ACECA 
emphasizes that, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code or in any 
other law for the time being in force, the offences in this Act shall be tried by special magistrates 
only”. 
Compulsory interrogation powers found in section 27 of the EFCC Act requires a person who 
has been arrested for an offence to make a written declaration on the location and provenance of 
his assets, to refuse to make the declaration or to make a false one is an offence punishable with 
five years imprisonment. This section is a contravention of 35(2) of the Nigerian constitution 
which states that any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to remain silent or 
avoid answering any question until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any other person 
of his own choice. Compulsory interrogation is clearly an infringement of an accused person’s 
fundamental human rights. 
 
7.5 THE OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS IN THE ICPC AND THE EFCC ACT 
Offences are duplicated in anti-corruption statutes in Nigeria which is unnecessary 
because duplication of laws open avenues for double jeopardy which is unconstitutional.  While I 
                                                          
425 Republic Act 3019, Anti Graft Act, Public Act 1379, Penal Act, Anti Money Laundering Act (Philippines). 
426 See Froilan L. Cabarios, Corruption Control in the Criminal Justice System of The Philippines; Public Attorney, 
Department of Justice, Public Attorney’s Office, Philippines. 
427 See Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003, section 3. 
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shall sporadically discuss other anti corruption statutes, my main focus shall be overlapping 
functions in the ICPC and EFCC Act. The Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code provide for 
official corruption of public officers428 and public officers taking gratification429 and the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offence Act, 2004 also provides for accepting gratification,430 
corrupt offers to public officers,431 and corrupt demands by persons.432  
EFCC investigates both the public and private sector, specifically the EFCC Act 
mandates the commission to combat financial and economic crimes; prevent, investigate, 
prosecute and enforce other laws and regulations including  the Money Laundering Act 1995, the 
Money Laundering (Prohibition) act 2004, the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related 
Offences Act 1995, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks 
Act 1994, the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 and Miscellaneous Offences 
Act.433 
 
7.5.1 Investigation of Offences and Interrogation of Offenders 
Sections 27, 28 and 29 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2004(ICPC) 
provide for the power to investigate reports, inquire into information, power to examine persons 
and power to summon persons for examination respectively. The three sections generally provide 
for the power of investigation and interrogation.434 Section 28 of the Act specifically empowers 
an officer to give three orders435 which the person investigated must comply with.436 Subject to 
                                                          
428 Section 98A and 98B of the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code respectively.  
429 Section 115 and 115 of the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code respectively.  
430 Section 8. 
431 Section 9. 
432 Section 10. 
433 See EFCC Establishment Act, Art 6 (2004). 
434 Section 27(3). 
435 Section 28(1)(a), (b) and (c), 
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the provisions of section 29 to 34 of the Act,437 the Commission has the power to issue summons 
directed to a person complained against or any other person to attend before the Commission for 
the purpose of being examined in relation to the complaint or in relation to any other matter 
which may and or facilitate the investigation of the complaint.  
Similarly, section 6 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004 (EFCC) 
provides for power of investigation by the Commission, the Commission has the power to cause 
investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has 
committed an offence under the Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes.438 
The Commission has the power to cause investigations to be conducted into the properties of any 
person if it appears to it that the person’s life style and extent of the properties are not justified 
by his source of income.439 Since both Acts do not provide for the modus operandi of 
investigation and interrogation, officers of the anti-corruption bodies are expected, in the interest 
of the rule of law, to comply with the Criminal Procedure Act440 and the Criminal Procedure 
Code441 in their investigation and interrogation.442  
 
7.5.2 Arrest, Search, Seizure and Forfeiture 
The ICPC Act does not specifically provide for the arrest of a person who is served with 
summons to appear before the Commission. It merely provides that a person who has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
436 Section 28(3) to (9). Section 28(10) provides penalty of three months imprisonment for non-compliance with the 
section. 
437 Section 29 provides for summons against suspects. Section 30 provides for forms and service of summons. 
Section 31 provides for mode of service. Section 32 provides for substituted service. Section 33 provides for 
acknowledgment of service. Section 34 provides for detention of person refusing to acknowledge service. 
438 Section 6(1)(a). 
439 Section 6(1)(b). 
440 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, Cap. 41 (2004). 
441 Id. Note 1960. 
442 The Criminal Procedure Act applies to the Southern States and  the Criminal Procedure Code applies to the 
Northern States. 
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served with a summons and refuses to appear before the Commission will be arrested and 
detained.443 A provision, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in the case of Attorney-
General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation.444  Similarly, the EFCC Act 
specifically provides for the arrest and apprehension of economic and financial crime 
perpetrators.445 
By section 37 of the ICPC Act, an officer of the Commission in the course of his 
investigation may seize property which he has reasonable grounds to suspect is related to an 
offence.446 Section 38 provides for the custody of seized property. Similarly, section 25 of the 
EFCC Act provides for seizure of property and specifically states that any property subject to 
forfeiture under the Act may be seized by the Commission in incidental to an arrest or search, in 
the case of property liable to forfeiture upon process issued by the Court following an application 
made by the Commission in accordance with the prescribed rules.447 
While section 47 of the ICPC Act provides for the forfeiture of property upon prosecution for 
an offence, section 48 provides for forfeiture of property where there is no prosecution and the 
Chairman of the Commission is enjoined to apply to a Judge of the High Court for an order of 
forfeiture of the property before the expiration of twelve months from the date of the seizure. 
Similarly, sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the EFCC Act provide for forfeiture of properties. 
Section 19 provides for forfeiture after conviction in certain cases, section 20 provides for 
properties that will be forfeited by the Federal Government, section 21 and 22 provides for the 
forfeiture of foreign assets and passport and section 24 makes further general provision on 
forfeiture.  
                                                          
443 Section 35. 
444 Supra note at 180. 
445 Section 12(1)(b). 
446 Section 37(1). 
447 Section 25(1). 
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7.5.3 Decision to Prosecute 
 
The decision to prosecute must be exercised judicially and judiciously and with utmost 
caution for fear of prosecuting and probably convicting an innocent person and the decision in 
most cases is taken by the prosecution.  Section 61 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act, 2004 provides for the prosecution of offences. Every prosecution for an offence 
under the Act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption and other related offences will be 
deemed to be done with the consent of the Attorney-General.448 By section 61(1) of the Act, 
prosecution of offences need not be by the Attorney-General, section 61(2) of the Act vests in 
the appropriate authority the power to prosecute offences however, the appropriate authority is 
not defined in the Act, this is a lacuna and should be addressed to avoid misconstruing the 
section.   
Similarly, section 12 of the EFCC Act generally provides for special duties of the units of the 
Commission,449 section 12(2) which provides that the legal and prosecution unit shall be charged 
with the responsibility for prosecuting offenders under the Act, supporting the general and assets 
investigation unit by providing the unit with legal advice and assistance whenever it is required, 
conducting such proceedings as may be necessary towards the recovering of any assets or 
property forfeited under the Act and performing such other legal duties as the Commission may 
refer to it from time to time. 
 
 
 
                                                          
448Section 61(1). 
449 The Units are spelt out in section 11 of the Act. They are the General and Assets Investigation Unit, the 
Legal and Prosecution Unit, the Research Unit, the Administrative Unit and the Training Unit. 
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7.5.4 Jurisdiction of Courts 
Offences in the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code including corruption are usually tried 
in the High Court. Section 61(3) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act vests 
in the Chief Judge of a State or of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja the 
power to designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he will deem 
appropriate to hear and determine all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud, or other related offences 
arising under the Act or any other laws prohibiting fraud, bribery, or corruption.  
Similarly, section 18 of the EFCC Act provides that the Federal High Court or High Court of 
a State has jurisdiction to try offenders under the Act.450 Section 19(1) of the Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act, 2004 provides that the Federal High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
try offences under the Act. Section 14 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related 
Offences Act, 2006 provides that the Federal High Court or the High Court of the Federal 
Capital Territory and the High Court of the States shall have jurisdiction to try offences and 
impose penalties under the Act. 
As it were, ICPC Act vests jurisdiction in the State High Court or the High Court of the 
Federal Capital Territory,451 the EFCC Act vests jurisdiction in the Federal High Court or High 
Court of a State, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act vests in the Federal High Court 
exclusive jurisdiction and the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act vests 
jurisdiction in the Federal High Court, or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory or the 
High Court of a State. Both the ICPC Act and the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related 
Offences Act share in common in terms of jurisdiction, the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory and the High Court of a State.  
                                                          
450 Section 18(1). 
451 Section 61(3). 
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The EFCC Act also shares with the ICPC Act and the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud 
Related Offences Act in terms of jurisdiction, the High Court of a State. While the ICPC Act, 
and the EFCC Act vest jurisdiction in two Courts, the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud 
Related Offences Act vests jurisdiction in three Courts, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 
vests jurisdiction in only the Federal High Court, a jurisdiction which is exclusive to that Court. 
 
7.5.5 Conclusion  
As earlier stated, I recommend that the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) should be dissolved by the National Assembly for its lack of 
proactiveness and its overlapping functions with the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) as I have emphasized above.  Eliminating this problem of overlapping 
functions between both commissions would also eliminate instances of double jeopardy currently 
experienced in cases prosecuted by the agencies.452 The law provides that nobody should be 
prosecuted or convicted twice on the same offence neither could the case be re-opened if he was 
convicted or discharged and acquitted. 453 The duplication of offences is a constraint in the 
successful prosecution of the anti-corruption offences. The creation of anticorruption 
commissions  does not mean that the problems of corruption will miraculously disappear, If there 
is one lesson to be learnt from the history of anti corruption commissions in Nigeria is that there 
are no individual solutions to tackling corruption, anti corruption commissions are an innovative 
institutional response to corruption, but they are not the ultimate panacea. 
 
                                                          
452 For instance, former governor of Bayelsa state, Mr. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was indicted under the ICPC Act 
and EFCC Act for the same offences. 
453 Constitution, Art 36(9) (1999) (Nigeria). 
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7.6 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW AND ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN 
FIGHTING CORRUPTION; EXPERIENCES OF INDIA’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
ACT (RTI)  AND  THE SOUTH AFRICA’S PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION ACT. 
 
“Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own 
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without 
popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or 
perhaps both”.454 Fighting corruption requires transparency and accountability, which includes 
making information on public transactions open to the public. The dissemination of information 
about public affairs and the management of public issues is one of the most frequently-cited 
anticorruption measures”.  
 
Section 39 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution states that, every person shall be entitled to 
freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference.  For governance institutions and civil society groups working 
on transparency and anticorruption, access to information is very essential for them to monitor 
and expose corruption. Transparency in the structures and procedures for spending public funds 
and granting benefits helps prevent corruption by reducing the opportunities for corruption. 
Access to government records and information is an essential requirement for modern 
government, access facilitates public knowledge and discussion, it provides an important guard 
against abuses, mismanagement and corruption which can also be beneficial to governments 
themselves – openness and transparency in the decision making process can assist in developing 
                                                          
454 James Madison available at http://www.jamesmadisonproject.org/news.php?news_id=6. 
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citizen trust in government actions and maintaining a civil and democratic society. 455 
Governments around the world are increasingly making more information about their 
activities available and over fifty countries around the world have now adopted comprehensive 
Freedom of Information(FOI) Acts to facilitate access to records held by government bodies and 
over thirty more have pending efforts. While FOI acts have been around for several centuries, 
over half of the FOI laws have been adopted in just the last ten years. The growth in transparency 
is in response to demands by civil society organizations, the media and international lenders. 456  
At the International level, the right to information finds articulation as a human right in most 
important basic human rights documents, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,457 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.458  At regional levels, there are 
numerous other human rights documents, which include this fundamental right for example, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,459 the 
American Convention on Human Rights,460 the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights,461 etc. The Commonwealth has also formulated principles on Freedom of Information, 
even the United Nations at its very inception in 1946, the General Assembly resolved that 
                                                          
455 David Banisar, Freedom of Information And Access To Government Records Around The World, (May 2004) 
available at http://freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2004.pdf. 
456 Id. 
457 See Article 19(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.  
458 See Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. 
459See Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom states 
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
460See Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's 
choice. 
461 See Article 9(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights states that Every individual shall have the 
right to receive information. 
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Freedom of Information is a fundamental human right and the touchstone for all freedoms to 
which the United Nations is consecrated.462 The 2003 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC) entered into force in 2005 and its one hundred and forty signatories have 
committed to adopting access to information regimes, as well as to implementing other 
transparency measures in the conduct of state business463. Nigeria is a signatory to the 
Convention.  
The potential of UNCAC is in three-fold:464 
• It provides a global framework for combating corruption, by establishing worldwide 
standards that bind countries at all levels of economic and democratic development; 
• It encapsulates the measures necessary to prevent corruption, including access to 
information and promotion of transparency in private finance, public procurement and 
national anti-corruption agencies; 
• It sets legal standards for the criminalization of corrupt acts. 
Article 10 of the Convention on public reporting encourages countries to adopt measures to 
improve public access to information as a means to fight corruption. It states “Taking into 
account the need to combat corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to enhance 
transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning 
and decision-making processes, where appropriate. Such measures may include”, 
 
(a) Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to obtain, 
where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and decision-making 
                                                          
462United Nation General Assembly, (1946) Resolution 59(1), 65th Plenary Meeting, December 14. 
463 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html. 
464http://www.ifap.ru/library/book115.pdf. 
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processes of its public administration.  With due regard for the protection of privacy and 
personal data, on decisions and legal acts that concern members of the public; 
(b) Simplifying administrative procedures, where appropriate, in order to facilitate public 
access to the competent decision-making authorities; and 
(c) Publishing information, which may include periodic reports on the risks of corruption in 
its public administration. 
In addition, Article 13 on “participation of society” states that each State Party shall take 
appropriate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public 
sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based 
organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness 
regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption. 
This participation should be strengthened by such measures as: 
(a) Enhancing the transparency of and promoting the contribution of the public to 
decision making processes; 
(b) Ensuring that the public has effective access to information; 
The Commonwealth, an association of fifty three countries in 1980 adopted a resolution 
encouraging its members to enhance citizens’ access to information, in 1999 the Commonwealth 
Law Ministers recommended that member states adopt laws on Freedom of Information based on 
the principles of disclosure, promoting a culture of openness, limited exemptions, records 
management, and a right of review.465 In 2003, the Commonwealth secretariat issued model bill 
                                                          
465 Communiqué issued by the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers at the Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 
May 1999. 
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on Freedom of Information466 the draft sets out detailed procedures for parliamentary systems 
based on the Freedom of Information laws in Canada, Australia and other Commonwealth 
countries. 
On a regional level, the African  Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption467 requires states parties to adopt measures that guarantee access to information. 
Article 9 of the Convention states that, each state party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the right of access to any information that is required to assist in the 
fight against corruption and related offences. The African Union which created the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights468 adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression in Africa on October 2002,469 The Declaration calls on member states to recognize 
freedom of expression rights, section IV on “Freedom of Information” states: 
1.  Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the public good 
and everyone has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly defined rules 
established by law. 
2. The right to information shall be guaranteed by law in accordance with the following 
principles: everyone has the right to access information held by public bodies; everyone has 
the right to access information held by private bodies which is necessary for the exercise or 
protection of any right; 
                                                          
466 Commonwealth Secretariat, Freedom of Information Model Bill, May 2003. 
http://www.cpahq.org/CommonwealthFOIAct_pdf_media_public.aspx 
467 http://www.africa-
union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corr
uption.pdf 
468 See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nairobi, Kenya, June 1981. http://www.africaunion. 
org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Banjul%20Charter.pdf. 
469 See Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 32nd Session, 17 - 23 October 2002. 
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Any refusal to disclose information shall be subject to appeal to an independent body and/or 
the Courts; public bodies shall be required, even in the absence of a request, actively to 
publish important information of significant public interest; 
No one shall be subject to any sanction for releasing in good faith information on 
wrongdoing, or that which would disclose a serious threat to health, safety or the 
environment, save where the imposition of sanctions serves a legitimate interest and is 
necessary in a democratic society; and secrecy laws shall be amended as necessary to comply 
with Freedom of Information principles. 
3. Everyone has the right to access and update or otherwise correct their personal 
information, whether it is held by public or by private bodies.470 
Toeing the same line, the Treaty of ECOWAS of 1975 encourages the free flow of 
information within national borders as well as regional cooperation in the area of information. 
Article 65 of the Treaty states that member states undertake to co-ordinate their efforts, pool their 
resources in order to promote the exchange of radio and television programmes at bilateral and 
regional levels and also encourage the establishment of programme exchange centers at regional 
level and strengthen existing programme exchange centers. 
Article 66 of the Treaty further states that; 
• In order to involve more closely the citizens of the Community in the regional integration 
process, member states agree to co-operate in the area of information.  
• To this end they undertake as follows:  
o to maintain within their borders, and between one another, freedom of access  for 
professionals of the communication industry and for information sources;  
                                                          
470 Adopted by The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, meeting at its 32nd Ordinary Session, in 
Banjul, The Gambia, from 17 to 23 October 2002. 
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o to facilitate exchange of information between their press organs,  to promote and 
foster effective dissemination of information within the Community;  
o  to ensure respect for the rights of journalists;  
o to take measures to encourage investment capital, both public and private, in the 
communication industries in Member States;  
o to modernize the media by introducing training facilities for new information 
techniques; and  
o to promote and encourage dissemination of information in indigenous languages, 
strengthening co-operation between national press agencies and developing 
linkages between them. 
Also, the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in article 2(10) 
states  one of its  objectives as to Promote the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster 
citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability 
in the management of public affairs. The most basic feature of Freedom of Information laws is 
the ability for individuals to ask for records, documents and information held by public 
authorities and other government bodies. There are a number of common exemptions that are 
found in nearly all law, these include the protection of national security and international 
relations, personal privacy, commercial confidentiality, law enforcement and public order, 
information received in confidence, and internal discussions. Most laws require that harm must 
be shown before the information can be withheld, for at least some of the provisions. 471 
A number of countries’ laws include “public interest tests” that require that withholdings 
must be balanced against disclosure in the public interest and this allows for information to be 
released even if harm is shown if the public benefit in knowing the information outweighs the 
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harm that may be caused from disclosure. This is often used for the release of information that 
would reveal wrongdoing, corruption or to prevent harm to individuals or the environment but in 
some countries it applies to all exemptions for any public reason. 472  
The idea of a Freedom of Information law for Nigeria was conceived in 1993 by three 
different organizations, working independently of each other.  The organizations, Media Rights 
Agenda (MRA), Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) and the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), 
subsequently agreed to work together on a campaign for the enactment of a Freedom of 
Information Act. The objective of the campaign was to lay down as a legal principle the right of 
access to documents and information in the custody of the government or its officials and 
agencies as a necessary corollary to the guarantee of freedom of expression. It was also aimed at 
creating mechanisms for the effective exercise of this right. 473 
The consultations among the initial partner organizations was geared, among other 
things, towards determining the various interest groups likely to be affected by the legislation, 
those who should have a right or standing to request information under a Freedom of Information 
regime and under what circumstances information may be denied those seeking them, what 
departments or organs of government would be responsible for releasing information and 
documents to those seeking them and determining the agencies and arms of government to which 
the legislation would extend. Media Rights Agenda was designated the technical partner in the 
project under the arrangement agreed upon for taking the project forward.  In keeping with this 
role, it was asked to produce a draft Freedom of Information Law.474 
The political situation in Nigeria deteriorated shortly afterwards as the then President, 
General Sani Abacha’s regime became more repressive and brutal and the law was never passed. 
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Following the death of General Abacha in June 1998, the regime of Major-General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar which took over political authority in the country immediately embarked on a 
transition to civil rule program under which elections were held into various levels of 
government between December 1998 and February 1999. This development created the 
necessary political climate to revisit the issue. 475  
Another opportunity to review the draft law and its content came up in March 1999 when 
Media Rights Agenda, working with ARTICLE 19, the International Centre against Censorship 
in London and the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission, organized a workshop on 
Media Law Reform in Nigeria which was held between March 16 and 18, 1999, the workshop 
was attended by sixty one representatives of the media; both independent and state controlled, 
regulatory bodies, the legal profession, international institutions, local and international non-
governmental organizations, and other interest groups.476 The Freedom of Information Bill was 
finally presented to the legislature in 1999. 
On May 28, 2011, history was made and the Freedom of Information bill was signed into law 
by the President of Nigeria as the Freedom of Information Act of 2011, twelve years after the bill 
was first presented to the Nigerian National Assembly. In a nutshell, the newly enacted Freedom 
of Information Act: 
• Guarantees the right of access to information held by public institutions, irrespective of 
the form in which it is kept and is applicable to private institutions where they utilize 
public funds, perform public functions or provide public services. 
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• Requires all institutions to proactively disclose basic information about their structure 
and processes and mandates them to build the capacity of their staff to effectively 
implement and comply with the provisions of the Act 
• Provides protection for whistleblowers. 
• Makes adequate provision for the information needs of illiterate and disabled applicants; 
• Creates reporting obligations on compliance with the law for all institutions affected by 
it. These reports are to be provided annually to the Federal Attorney General's office, 
which will in turn make them available to both the National Assembly and the public. 
• Requires the Federal Attorney General to oversee the effective implementation of the Act 
and report on execution of this duty to Parliament annually. 
For the first time, public institutions are legally obliged to keep proper records and must 
respond to requests for information within seven days after application is received make the 
information available to the applicant.  Where the public institution considers that the 
application should be denied, the Institution shall give written notice to the applicant that 
access to all or part of the information will not be granted, stating reasons for the denial.477 
The Freedom of Information Act provides for among other things, the right of any person to 
access or request information, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the 
custody or possession of any public official, agency or institution howsoever described.  An 
applicant for access to public information need not demonstrate any specific interest in the 
information being applied for.478 
                                                          
477 See Section 5, Freedom of Information Act of 2011 (Nigeria). 
478 See Section 2, Freedom of Information Act of 2011 (Nigeria). 
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The Act, however, has a laundry list of exemptions in sections 12,13,15,16,17 and 18; 
exemption of international affairs and defense,479 exemption of law enforcement and 
investigation,480 exemption of personal information,481 exemption of third party 
information,482exemption of professional or other privileges conferred by law, including 
journalism confidentiality privileges,483and exemption of course or research materials.484 
Exemptions to the freedom of information law should be as limited in scope as possible for 
the law to have meaning and the desired impact on governance”. Exemptions should be 
clearly and narrowly drawn and subject to strict and public interest tests, the Freedom of 
Information Act is deficient in this area. 
I believe the Freedom of Information Law is a fundamental tool in fighting corruption 
because whether it involves government agencies or private citizens and civil society 
organizations, they should be able to compel disclosure of relevant public information for 
relevant investigations into allegations of corruption and other related activities. Citizen's right to 
seek information from the state on any issue promotes transparency and accountability in 
government because such openness shows that the government has nothing to hide and this will 
improve citizen’s trust in government action.   
Want to know how government money is been spent? Use the legislation to clear-up rates, 
Unhappy about a regulatory body that never seems to do anything when people complain? Ask 
for their internal guidance on handling complaints and see if their staff is doing what they're 
supposed to do, want to know about how the money allocated to your state is spent and on what? 
Ask for financial records and budgets. The public will have the right to peer into a public 
                                                          
479 Id at Section 12. 
480 Id at Section 13. 
481 Id at Section 15. 
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483 Id Section 17.  
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authority's files and check how well it is doing its job. People who want to know why they aren't 
getting the service they expect, are unhappy with a proposal, or want to satisfy themselves that 
the right decision was taken, will now be able to see the paperwork for themselves. 
To the public, secrecy means that there is something to hide, that officials can't justify their 
decisions, are concealing their errors or have ignored legitimate concerns and this would make 
them skeptical about what the authority tells them, less likely to follow its advice or believe its 
successes. Freedom of Information is a chance to strengthen public confidence that few 
authorities can afford to ignore. The public is entitled to a clear understanding of the work of all 
public authorities. The Freedom of Information law would contribute to better government 
accountability, transparency and popular participation in democratic processes.   
The print and electronic media have a significant role to play during the lifespan of an anti – 
corruption programme, given the importance of access to information and information 
dissemination throughout the process.485 This is true because some anti – corruption activities 
may never fully achieve their desired effect unless they are complemented by truly independent 
and professional media organizations, it is difficult to imagine avenues more effective than the 
media in exposing corruption, or informing them of gains made in sectors where similar anti- 
corruption programmes are being implemented.  
I believe true democracy cannot be achieved or felt if the citizens have no access to 
information. Rather, true democracy is achieved when people engage with their leaders and 
influence decision making process. With access to information, citizens will then be empowered 
to demand action against the corrupt and recovery of diverted development expenditure, lack of 
free flow of information impairs and slows down economic and social development. 
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7.6.1  Right to Information Act (RTI); the Indian Experience 
 
The Supreme Court ruled in 1975 that access to government information was an essential part 
of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. In order to promote transparency 
and accountability in the administration, the Indian Parliament enacted the Freedom of 
Information Act, 2002, which was repealed later and a new act, The Right to Information Act, 
(“the Act”)486 came into force on 12 October 2005. The new law empowers Indian citizens to 
seek information from a public authority, thus making the government and its functionaries more 
accountable and responsible.487  
The Act defines information in section 2(f) as any material in any form, including records, 
documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, 
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and 
information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any 
other law for the time being in force. RTI mandates the proactive disclosure of information by 
public authorities. Section 3 and 4 of the Act states that subject to the provisions of this Act, all 
citizens shall have the right to information. It also states that every public authority shall 
maintain all its records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and in the form which 
facilitates the right to information under this Act and ensure that all records are appropriately 
computerized within a reasonable time and subject to availability of resources, computerized and 
connected through a network all over the country so that access to such records is facilitated.  
                                                          
486 See The Right to Information Act, 2005.(India) 
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Section 8 of the Act includes a list of exemptions, although they are all subject to a blanket 
override whereby information may be released if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
harm to the protected interest. Exemptions covers disclosures that would prejudicially affect the 
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic or economic interests of the State, 
relations with foreign States, would lead to incitement of an offence, has been expressly 
forbidden to be published by a Court or tribunal, could constitute a contempt of Court, would 
endanger the life or safety of a person or identify a source used by law enforcement bodies, 
would impede an investigation or apprehension or prosecution of an offender, would cause a 
breach of parliamentary privilege, cabinet papers (although materials relied upon must be 
released after decisions are made), commercial confidence information, trade secrets or 
intellectual property where disclosure would harm the competitive position of a third party, 
information available due to a fiduciary relationship, information obtained in confidence from a 
foreign government and personal information which has no relationship to any public activity or 
which would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 
The Main thrust of RTI Act is to change the culture of secrecy and aloofness that has 
long plagued India’s monolithic and opaque bureaucracy, the RTI Act has promised to reverse 
this culture of secrecy and unaccountability by recognizing that the government only holds 
information on behalf of the owners, its citizens. Indeed, by breaking down this culture of 
secrecy, the law also opens channels of communication between citizens and government.488 The 
RTI Act provides citizens with a vital tool to inform themselves about a government’s record in 
office, in this way it empowers ordinary people to make more informed electoral decisions, 
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giving them an opportunity to participate more effectively in governance and policy 
formulation.489 
Although the Official Secrets Act, of 1923, which is based on the 1911 UK OSA, has not 
been repealed, the Right to Information Act specifically states that its provisions will have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistent in the OSA or any other law.490  The Public Records Act, 
1993 sets a thirty year rule for access to archives491 and the Right to Information 
Act specifically states that information shall be provided under the Act after twenty years, but it 
then specifies that certain exemptions will still apply beyond this period. Right to Information in 
India means the freedom of people to have access to government information and it implies that 
citizens and non-governmental organizations should enjoy a reasonably free access to all files 
and documents pertaining to the governmental operations, decisions, and performance. In other 
words, it means openness and transparency in the functioning of the government. Thus, it is 
antithetical to secrecy in public administration.492 
The Right to Information Act has improved the enforcement of many other economic and 
political rights In India. For example, the Right to Information Act is used to enforce rations 
distribution by revealing that food vendors are not providing the government subsidized food to 
impoverished citizens. This has resulted in substantial changes in the food distribution system to 
ensure that citizens are getting their food while vendors are getting adequate compensation. 
Others are using it to prompt officials to respond to longstanding problems with roads, buildings 
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and jobs.493 Varsha Rajora, in his paper on “Tackling Corruption through RTI: A Base for Good 
Governance”494 stated that RTI has recorded the following successes since its introduction in 
2005.  
• It has made administration more accountable and has reduced the gap between the 
administration and the people by increasing citizen participation. 
• It has made people aware of administrative decision-making and promoted public interest 
by discouraging arbitrariness in administrative decision making 
• It facilitates better delivery of goods and services to people by civil servants 
• It facilitates intelligent and constructive criticism of administration 
•  It has reduced the scope for corruption in public administration 
• It upholds the democratic ideology by promoting openness and transparency in 
Administration 
• It has made administration more responsive to the requirements of the people 
• It has reduced the abuse of authority by the public servants. 
The RTI Act is not only a strong tool against government but also against judicial corruption. 
The Delhi High Court's ruling states that information about judges’ assets cannot be kept 
concealed and it must be disclosed to any citizen seeking the information under the 
RTI Act. The landmark verdict further held that the office of the Chief Justice of India is a public 
authority and it cannot enjoy special exemption from the RTI Act.495 
 
 
 
                                                          
493 http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf 
494 Varsha Rajora, Institute of Law, Nirma University, Gujarat, India. 
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7.6.2 Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) of South Africa 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa496guarantees the right of access to 
information in Section 16(1)497 and the general right in section 16(1)(b)498 is augmented by an 
explicit right of access to information in section 32 of the South African  Constitution. There is a 
further constitutional obligation that the state enacts enabling legislation to fully realize this 
right.499 Contemporaneous with section 32(2) of the Constitution, parliament enacted the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)500 to give effect to the right of access to 
information, PAIA came into operation on 9 March 2001, giving effect to the constitutional right 
of access to any information held by any public or private body that is required for the exercise 
or protection of any rights. Where a request is made in terms of the Act, the body to which the 
request is made is obliged to release the information, except where the Act expressly provides 
that the information may or must not be released.501  
PAIA is lauded as one of the few pieces of information access legislation the world over 
that is progressive enough to apply to both public and private sectors, as well as to records, 
irrespective of when the record came into existence. Its application also restricts “the exclusion 
of any provision of other legislation that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of a record…and is 
materially inconsistent with an object, or a specific provision, of this Act”. 502 The PAIA enables 
the public to scrutinize government decision-making and hold government accountable for 
                                                          
496 108 of 1996. 
497 See Section 16(1) which states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of 
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502 See Art. 5 of The Promotion of Access to Information Act (South Africa). 
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actions and decisions that affect their lives and rights. The framework created in terms of the 
PAIA enables the public to access information and ensures that the public service participates in 
promoting a culture of human rights and a just public administration. Without reliable and 
relevant information, citizens do not know what government is doing and cannot hold it 
accountable.503 
The Act furthermore sets out a series of enabling provisions for information requesters, 
among which is that the requester’ s right of access is not affected by “any reason the requester 
gives for requesting access” or by the relevant information officer’s “belief to what the requester’ 
s reasons are for requesting access”.504 There is also an expansive list of the duties and 
responsibilities of public and private information holders, a key feature of which is the 
requirement to publish manuals containing comprehensive details of how to access 
information505 as well as provide categories of records that are automatically available.506  
PAIA also provides for the Human Rights Commission to play a major role in assessing, 
monitoring and implementing various aspects of the legislation.507 Section 9 of the Act 
recognizes that such right to access to information cannot be unlimited and should be subject to 
justifiable limitations, including, but not limited to: 
• Limitations aimed at the reasonable protection of privacy; 
• Commercial confidentiality; and 
• Effective, efficient and good governance; and 
• In a manner that balances that right with any other rights, including such rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 
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Public and private organizations are requested by PAIA to publish manuals describing 
their structure, functions, contact information, access guide, services and description of the 
categories of records held by the organization. The manuals, to be submitted to the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), are to be published in the Government Gazette by 
February 2003. SAHRC is designated to see the functioning of the Act and it is required under 
law to issue a guide on the Act and submit reports to Parliament. The Commission is also 
expected to promote the Act, make recommendations and monitor its implementation.508 
State bodies currently have thirty days to respond.509 The Act also includes a unique 
provision (as required in the Constitution) that allows individuals and government bodies to 
access records held by private bodies when the record is “necessary for the exercise or 
protection” of people's rights. Bodies must respond within 30 days.510 The Act does not apply to 
records of the Cabinet and its committees, judicial functions of Courts and tribunals, and 
individual members of Parliament and provincial legislatures.511 PAIA sets out several grounds 
for the refusal of a request for access to records in both public and private bodies.512 One of those 
grounds for refusal prescribes the mandatory protection of commercial information of third 
party.513 This provision has the potential to prevent access, on the grounds of 'commercial 
confidentiality', to information emanating from the privatization and/or corporatization initiatives 
of the government. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal limited the right of individuals to obtain information from 
private bodies, ruling in March 2006, the Court stated that a hospital was not required to provide 
information to the wife of a deceased patient who was trying to obtain more information about 
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512 See Art. 33 -45 & Art. 62 – 69 of The Promotion of Access to Information Act (South Africa). 
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his death as part of a potential lawsuit against the hospital.514South Africa's Freedom of 
Information legislation remains unique in the world, however, being the only such law that 
permits access to records held by private as well as public bodies.515 Some other countries cover 
the private sector only partly.516 
However, one caveat I observed with the Act is the fact that Section 12(a) states that, 'this 
Act does not apply to a record of the Cabinet and its committees', this exemption is brutal 
because it renders the right of access to policy decisions and processes of government 
inaccessible to the public (for example, state policy on reparations). This is completely 
inconsistent with the constitutional right of access to 'any information' held by a public body. 
Based on the comparative analysis of India’s Right to Information Act and South Africa’s 
Promotion to Access of information Act, I would rightly state that Nigeria can draw experiences 
from both Acts and I shall say why. I decided to use both Acts as analysis because both countries 
have some similarities with Nigeria as regards population, diversity and level of corruption and 
they have been able to curb corruption by having the Freedom of Information Act. Both Acts 
have unique features that can be borrowed by the newly passed Nigerian Freedom of Information 
Act. 
The Freedom of Information Act provides for the right of any person to access or request 
information, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the custody or possession 
of any public official, agency or institution.517Just like Section 3 of the South Africa’s Promotion 
to Access of information Act, I propose that the right of individuals to access information or 
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records should be extended to private companies that are owned by the state and operating 
mainly for profit, they may or may not be performing public functions. I shall explain why. 
In Nigeria, the private sector is performing many functions which were previously the 
domain of public sector and as a result, a lot of information is now with the private sector. In 
1999, the Federal Government enacted the Public Enterprise (Privatization and 
Commercialization) Act which established the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE).518 BPE is 
charged with the overall responsibility of implementing the council's policies on privatization 
and commercialization, as such a number of public enterprises have been privatized.519 As a 
result of privatization in Nigeria, a substantial amount of information about public functions 
which was previously in the possession of governments now belongs to the private sector and if 
the proposed bill protects private companies, information relating to private banks, 
telecommunication companies, hospitals, and universities will not be accessible to individuals. 
Section 8 of the Freedom of Information Act states that where the government or public 
institution refuses to give access to a record or information applied for under the Act or a part 
thereof, the institution shall state in the notice given to the applicant the grounds for the refusal 
and that the applicant has a right to challenge the decision refusing access and have it reviewed 
by a Court. Section 21 further states that any applicant who has been denied access to 
information, or a part thereof may apply to the Court for a review of the matter within thirty days 
after the public institution denies or is deemed to have denied the application, or within such 
further time as the Court may either before or after the expiration of the thirty days fix or allow. I 
                                                          
518 http://www.bpeng.org/en/default.htm 
519 For example, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), 
Nigerian Airways, National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria, Federal Super Phosphate Fertilizer Company Limited, 
Ashaka Cement Company Limited and Unipetrol Nigeria Limited. 
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believe that seeking redress in Court for been refused access to a record will not be efficient 
because of the already slow judicial process in Nigeria.  
The law should provide for an individual right of appeal to an independent administrative 
body from a refusal by a public body to disclose information. The body must meet certain 
standards and have certain powers. Its independence should be guaranteed, both formally and 
through the process by which the head and/or board is/are appointed. Individuals appointed to 
such a body should be required to meet strict standards of professionalism, independence and 
competence, and be subject to strict conflict of interest rules. The procedure by which the 
administrative body processes appeals over requests for information which have been refused 
should be designed to operate rapidly. 
Having said that, I would recommend that just like what the India’s Right to Information 
offers, the Freedom of Information Bill should include the establishment of an Information 
Commission with branches in the six geographical region of Nigeria as it were for easy 
accessible. This Commission should amongst other powers that shall be assigned to it be 
responsible for   receiving and inquiring into a complaint from any person, who has been refused 
access to any information requested under the Act or who has not been given a response to a 
request for information or access to information within the time limit specified under this Act. 
The Information Commission, as the case may be, shall, while inquiring into any matter should 
have the same powers as are vested in a high Court. The decision of the Commission should be 
communicated within thirty days from the day such appeal was filed. 
The decision of the Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may 
be, shall be binding.  
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Table 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS 
 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT, NIGERIA 
PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION ACT, SOUTH 
AFRICA 
RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
ACT, INDIA 
Came into force on May 28, 2011 
 
Came into force March 2001 
 
Came into force on October 2005 
 
Grants any person the right to access 
or request information, which is in 
the custody or possession of any 
public official, agency or institution  
Applies to access to records held 
by private as well as public bodies. 
This Act applies to— a record of a 
public body and a record of a 
private body. (Section 3) 
 
Means the right to information 
accessible under the RTI Act, which 
is held by or under the control of any 
Public Authority. (Section 2(j)) 
 
Does not apply to international 
affairs and defense, law enforcement 
and investigation, personal 
information, third party information, 
professional or other privileges 
conferred by law, including 
journalism confidentiality privileges 
and  course or research materials 
Section 12 of this Act does not 
apply to the record of certain 
public bodies as thus; the Cabinet 
and its committees, the judicial 
functions of, a Court referred to in 
section 166 of the Constitution; a 
Special Tribunal established in 
terms of section 2 of the Special 
Investigating Units and Special 
Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act No. 74 
of 1996); or a judicial officer of 
such Court or Special Tribunal; or 
an individual member of 
Parliament or of a provincial 
legislature in that capacity. 
 
Section 24(1) states that nothing 
contained in this Act shall apply to; 
Intelligence Bureau, Research and 
Analysis Wing of the Cabinet, 
Secretariat, Directorate of Revenue 
Intelligence, Central Economic 
Intelligence Bureau, Directorate of 
Enforcement, Narcotics Control 
Bureau, Aviation Research Centre, 
Special Frontier Force, Border 
Security Force, Central Reserve 
Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border 
Police, Central Industrial Security 
Force, National Security Guards, 
Assam Rifles, Special Service 
Bureau, Special Branch (CID), 
Andaman and Nicobar, The Crime 
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Branch-C.I.D.-CB, Dadra and Nagar 
Haveli, Special Branch, 
Lakshadweep Police.  
 
Section 8 states that where the 
government or public institution 
refuses to give access to a record or 
information applied for or a part 
thereof, the institution shall state in 
the notice given to the applicant the 
grounds for the refusal, the specific 
provision of this Bill that it relates to 
and that the applicant has a right to 
challenge the decision refusing 
access and have it reviewed by a 
Court. 
Section 21 further states that any 
applicant who has been denied 
access to information, or a part 
thereof may apply to the Court for a 
review of the matter within thirty 
days after the public institution 
denies or is deemed to have denied 
the application, or within such 
further time as the Court may either 
before or after the expiration of the 
thirty days fix or allow. 
 
Section 74 & 75 of the Act states 
that a requester may lodge an 
internal appeal with the relevant 
authority against a decision of the 
information officer of a public 
body within 60 days. 
 
 
Section 19(1) of the Act states that 
any person who, does not receive a 
decision within the time specified 
indicated in the Act or is aggrieved 
by a decision of the Central Public 
Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may 
be, may within thirty days (30 days) 
from the expiry of such period or 
from the receipt of such a decision 
prefer an appeal. Section 19(2) states 
that a second appeal against the 
decision under sub-section (1) shall 
lie within ninety days (90 days) from 
the date on which the decision 
should have been made or was 
actually received, with the Central 
Information Commission or the 
State Information Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
To Nigerians, corruption is such a common phenomenon that defines the country and 
expectations of corruption infuse everyday experience whether one is a parent trying to look for 
school admission for their child, a college graduate trying to find a job, a motorist approaching 
most often than not an unauthorized police check point, a business person looking for federal, 
state or local government contracts, a traveler seeking for a foreign visa, or an ordinary Nigeria 
just trying to survived the everyday hassles. Most Nigerians I spoke to through the course of my 
research say they give bribe for services due to them out of necessity. 
In Nigeria, the political terrain is so toxic that it becomes a game of “if you cannot beat 
them, then you join them”, vested interests can have a strong impact on political will to address 
corruption, thus, those in favor of corruption will do anything within their power to maintain the 
status quo and sustain that vicious circle of corruption. The Nigerian State ought to create an 
enabling environment for accountability and transparency in governance by ensuring that the 
fundamental objectives outlined in Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution are made justiciable. A 
society which cannot establish a social security scheme to provide adequate shelter, sufficient 
food, social security insurance, pension, gratuity, unemployment benefits, health benefits and 
welfare for the disabled cannot meaningfully tackle corruption and promote accountability in 
government. 
It does not matter whether it is a developed, developing or less developed country, 
reducing corruption requires functioning governmental institutions and curbing corruption 
requires strong oversight through legislature, judiciary, law enforcement, independent media and 
civil society “When these institutions are weak, corruption spirals out of control with horrendous 
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consequences for ordinary people and for justice and equality in societies more broadly”.520 
Where corruption is entrenched, anti corruption commissions can only play a limited role, as 
their powers of investigation and enforcement may be constrained by influential politicians, god 
fathers and civil servants who indulge in corruption.  
The basic success of any anti-corruption regime is political will and from the foregoing, it 
is irrefutable that there are enough laws in the statute book to squash corruption but the 
enforcement of those laws depends on the political will of the governing class coupled with the 
creation of an enabling environment for a corrupt free society. Vigorous prosecution and change 
in public attitude is needed to curb corruption. What I have proposed is a pragmatic research 
work drawing on legal scholarship on strengthening anti corruption commissions and laws in 
Nigeria. I focused on reviewing the laws already in place, proposed amendments and new steps, 
it is with this aim in mind that I have developed this proposal for reforming anti corruption laws, 
to be challenged, debated and refined as the way forward.  
  
                                                          
520 Transparency International, Persistently high corruption in low-income countries amounts to an ongoing 
humanitarian disaster, Berlin, (Sept. 23, 2008). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
PENDING EFCC CASES 
 
 
 
Name 
 
Trial Court 
 
 
Case Status 
 
Amount 
Involved 
(Naira) 
 
Status of Suspect 
1 Ayo Fayose (Former 
Governor of Ekiti State) 
 
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 
51 state counts. 
Plea taken  
N1.2 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2007 
 
 
2 
Adenike Grange(Former 
Minister of Health 
 
FCT. High 
CourtMaitama 
Arraigned on 56   
state counts. Plea 
already taken.  
N300 
million  
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
3 
 
Joshua Dariye(Former 
Governor Plateau State) 
FCT High 
CourtGudu 
Arraigned on  14  
state counts. Plea 
already taken . 
N700 
Million 
granted bail by court 
since 2007 
4 
 
Saminu Turaki(Former 
Governor, Jigagwa 
State) 
FCT High 
CourtMaitama 
Arraigned on  32 
state counts. Plea 
already taken. 
N36 Billion granted bail by court 
since 2007 
5 
 
Orji Uzor Kalu(Former 
Governor, Abia State 
Fed. High 
CourtMaitama 
Arraigned on 107  
state counts. Lost 
at trial court but 
has gone on 
appeal to stay 
trial. 
N5 Billion granted bail by court 
since 2008 
 
6 
James Ibori(Former 
Governor, Delta State) 
Federal High 
Court Asaba 
Arraigned on 170 
state counts. Case  
re-assigned by CJ 
to Asaba FHC. 
Accused was 
acquitted of all 
charges in 
December 2009. 
N9.2 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
7 
 
Iyabo Obasanjo-
Bello(Serving Senator) 
FCT High 
Court, Maitama
Arraigned on 56 
state counts. Plea 
already taken.  
N10 
Million 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
 
8 
Lucky 
Igbinedion(Former 
Governor of Edo State) 
Fed. High 
Court, Enugu 
Arraigned on 191  
state counts. 
Applied for plea 
bargain 
&Convicted  
N4.3 
Billion 
Case determined 2008 
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9 
Gabriel Aduku(Former 
Minister of Health)  
FCT. High 
Court, Maitama
Arraigned on 56 
state counts.Court 
judgment on no 
case against 
suspect under 
review by EFCC 
N300 
Million 
Case determined in 2008 
10 
 
Jolly Nyame(Former 
Governor of Taraba 
State) 
Fed. High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 21 
state counts.Plea 
already taken . 
N180 
Million 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
11 
 
Chimaroke Nnamani 
(Former Governor of 
Enugu State) 
 
Fed. High 
Court, Lagos 
 Arraigned on 105 
state counts. Plea 
taken . 
N5.3 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2007 
12 
 
Michael 
Botmang(Former 
Governor of Plateau 
State) 
Fed. High 
Court,Maitama 
Arraigned on 31 
state counts. Plea 
taken.  
 
N1.5 
Billion 
 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
13 
 
Roland Iyayi (Former 
Managing Director of 
FAAN) 
FCT High 
Court, Maitama
Arraigned on 11 
state counts. Plea 
taken. Trial on-
going Court 
taking prosecution 
witnesses 
testimony 
N5.6 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
14 
 
Nyeson Wike (Serving 
Chief of Staff to 
Governor of Rivers 
State) 
FCT High 
CourtMaitama 
Arraigned on  
state counts. Court 
quashed charges. 
EFCC appealed 
judgment. Appeal 
pending at appeal 
court. 
N4.670 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
15 
 
Kenny Martins (Police 
Equipment Fund) 
FCT High 
Court,Maitama 
Arraigned on 28 
amended state 
counts. Plea taken 
and trial on-going. 
Witnesses under 
cross-
examination. 
Continuation of 
trial fixed for 
Nov.9 
N7,740 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
16 
 
Eider George (Austrian 
Business man) 
FCT High 
Court, Maitama
Arraigned on 11 
state counts. Plea 
taken and trial on-
going. 
Prosecution 
witnesses 
undergoing cross-
examination. 
 
 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
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Continuation of 
trial fixed for 
Nov.17 
17 
 
13 Filipinos (Charged 
for Oil Bunkering) 
Fed. High 
Court, Benin 
Arraigned on state 
counts, convicted 
at the close of trial 
and sentenced to 
65 Years 
altogether  
N300 
Million 
EFCC returns to court to 
seek forfeiture of vessel 
used for oil theft Oct 23 
slated for adoption of 
written addresses on that 
18 
 
6 Ghanaians (Charged 
for Oil Bunkering) 
Fed. High 
Court, Benin 
Arraigned on state 
counts and trial 
Commenced. 
Prosecution 
closed case, 
matter adjourned 
to Nov.4&5 for 
defence to close. 
N250 
Million 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
19 
 
Patrick Fernadez (Indian 
Buisnessman) 
Fed. High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 56 
state counts. Plea 
already taken and 
trial commences 
Nov 
N32 Billion granted bail by court in 
2009 
20 
 
Prof. Babalola 
Borishade (Former 
Minister of Aviation) 
FCT High 
Court,Maitama 
Arraigned on 11 
state counts. Plea 
taken and trial on-
going .  
N5.6 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
21 
 
Boni Haruna (Former 
Governor, Adamawa 
State) 
Fed. High 
CourtMaitama 
Arraigned on 
amended 28 state 
counts. Plea 
taken.  
N254 
Million 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
22 
 
Femi Fani-Kayode 
(Former Minster of 
Aviation) 
Fed. High 
Court,Lagos 
Arraigned on 47 
state counts . Plea 
taken . 
N250 
Million  
granted bail by court in 
2008 
 
23 
Prince Ibrahim Dumuje 
(Police Equipment 
Fund) 
FCT High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 28 
amended state 
counts. Plea taken 
N7,740 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
24 
 
Bode George (Chieftain 
of the ruling party, PDP) 
Fed. High 
Court.Lagos 
Arraigned on 68 
state counts. Plea 
taken and trial 
concluded. 
Accused 
sentenced to 29 
years in 
Imprisonment. 
Accused has 
appealed decision. 
N100 
Billion 
granted bail by court 
since 2008 
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25 
 
Rasheed Ladoja (Former 
Governor of Oyo State) 
Fed. High 
Court,Lagos  
Arraigned on 33 
state counts. Plea 
taken . 
N6 Billion granted bail by court 
since 2008 
26 
 
Four Snr Zenith Bank 
Managers 
Fed. High 
Court, Port 
Harcourt 
Arraigned on 56 
state counts. Plea 
taken but case 
stalled over an 
injunction by 
Rivers State Govt, 
which is a party in 
the case to stop 
EFCC. Injunction 
being challenged 
at appeal court 
N3.6 
Billion 
Granted bail by court in 
2009 
27 
 
Mallam Nasir El-Rufai 
(Former Minister of 
Federal Capital 
Territory) 
Fed. High 
Court,Abuja 
Arraigned on 8 
state counts. 
Suspect charged 
for corruption and 
abuse of office. 
Plea not taken 
because suspect 
has refused to put 
in appearance and 
papers for 
extradition filed. 
 
 
Suspect at large 
28 
 
Sen. Nicholas 
Ugbade,(Serving 
Senator)Hon. Ndudi 
ElumeluHon. 
Mohammed Jibo,Hon. 
Paulinus Igwe,(Serving 
Members of House of 
Reps)Dr Aliyu 
Abdullahi(Serving 
Fed.Perm.Sec) Mr. 
Samuel Ibi.Mr. Simon 
Nanle,Mr. Lawrence 
Orekoya,Mr Kayode 
Oyedeji,Mr. A. Garba 
Jahun,(This is the Rural 
Electrification Agency 
Case involving a serving 
Senator, 3 serving 
members of the House 
of Representatives, the 
Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Power 
and other high profile 
public officers) 
FCT High 
Court Abuja 
Arraigned on 158 
state counts. Plea 
taken while 
prosecution has 
filed more 
charges  against 
suspects.  
N5.2 
Billion 
Remanded in Prison 
Custody and later 
granted bail Court in 
2009 
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29 
 
Prof B. Sokan,Molkat 
Mutfwang,Michael Aule 
,Andrew Ekpanobi,(All 
Directors) Alexander 
Cozman(MD,Intermarke
t Ltd).(This is the UBEC 
case where high profile 
public servants connived 
with an American, 
Alexander Cozman) to 
defraud the Government. 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 64 
state counts. Plea 
taken while more 
charges were filed 
against suspects 
due to appearance 
of Prof Sokan. 
N636 
Million 
Suspects remanded in 
prison custody and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009. 
 
30 
Dr Ransome OwanMr. 
Abdulrahman Ado, Mr. 
Adulrasak Alimi,Mr. 
Onwuamaeze Iloeje, 
Mrs Grace Eyoma,Mr. 
Mohammed Bunu,Mr. 
Abimbola Odubiyi (This 
is the Nigeria Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
case where the 
Chairman and his 6 
Commissioners 
corruptly enriched 
themselves) 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 196 
state counts. Plea 
taken. Trial billed 
to commence 
while more 
charges were filed 
against suspects. 
N1.5 
Billion 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
 
31 
Tom Iseghohi, 
Muhammed Buba, Mike 
Okoli,(GM&Managers 
of Transcorp Group 
PLC) 
Fed. High 
Court,Abuja 
Arraigned on 32 
state counts. Plea 
taken. Matter 
adjourned for 
commencement of 
trial Nov 9.  
N15 Billion Suspects Remanded in 
Kuje Prison and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
 
32 
Dr Albert Ikomi, rtd 
perm sec, his firm, 
satelite town dev co Ltd 
Fed. High 
Court, Ikoyi, 
Lagos 
Arraigned on 4 
state counts. Plea 
taken and Matter 
adjourned for 
hearing 
N43 
Million 
Suspects Remanded in 
Ikoyi Prison and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
 
33 
Dr Yuguda Manu 
Kaigama, Chairman, 
Taraba State Civil 
Service Commission 
Taraba State 
High Court 5, 
Jalingo 
Arraigned on 37 
state counts . Plea 
taken and  Matter 
adjourned for trial 
N17 
Million 
Suspect remanded in 
prison custody. Co-
accused,  Yakubu 
Danjuma Takun, at 
large. 
 
34 
Chief Joe Musa, DG 
Natioanl Gallery of Art, 
Olusegun Ogumba, 
Chinedu Obi, Oparagu 
Elizabeth, Kweku 
Tandoh,(All Directors of 
NGA). 
FCT High 
Court, 
Lugbe(Justice 
Olukayode 
Adeniyi) 
Arraigned on 
12 state counts. 
Plea taken. 
N1.012 
Billion 
Suspects Remanded in 
Kuje Prison and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
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35 
Dr Dayo  Olagunju, 
Ex.Sec.National 
Commission for Mass 
Literacy, Adult &Non-
Formal Education. 
Joshua Alao, Alice 
Abang, Jibrin Waguna, 
Ahmed Abubakar, 
Shehu Abdullahi, Dr 
Victoria King-
Nwachukwu, Adamu 
Khalid, Moses Oseni, 
Francis Awelewa 
&Bashir Suleiman 
Fed. High 
Court, 
Abuja.Justice 
Anuli Chikere 
Arraigned on 17 
state counts.Plea 
taken and Matter 
adjourned for 
commencement of 
trial Oct 22 
N479 
Million 
Suspects Remanded in 
Kuje Prison and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
 
36 
Hamman Bello 
Hammed, Ex-CG 
Customs, Hannatu 
Sulaiman, Tajudeen 
Olalere, Lukman 
Hussain, Popular Foods 
Ltd & Silver Maritime 
shipping coy ltd 
Fed. High 
Court Lagos. 
Justice Ramat 
Moh’d 
Arraigned on 46 
state counts. Plea 
taken. 
N2.5 
Billion 
Suspects Remanded in 
Kirikiri&Ikoyi Prisons 
and later granted bail by 
court in 2009. 
 
37 
Professor Innocent 
Chuka Okonkwo, fmr 
VC Imo state Univ, 
Uchechi Nwugo & 
Wilfred Uwakwe 
Fed.High 
Court, 
Abuja.Justice 
Mohammed 
Garba Umar 
Arraigned on 14 
state counts. Plea 
taken Adjourned 
to Nov for trial. 
N145 
Million 
Suspects Remanded in 
Kuje Prison and later 
granted bail by court in 
2009 
 
38 
Dr (Mrs) Cecilia 
Ibru(Fmr CEO,Oceanic 
Bank PLC) 
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos. Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 25 
state counts. Plea 
taken and case  
adjourned to Nov 
for trial 
N160.2 
Billion 
Suspect remanded in 
EFCC custody, but 
granted bail on 14/9/09 
 
39 
Dr Bartholomew(Fmr 
CEO,Union Bank PLC) 
Bassey Ebong, Henry 
Onyemem & Niyi 
Albert  Opeodu(Ex-
Directors, UBN) 
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 28 
state counts. Plea 
taken and case 
adjourned to Nov 
for trial 
N187.1 
Billion 
Suspects remanded in 
EFCC custody,But 
granted bail on 14/9/09 
 
40 
Raymond Obieri,(Fmr 
Chairman,Intercontinent
al Bank PLC Hyacinth 
Enuha, Ikechi Kalu, C.A 
Alabi, Samuel Adegbite, 
Isyaku Umar, Sanni 
Adams. 
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 18 
state counts. Plea 
taken and case 
adjourned to Nov 
for trial 
N131.8 
Billion 
Suspects remanded in 
EFCC custody,But 
granted bail on 14/9/09 
 
41 
Sebastian Adigwe, Peter 
Ololo, Falcon Securities 
Ltd   
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 36 
state counts. Plea 
taken and case 
adjourned to Nov 
for trial 
N277.3 
Billion 
Suspects remanded in 
Prison custody,But 
granted bail on 15/9/09 
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42 
Okey Nwosu FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 11 
state counts. Plea 
taken and case 
adjourned to Nov 
for trial 
N95.1 
Billion 
Suspects remanded in 
Prison custody,But 
granted bail on 15/9/09 
 
43 
Alex Nkenchor, Ex-
Bank Manager, Ebi 
Odeigah & GMT 
Securities & Assets Nig 
Ltd 
Lagos High 
Court, Ikeja. 
Justice M.O 
Obadina 
Arraigned on 10 
state counts. Plea 
taken and suspects 
still remanded in 
prison custody 
pending 
consideration of 
bail application. 
N860 
Million 
Suspects remanded in 
ikoyi prison. Bail 
application for 
consideration Oct 20 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
CASE STUDY 1 
CHRIS NGIGE AND  CHRIS UBA SAGA 
A wealthy member of the powerful Uba political family, Chris Uba is an iconic example of 
the godfather phenomenon in Nigeria.521  Chris Uba, a member of the People Democratic Party 
Board of Trustees, was at the apex of his power during the 2003 Nigerian elections, when he 
sponsored People Democratic Party (PDP) candidates and rigged their election to office across 
Anambra State. After that election he publicly declared himself “the greatest godfather in Nigeria,” 
noting that “this is the first time an individual single-handedly put in position every politician in the 
state”.522 Among the politicians Chris Uba “sponsored” in 2003 was PDP Gubernatorial candidate 
Chris Ngige. The terms of their relationship were spelled out in remarkably explicit fashion in a 
written “contract” and “declaration of loyalty” that Ngige signed prior to the election.  
 Ngige promised in writing to “exercise and manifest absolute loyalty to the person of Chief 
Chris Uba as my mentor, benefactor and sponsor and agreed to allow Uba control over all important 
government appointments and the awarding of all government contracts”. The contract referred to 
Governor Ngige as the “Administrator” and to the unelected Uba as “Leader/Financier.” It also 
                                                          
521 Chris Uba’s brother Andy Uba  served as special advisor to President Obasanjo for nearly the entirety of the 
Obasanjo Administration and ran for Governor of Anambra State in 2007 his other brother Ugochukwu Uba was a 
senator representing Anambra South Senatorial District until losing in the PDP primaries in late 2006. 
522 Jibrin Ibrahim, The Rise of Nigeria’s Political Godfathers, BBC News (London), Nov. 10, 2003 available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3156540.stm 
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empowered Uba to “avenge himself in the way and manner adjudged by him as fitting and adequate” 
in case of any breach by Ngige that could not be settled through mediation.523 Relations between 
Ngige and Uba deteriorated rapidly. In July 2003 Governor Ngige was kidnapped by armed 
policemen and forced at gunpoint to sign a “letter of resignation.524  Ngige’s resignation was eagerly 
accepted by the State House of Assembly despite the circumstances under which it was obtained.  
Ngige successfully petitioned to have his resignation thrown out by the federal Courts and remained 
in office but quickly found himself under siege yet again.  
In 2004 thugs armed with firearms and crude explosives attacked Government House in 
Awka and burned part of it to the ground while policemen stood aside and watched.525 Other gangs 
then staged several attacks on other government buildings throughout the state.526 As many as twenty 
four  people were killed during the ensuing violent clashes and looting.527Ngige, like most of the 
Nigerian press and many civil society groups, alleged that Chris Uba was behind the attack. Chris 
Uba denied any involvement in the matter. The police’s failure to investigate who was behind the 
attack, and specifically Uba’s alleged involvement, stands as a stark example of the impunity he has 
consistently enjoyed.528 The Ngige-Uba saga came to an end in March 2006 when a Federal Court of 
Appeal ruled that Ngige’s 2003 election victory was fraudulent and therefore null and void. The 
result was Ngige’s replacement with his 2003 electoral opponent from the opposition All 
                                                          
523 Agreement "Among the Parties as Partners in the Project of Government of Anambra State and Nigeria," on file 
with Human Rights Watch. 
524 Governor Ngige missing, The Vanguard (Nigeria) July 11, 2003. 
525 Interview by Human Rights Watch with Chris Ngige, Bethesda, Maryland, (Jan. 18, 2007). Tensions high in 
Nigeria State, BBC 
 News Online (London), Nov. 12, 2004 available at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4006215.stm. 
526 Tony Edike, Awka: A City Where Anarchy Reigned” The Vanguard (Nigeria) Nov. 15, 2004.Vanguard 
newspaper reported at the time that Anambra “is now ruled by hoodlums who have taken over every nook and 
cranny of the state maiming, killing and attacking public buildings without any resistance by the retinue of 
policemen deployed to maintain law and order”.  
527 Id. 
528 Interview by Human Rights Watch with Chris Ngige, Bethesda, Maryland, Interview  by  Human Rights Watch  
with civil society activists and opposition politicians, Lagos, Abuja and Awka  (Feb. 2007). 
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Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), Peter Obi.Obi had produced massive evidence of electoral 
fraud and his installation as governor was widely hailed as a victory for democracy in Anambra.529 
 
 
 
                                                          
529 Bolade Ominjo, Obi Sworn in, Promises New Dawn in Anambra, The Vanguard (Nigeria) Mar. 18, 2006. 
530 Human Rights Watch interview with Governor Rashidi Ladoja, Ibadan, February 8, 2007. 
531 Id. 
532 Id.  
Case Study 2 
RASHIDA LADOJA AND LAMIDI ADEDIBU SAGA 
In 2005, Rashidi Ladoja, the governor of Oyo State, was enmeshed in an obstinate fight with 
his political benefactor and godfather, Lamidi Adedibu .  Chief Adedibu, an active member of the 
ruling party in Nigeria, People Democratic Party (P.D.P) decided that it was time to get rid of former 
governor, Lamidi Adesina, who was a member of another party called Alliance for Democracy 
(A.D) put his grassroots political machinery at the disposal of Ladoja, a political novice and  former 
Senator at that time. Ladoja was elected as governor of Oyo State in an election that was largely 
characterized by election rigging.530 Ladoja told Human Rights Watch that he fell out with Adedibu 
shortly after coming into office in 2003 because he refused to allow Adedibu access to the treasury-
he alleges that Adedibu ordered him to turn over twenty five percent of the government's security 
vote of about fifteen million Naira (One hundred and fifteen thousand dollars) per month directly to 
him.531 
He also disregard the proposed list of commissioners his godfather sent to him to appoint 
and without consulting Adedibu, Ladoja announced his commissioners, picking only one name out 
of Adedibu's list.532 Needless to say that Adedibu was irked by Ladoja's actions. Here was a man he 
helped elect into power disregarding his wishes. The battle lines were drawn and as usual, the 
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533 Human Rights Watch interview with Chief Lamidi Adedibu, Ibadan, February 7, 2007. 
indigenes of Oyo state bared the brunt of the whole crises. Lives were lost, resources of the state 
were wasted, civil time were expended on impeachment notices at the end of it all, the godfather 
won and Ladoja was send packing out of the government house. In an interview with Human Rights 
Watch, Adedibu described Ladoja as an "ingrate”.533 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
THE STATE OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA SURVEY 
 
 
 
Perception as to whether public officials are likely to request bribe 
 
• 91.4% said yes 
• 8.6% said no  
Perception as to how many times the respondent  has personally given bribe 
 
• 59.1% said 0 -5 times 
• 15.3% said 5 – 10 
• 12.2% said 10 – 20 
• 13.4% said 20 and over 
Perception as to how many times the respondent  has personally received bribe 
 
• 91.7% said 0 -5 times 
• 3.8% said 5 – 10 
• 2.4% said 10 – 20 
• 2.2% said 20 and over 
Perception as to what regime is most corrupt in Nigeria 
 
• 12.4% said military 
• 38.0% said democratic 
• 45.5% said both military and democratic 
• 4.1% said they did not know 
Perception as to which of these actions are corrupt actions 
 
• Bribe for securing contracts  76.2% agree,  21.4% disagree  2.4% did not know 
 
• Using personal networks in securing contracts 56.2% agree 35.7% disagree 8.1% did 
not know 
 
• An official favoring his/her relatives 69.1% agree 23.8% disagree 7.1% did not know 
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• An official accepting gifts 57.6% agree 30.1% disagree 12.4% did not know 
 
Perception as to whether respondent is likely/ unlikely or do not know whether they 
will bribe these groups of persons to get something you are entitled to. 
 
• Police officers 49.3% likely 44.8% unlikely 6.0% do not know 
• State officials 41.8% likely 51.1% unlikely 7.1% do not know 
• Local government Officials 41.4% likely 52.2% unlikely 6.3% do not know 
• Custom Officers 49.8% likely 43.0% unlikely 7.2% do not know 
• Members of the legislature 26.8% likely 62.8% unlikely 10.4% do not know 
• Members of the Executive branch 29.1% likely 60.1% unlikely 10.8% do not know 
• Members of the judicial 19.7% likely 70.1% unlikely 10.2% do not know 
• Teachers/ professors 22.4% likely 70.9% unlikely 6.7% do not know 
• Court officials 27.3% likely 63.2% unlikely 9.5% do not know 
 
Perception as to what the appropriate punishment for public officers who uses his/her 
public office position for private gains and enriches them self should be. 
• Lose their jobs and go to prison 62.6%  
• Lose their jobs and have to pay a fine 17.5%  
• Lose their jobs only 1.8%  
• It depends on the seriousness of the corruption 15.4%  
• There should be no penalty for this 0.9%  
• I do not know 1.6%  
• I do not care 0.2% 
 
Survey methodology 
 
? Nigerian’s urban population was determined to be forty eight percent of the total 
population of one hundred and forty million which translated to be sixty seven million 
two hundred534. 
                                                          
534 http://globalis.gru.unu.edu 
 213 
 
? Sample size is one thousand and thirty seven535 individuals, under twenty four – over 
sixty  years, eight hundred and eighty one males, three hundred and forty four females 
? Online survey was created at www. surveymonkey.com  
? The margin of error accepted was four percent536 at ninety nine percent confidence 
level537 
? Response distribution was fifty percent538 
? Survey was conducted October 17th  – December 18th, 2009 
  
                                                          
535 This is the minimum recommended size of your survey. If you create a sample of this many people and get 
responses from everyone, you are more likely to get a correct answer that you would from a large sample where only 
a small percentage of the sample responds to your survey. 
536 The margin of error is the amount of error that you can tolerate. If 90% of respondents answer yes, while 10% 
answer no, you may be able to tolerate a larger amount of error than if the respondents are split 50 – 50 or 45 – 55. 
Lower margin of error requires a larger sample size available at  http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html  
537 The confidence level is the amount of uncertainty tolerated. Suppose there are 20 yes-no questions in the survey, 
with a confidence level of 95%, one would expect that for one of the questions  (1 in 20), the percentage of people 
who answer yes would be more that the margin of error away from the true answer. The true answer is the 
percentage one would get if one exhaustively interview everyone. 
538 For each question, what does one expect the result will be? If the sample is skewed highly one way or the other, 
the population probably is, too.  
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